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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON FISCAL ILLUSION 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for Ihe degree 
of Doctor qf Philosophy, May, 1998 
Abuzer Pinar 
The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between taxation ani 
public spending in the UK, utilising public choice theories that the level 0 
government spending should reflect voter-taxpayer's demand for public goodý 
Such theories argue that certain features of the tax structure affect voter' 
perceptions of their tax burden so that they underestimate how much they ar 
paying for public goods. Fiscal illusion is investigated as a key issue in a time 
series analysis of general government expenditures, and a cross-section analysi 
of local government spending. Also survey data from British Social Attitudes i 
employed to analyse the relationship between tax perceptions and preferences fo 
public spending. 
The time-series results show quite consistent evidence that low visibility of taxe 
and deficit financing are associated with increased levels of spending, but fo 
various reasons measures of tax elasticity and complexity performed less well 
Closer examination suggests that deficit financing is less an illusory plan to hid, 
expenditure increases from voters and more a short-term necessity when shock 
cause (trends in) spending and revenue to diverge. The cross-section result 
suggest fairly strong support for the "flypaper effect" that central governmen 
grants increase spending by more than would an equivalent increase in loca 
income. Measures of local accountability appeared to have similar effects, whill 
evidence on renter illusion suggests different outcomes in the two alternative tX, 
regimes (community charge and council tax). Evidence from the micro-dat; 
analysis suggests some forms of fiscal illusion, though the influence of ta'. 
misperceptions on the demand for public spending is ambiguous. 
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the tendency to use invisible taxes ti 
support increased spending, however, the use of this evidence, per se, may b, 
misleading in drawing future prospects for tax and expenditure policies. Micro 
data analysis of fiscal perceptions offers a potentially important means o 
determining policy instruments. Moreover, if governi-nents aim at increasing loca 
accountability, inter-governmental fiscal relations should be reconsidered. 
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
There has long been observed a tendency for the public sector to grow faster 
than the economy as a whole in many countries. More than a century ago, 
Wagner asserted that this tendency was inevitable. With the increasing 
availability of time series data, many writers have tested Wagner's Law. 
narrowly defined as asserting that the income elasticity of demand for 
government output is greater than unity; there is little empirical support for this 
strict definition (Diamond, 1989; Gemmell, 1990a, 1993). Other explanations 
for public sector growth contend that this tendency is not inevitable. Peacock 
and Wiseman (1961) argued that external shocks, such as wars. caused sudden 
increases in public spending which did not revert back to its pre-shock level 
once the shock had passed; during 'non-shock' periods there was no necessary 
tendency for public sector share of national income to increase, rather it tended 
to hover around its existing share. 
Alternative approaches have been developed within the public choice theory. 
Such theories emphasize particularly the importance of political process and 
other institutions, such as bureaucracy. A distinction is made between the 
demand and supply sides of public goods, which are produced by governments, 
the volume being an outcome of the political decision making process based on 
the interactions between voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. It has been argued 
that the level of government spending should reflect voter-taxpayer's demand 
for public goods (Downs. 1957-, Buchanan, 1960), however, the suppliers of 
public goods (politicians, bureaucrats etc. ) may have their own agenda, -ýN-hich 
1 11 1 1) ý. Ituplur i Introduclion 
may not necessarily follow voter-taxpayers' demand (Niskanen, 1971). It has 
also been argued that certain features of the tax structure (perhaps imposed by 
self-interested agenda setters) may distort voters' tax perceptions (fiscal 
illusion), since explicit (market) prices for publicly-provided goods do not 
exist, and voter-taxpayers make choices based on perceptions (Buchanan, 
1960). Under these conditions, actual government output will not be at the 
optimum level; this questions the precision of the democratic process with 
respect to the provision of government-provided goods. 
The key concept of fiscal illusion is based on the seminal study of Puviani 
(1903), and refers to systematically biased perceptions of costs and benefits of 
goverm-nent activity. Assessments of the benefits of the publicly-provided 
goods are argued to be 'Intrinsically subjective and highly personal' (Goetz, 
1977: 177), and hence the empirical studies have been devoted almost 
exclusively to the revenue side of government activity. It is hypothesised by 
public choice scholars that complex tax structures induce underestimation of 
the tax-prices of publicly-provided goods, and therefore lead voter-taxpayers to 
favour relatively higher levels of public spending. Proposed sources of fiscal 
illusion are: revenue complexity (and the degree of visibility of taxes); tax 
elasticity; and the extent of deficit finance. Two other forms of fiscal illusion 
are the flypaper effect and renter illusion, both with particular relevance to 
local goverm-nent finance. 
The Herfindahl index (the sum of squares of revenue shares) was used to 
measure the complexity of tax structure in the seminal study of Wagner (1976). 
This index has been criticised that it treats various taxes as the same, while 
ion 
those taxes may not be equally visible. Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) 
found that the impact of complexity was even higher xN, -hen the taxes were 
weighted for the degree of visibility, and the share of 'less visible' mxcs have 
also been used as a proxy for the invisibility hypothesis. The inclusion of tax 
elasticity as a determinant of public expenditure derives from Oates (1975) 
who found a positive and significant relationship between the share of personal 
income taxes (a proxy for tax system elasticity) and general government 
expenditures. Early empirical studies of debt illusion were based on cross- 
section analysis of US data, and the results were ambiguous. A more direct test 
was pioneered by Niskanen (1978) in a time-series analysis of the effect of 
budget deficits on government expenditures. The measures of fiscal illusion in 
local government level have been more straightforward, per capita central 
grants and the percentage of local residents who live in rented accommodation 
have been used to proxy the 'flypaper effect' and renter illusion, respectively. 
1.2 THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 
For the purpose of this study, we provide a short survey of the British tax 
system. The concerns here are the main categories of government revenues (i. e. 
personal income tax, corporate tax, social security contributions,, and 
expenditure tax), and the sources of local government finance (i. e. local tax and 
central grants). I The income tax structure of the UK operates via a system of 
allowances and bands. All individuals are entitled to a personal allowance 
which is deducted from total income before tax to derive taxable income. 
Additional allowances are available to those over 65, to married couples. and in 
I We refer to Meade (1978) for m ore details of direct taxation, and to Kay and King (1990) for 
the whole tax system. Dilnot and Stears (1997) also provide a useful surve-% of British tax 
system, including recent reform. 
1ý- 
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some other cases. Taxable income is subject to different tax rates depending on 
the tax band that income falls. Currently, low income earners pay a lower rate 
of 20%, compared to the basic rate of 24%; a higher rate of 40% is payable on 
additional income above the basic rate limit. 
Social Security Contributions (SSC)- previously known as National Insurance 
Contributions (introduced in 1948) are the other major tax on personal income. 
This is the only pay-roll tax in the UK, and entitles individuals to receipt of 
certain social security benefit. SSCs were originally introduced as a flat-rate 
tax, payable by all those in work and by their employers. As social security 
expenditure grew, the flat-rate contribution needed to finance the scheme 
became an increasingly large proportion of earnings. This brought a heavy 
burden on the low paid and, in 1961, earnings-related contributions were 
introduced. The share of earnings-related contributions has increased steadily 
and, since 1975,, SSCs have been wholly earnings-related. 
Corporate tax is charged on profits made by UK resident companies, public 
corporations and unincorporated associations, and it is a relatively modern 
development (introduced in 1947). Before the Second World War, it was 
integrated with the personal income tax, and special taxes on profits were used 
only as wartime measures to raise extra revenue. When the War ended, the 
system was rationalised by increasing the rate of profits tax and exempting 
individuals and partnerships from this additional tax. The system of corporate 
tax has subsequently changed at regular intervals. The standard rate of 
corporation tax is currently 33%, although there is a reduced rate for small 
companies. 
mo C napr Iniroduction 
Indirect taxes are the other mzkjor source of government revenue. The structure 
of commodity taxes in the UK is characterised by one general sales tax (value 
added tax 
- 
VAT), and heavy duties on three products, tobacco, alcoholic 
drinks and petrol. VAT replaced the purchase tax (a single-stage wholesale 
sales tax) in the early 1970s. The basic principle of VAT is that it is a sales tax 
chargeable to the sellers of all output, and firms are allowed to deduct any VAT 
that has been levied on inputs into their products. The main advantage of VAT 
is that it is a method of levying a tax on all commodities that enter 
consumption while effectively exempting all intermediate goods (those who 
buy goods for further processing receive a refund of the tax that they have been 
charged, and only those who are the final consumers of the goods actually pay 
tax). The standard rate of VAT in the UK is 17.5%, although a lower rate of 
8% is applied to domestic fuel. Various categories of goods are either zero- 
rated or exempt. Around the world, VAT has been more and more widely 
introduced and the proportion of revenue obtained from it has tended to 
increase in recent years. 
The local authorities in Britain have traditionally financed their expenditure by 
levying taxes on the property within their area of jurisdiction, and by additional 
grants from the central government. A distinguishing feature of British local 
government finance over the past ten years or so has been the series of major 
changes to the form of local tax. A domestic property tax was replaced in April 
1990 by an essentially flat rate Poll Tax (the Community Charge) which in turn 
was replaced by a mildly progressive tax based on property value bands (the 
Council Tax). Central grants were initially mainly related to spill-overs 
("hapler-T7n-troducl ion 
(services which benefited the population at large instead of. or as well as, the 
residents of a particular locality). Subsequently, fiscal imbalance became a 
more important element in government grants, tax collection has become more 
centralised than exPenditure decisions. ) and the grants have been used to offset 
these local differences. As a consequence, decision making at the local level is 
highly influenced by the system of central grants (we relate these to fiscal 
illusion theories below). 
1.3 AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The importance of taxation, as a major policy tool of governments, cannot be 
questioned. However, the issues of measuring the voter-taxpayers' perceptions 
and reflecting their preferences in public policy remain debatable. This thesis 
will be concerned with fiscal illusion and the demand for general and local 
public spending in the UK. We observe that general government expenditure 
tended to rise steadily in the post-second World War period, and despite a 
marked reduction in the expenditure/GDP ratio in the Thatcher era, this trend 
has continued in the 1990s (see Figure 1.1). The entire period of 1955-94 can 
be characterised by quite volatile budget deficits. Revenue tended to keep pace 
with spending until the late 1960s (running ahead in 1968-71), a deficit 
emerged following the oil crisis, which peaked in 1974, was reduced 
significantly in the early 1980s, re-emerged, was eliminated in 1987-88 and re- 
emerged again. Revenue and expenditure tracked fairly closely over 1955-72; 
although a deficit wedge was inserted, revenue and expenditure still tended to 
track over 1973-1989, however, since 1990, the two have diverged, with 
revenue falling while spending rose, implying a steadily increasing deficit. 
--r7777 
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Figure 1.1 Government Expenditures and Revenues in the UK, 1955-94 
(as a proportion of GDP) 
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The elements of fiscal illusion which we focus on may offer insights into these 
trends in at least two ways. First, government can avail itself of fiscal illusion 
to increase spending, either by allowing the deficit to increase or by use of an 
appropriate tax structure, such as more reliance on less visible taxes. Second, 
faced with a sudden need to increase spending (e. g. a Peacock-Wiseman 
effect), governments may have recourse to fiscal illusion to disguise from 
voters the need to finance the increase. Thus, an increased deficit is an obvious 
response to an external shock which immediately increases the demand for 
spending (while it is difficult to adjust tax revenue quickly, and may be 
politically difficult to cut spending). One fiscal illusion hypothesis would be 
that over time, to maintain spending and reduce the deficit (because of its 
OD "; t rý- CD CO (0 (D c\I LO Co le LO QO (D (D P- r, 
-- 
rý- P- 00 00 OD 0) (3) G) CY) C) 0) Cy) CT) 0-) C» cn cn cn 
Chapter I Introduction 
macroeconomic effects), the tax structure will evolve in an 
supporting , manner. 
Regarding the British local government finance, although the introduction of 
the Poll Tax was presented as a measure to reduce fiscal illusion and thereby 
increase local accountability, Cullis et al (1991) argued that if median voters 
have imperfect Imowledge of how grants and local taxes interact. public 
perceptions of the Poll Tax would even induce increased fiscal illusion. We test 
for fiscal illusion evidence under both the community charge and council tax 
regimes. 
It should be noted that aggregated data offers only a crude means of testing 
fiscal illusion, and direct testing is best achieved by using survey evidence to 
assess which misperceptions prevail, and how those misperceptions influence 
the demand for public spending. We utillse a recent British Social Attitudes 
Survey (1995) to do this. 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
The outline of the thesis is as follows. A brief literature survey of public sector 
growth and fiscal illusion is provided in Chapter 2 focusing on structural and 
public choice approaches. The former set of explanations is essentially based 
on the economic and social structure of societies, and includes the long- 
standing Wagner's Law and Musgrave's hypotheses, the relative price effect 
and Baumol Hypothesis, and the Peacock-Wiseman Hypothesis, the latter set is 
associated with the decision-making process in the public sector. and includes 
more recent theories of distributive politics, bureaucracy, pressure groups, and 
Chapter I Introduction 9 
fiscal illusion. Most of those hypotheses concerning the demand for 
government-provided goods are tested in the subsequent chapters. 
In Chapter 33, we adopt a public choice approach. incorporatin, (,,, fiscal illusion, 
to explain trends in public expenditure in the UK for the period of 1955-94. 
The incorporated fiscal illusion variables are the complexity and elasticity of 
the British tax system, the relative visibility of various revenue categories, and 
deficit finance. It should be noted that the measures of these variables closely 
interact, and therefore, we use cointegration techniques to test the relative 
significance of each variable. The results obtained are consistent with 
comparable studies of public expenditure. We find quite consistent evidence 
that invisible taxes and deficit financing were associated with increased levels 
of spending, but other measures of fiscal illusion perform less well. 
In Chapter 4, a similar approach is applied to local government spending iii the 
UK, using data for two fiscal years, 1991/92 and 199-33/94, reflecting two very 
different local tax regimes 
-a community charge (poll tax) in 1991/92 and a 
property tax (council tax) in 1993/94. An important distinction between the two 
is that the former was levied on individuals at a flat rate payable by almost all 
adults,, while the latter was levied on households using different tax rates. We 
incorporate measures of the flypaper effect (per capita grants), accountability 
(the ratio of local non-taxpaying voters to local tax-payers), and renter illusion 
(the ratio of households in rented accommodation to local households) to a 
public choice model of demand for publicly-provided goods. Measures of fiscal 
illusion appear to have similar effects under both the community charge and 
Chapter I Introduciion 10 
council tax regimes, though the one for renter illusion produces different 
outcomes. 
In Chapter 5, we use the BSAS-1995 to test some of the fiscal illusion 
hypotheses. An interesting feature of this chapter is the attempt to compare the 
survey responses with the respondents' 'actual' situation. Some forms of fiscal 
illusion 
- 
in the sense that tax-payers appear to be inconsistent in their 
responses regarding tax perceptions 
- 
find support, and this inconsistency 
occurs most frequently for VAT. We also use some microeconometric 
techniques (the probit and the ordered probit models) to model attitudes to 
taxation and public spending. We find some interesting results regarding tax 
preferences and perceptions, while the influence of tax perceptions on the 
demand for public spending is ambiguous. 
Finally, the main findings of the thesis are summarised, and some conclusions 
are drawn in Chapter 6. Despite the consistency of the results obtained in the 
time-series and cross-section analyses with comparable studies of public 
spending, our attempt to analyse fiscal illusion in a more complete 
specification is forced by the aggregated nature of data to use crude measures 
of fiscal illusion. The micro-data analysis provides more direct evidence for 
fiscal illusion. 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Variety of theories have been proposed to explain the long-standing tendency 
of public sector growth. A set of theories based on Wagner's Law are variants 
of the argument that the income elasticity of demand for government output is 
greater than unity. Alternative theories argue that shocks cause sudden 
increases in the size of governments, which never falls back to the previous 
level. Another explanation for growth of government is the relative price effect 
that prices of public sector goods rise relative to private goods. 
Alternative approaches have been developed within public choice theory, 
assuming that the level of government spending should reflect voter-taxpayer's 
demand for public goods. On the other hand, the supply side of governinent 
(politics, bureaucracy etc. ) has been argued to have its own agenda, which may 
not necessarily follow voter-taxpayers' demand. It has also been argued that 
certain features of tax structure may distort voters' tax perceptions, and 
government agents may behave with self-interest: both cases may produce an 
actual government output which differs from the optimum level. 
These theories are reviewed in this chapter. Section 2.2 summarises structural 
and public choice approaches to government growth; Section 2.3 reviews the 
studies of fiscal illusion and public spending; and finally some conclusions are 
drawn in Section 2.4. 
Chapter 2 Literature Survey I -) 
2.2 THE GROWTH OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR: AN OVERVIEW 
This section overviews the theories of public sector growth under two sets of 
explanations: structural approaches and public choice approaches. The former 
set of explanations is essentially based on the economic and social structure of 
societies, and includes the long-standing Wagner's Law and Musgrave's 
hypotheses, the relative price effect and Baumol Hypothesis, and the Peacock- 
Wiseman Hypothesis; the latter set is associated with the decision-making 
process in the public sector, and includes more recent theories of bureaucracy, 
pressure groups, and fiscal illusion. 
2.2.1 STRUCTURAL APPROACHES 
The early attempts to explain the tendency of the public sector to orow faster 
than the economy, particularly in western industrialising countries, are 
essentially based on the economic and social structure of societies. Increasing 
national income, and changes in the composition of social and economic 
structure are regarded as causal factors for the growth of the public sector. 
Wagner's Law and Musgrave's Hypotheses 
One of the first attempts to explain the relative growth of public sectors in 
industrialising countries was by German Economist Adolf Wagner (1883), 
which was introduced to the English-speaking world at the end of the 1950s. 
2 
This tendency, termed by Wagner the 'law of increasing expansion of public, 
and particularly state, activities', and subsequently Imown as 'Wagner's Law. 
is noted in the original text as follows: 
I For useful surveys of government growth, see Borcherding (1977a) and Mueller (1987). 
A translation of Wagner's work can be found in Musgrave and Peacock (1958). 
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... 
in considering the absolute and relative level of expenditure for any public service... 
The following may be taken as a rule: State expenditure may be higher, in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of national income, in proportion as the immediate economic 
value (taken in the widest sense) of a public service is greater, its contribution to 
general productivity is greater as well as the 'free' national incorne (i. e. 
-fliat part of 
national incorne which is left after the satisfaction of the people's essential inaterial 
needs), and finally, in proportion as the part of State revenue derived frorn sources other 
than taxation, i. e. from the State's business activities, is larger (Wagner, 1883: 7). 
It is clear that Wagner pointed to the growing importance of government 
activity and expenditure as an inevitable feature of a 'progressive' state. Bird 
(1971) summarised three reasons why this development will take place: One 
reason is that the administrative and protective functions of the state would 
emerge as new requirements in industrialised societies; a second reason is that 
a considerable relative expansion of 'cultural and welfare' expenditures, 
especially with respect to education and income distribution, would take place; 
finally, the inevitable changes in technology and the increasing scale of 
investment would create large private monopolies which would have to be 
either regulated or taken over by the state in the interests of economic 
efficiency. All these developments would have to be financed by the state, and 
hence would require more economic sources to be diverted to the public sector. 
In fact, the emergence of private monopolies and externalities have often 
formed an important base for government intervention: governments either 
took over or regulated monopolies, and both cases created extra fiscal 
requirements. Urbanisation and population density emerged as other 
considerable problems of industrial societies. Since the seminal work of 
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Samuelson (1954), the scale economies of publicly provided goods has been an 
important argument for government expenditures. 
A number of subsequent writers introduced more detailed hypotheses of public 
sector growth based oi-i Wagner's Law. Musgrave (1969) is one of the best- 
Imown, whose work is referred as 'Musgrave's hypotheses' (see Gemmell, 
1993: 106). An important characteristic of Musgrave's work is that government 
expenditures are disaggregated into consumption, investment and transfers. and 
these are considered to change at different stages of economic progress. 
According to Musgrave, public investment is likely to form a large share of 
total investment at early stages of development but fall thereafter, however, it is 
not clear whether the increasing or decreasing tendencies of public investment 
are permanent. On government consumption, Musgrave argues that demand for 
'secondary needs' will increase in later stages of development, increasing 
private goods consumption will need complementary public goods, and state 
regulatory activities will be required for the growing complexity of an 
economy. Musgrave also argued that redistributional oýjectives motivate 
transfers, and whether public transfers will rise or fall depends on society's 
concern with equality, and changing social, cultural, and political factors 
(Gemmell, 1993: 106-8). 
Unlike Wagner, Musgrave is too cautious to impose a 'law', and regards the 
theory of expenditure growth as an elusive problem: 
Even if economic factors only are considered, it is difficult to arrive at an expenditure 
law. Inferior goods are the exception in the public as well as in the private sphere, so I 
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that there is every reason to expect a positive association between levels of public 
outlay and per capita income. But matters are far fi-orn obvious once the ratio of 
expenditure to GNP is considered (Musgrave, 1969: 122). 
Wagner's Law has been subject to various debates in terms of interpretation 
and testing. Per capita income is almost universally accepted as a measure of 
social progress, and government expenditures (and particular expenditure 
categories) are used to measure government size, but the empirical testing of 
Wagner's Law remains controversial. Gemmell (1993: 109-10) pointed out 
three interpretations of Wagner's Law in empirical testing: 
1. narrow/abso lute: government goods are 'nori-nal' (have a positive income elasticity of 
demand), causing an absolute rise in government expenditure as per capita Income rises. 
2. narrow/relative: government goods are 'superior' (have an Income elastic of demand 
greater than unity), causing the ratio of government expenditure to national income to I-- z: 1 
rise as per capita income rises. 
3. wide/relative: an increase in per capita income will be a. ysociated with a rise in the 
ratio of government expenditure to national income. 
Tests of the first interpretation have generally found support, confirming that 
the income elasticities of government-provided goods are positive: tests of the 
second interpretation have produced mixed results, while tests of the third have 
found strong support (see Gemmell, 199-3): 115-18). 
The Relative Price Effect and Baumol Hypothesis 
One explanation for increasing government expenditures is associated with the 
relative prices of public and private sectors. Despite the regular and persistent 
rise in the 'relative price of government', the term 'relative price' represents a 
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measure of public sector input prices relative to output prices iii the economy 
as a whole, because public goods are non-marketed where prices (and 
sometimes output) cannot be observed directly. This type of definition implies 
that the ratio of public expenditures to GDP in nominal terms will tend to rise 
over time without an analogous increase in the real size of the public sector. 
A possible explanation for the faster increase in the unit cost of government 
outputs is offered by Baurnol (1967), who hypothesised that productivity rises 
in public sector are likely to be smaller compared to those in private sector, 
because governments mainly provide services which are labour intensive. 
Gernmell (1987: 264) also noted that 'the relative growth in public or non- 
market sectors appears to result primarily from rising relative costs'. Another 
explanation is the rigid nature of government expenditure commitments. 
Assuming that public sector prices are accurately measured, the price effect can 
still be in two opposite directions: there will be less demand for public goods at 
higher prices (price elasticity of demand); and public expenditures will increase 
due to higher production costs (supply effect). The net effect depends on 
whether public sector prices can explicitly be determined, and how far voters 
can observe and react to them (see below). 
Although 
, 
it has been argued that military services have become fairly capital- 
intensive in recent years, while computers and other innovations have enhanced 
productivity in services, it is still not clear that productivity in public services 
(such as education and police protection) will keep pace with that in the private 
sector. Testing of productivity in public sector is also a troublesome issue, 
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though some indirect evidence suggests that public sector productIN"Ity lags 
behind private sector productivity (Mueller, 1987). 
Pornmereline and Schneider (1982) found some indirect evidence for the 
relative price effects, and Borcherding (1985), evaluating previous findings, 
noted some positive net effects of relative prices for US data. Gernmell 
(I 990a), using some cross-country data, found that 'relative price changes do 
affect the real size of the government sector, though the mechanisms by which 
this occurs may differ' (p. 376). A relative price variable was used by some 
other scholars in recent empirical studies (see, for instance, Diamond, 1989; 
Tridimas, 1992; Ashworth, 1995), however, any direct evidence of productivity 
lags in the public sector has not been found. 
The Peacock- Wiseman Hypothesis 
Another contribution to explanations of government growth was by Peacock 
and Wiseman (196 1) who argue that shocks cause sudden increases in the size 
of governments, which never falls back to the previous level. They noted, in 
their well-Imown study of the growth of public expenditure in the UK, that 
People will accept, in a period of crisis, tax levels and methods of raising revenue that 
in quieter times they would have thought intolerable, and this acceptance rernains when 
the disturbance itself has disappeared (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961: 27). 
In fact, citizens , resistance to high tax burdens was also mentioned in Wagner's 
work (see Gemmell, 1993: 105). However, Peacock and Wiseman introduce 
the important notion of 'suppliers' into the public expenditure determination 
process (Henrekson, 1993: 54; Rowley and Tollison, 1994: 125). They derived 
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the key concept of a 'tolerable tax burden' relying on the political propositions 
that governments desire to spend more (for political profit; ie. votes), while 
citizens do not like to pay more taxes: 
In 'noriTial' times, the existence of a custornary notion of 'tolerable burden' is likely to 
constrain the rate of implementation of government expenditure plans. But this 
constraint will be weakened or destroyed during periods of social upheaval, when such 
notions of taxation are more easily broken down, and the gap between a 'desirable' 
growth of public expenditures and a 'tolerable' tax burden may be narrowed (Peacock 
and Wiseman, 1961: vill). 
Two notions have been derived from the analysis of Peacock and Wiseman: 
One is the 'displacement effect' which argues that in periods of social 
upheaval, such as wars, some on-going government spending (related to normal 
times) are displaced upwards by war-related spending. Government 
expenditure does not fall to its original level, following the crisis period, 
because a war, for instance, is not fully financed by taxation due to limited 
taxable capacity. Therefore, nations have to repay debts and related charges 
after the event. The other is the 'inspection effect' which points to the 
previously unidentified government spending brought into focus by crisis. This 
arises from 'citizens' keener awareness of social problems' during the period of 
crisis, which allows governments to expand their scope of services to improve 
those social conditions (Brown and Jackson, 1990: 124). 
Peacock and Wiseman originally derived this hypothesis from an evaluation of 
UK public expenditure data. Despite many references to the hypothesis, its 
interpretation and testing have always been debatable. Henrekson (1993) 
derived the following testable versions of the hypothesis: 
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the strong version: real absolute government expenditure per capita evolves in a 
steplike pattern, where the movement from one step to another coincides with major 
social disturbances, such as wars; 
... 
the semi-strong version: government expenditure as 
a share of national income evolves in this sarne fashion. 
... 
the iveak i, crsion: the ratio of 
government expenditures to GDP follows an upward-sloping trend in normal times, and 
this trend is shifted permanently upward following a social upheaval. 
... 
the cilnorphous 
vcrsion: the values of the parameters of the relevant model explaining the development 
of government expenditures will change following a social upheaval (pp. 56-7). 
One of the early attempts to test the Peacock-Wiseman Hypothesis was by 
Gupta (1967), who used intercept and slope dummies in a simple public 
expenditure-GNP (both in per capita terms) specification, and found significant 
displacements after the world wars in most countries, and after the Great 
Depression in the case of US and Canada. On the other hand, Bonin et al. 
(1969), who follow a similar method to Gupta's, found mixed results for the 
UK, because the results were sensitive to data definitions. Rowley and Tollison 
(1994) suggested the cold war period of 1946-89, and argued that US data 
strongly supported the Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis as reductions in defense 
expenditure were systematically diverted into transfer programs, while 
Holcombe (1993), examining federal government spending in the US since 
1800, found no support for the permanent increase in public spending. 
More systematic methods have been suggested in recent years to test the time 
pattern of economic variables. Henrekson (1993) argued that previous 
empirical studies suffer from methodological shortcomings, and suggested that 
the most straightforward way to model the time pattern of public expenditures 
growth is by means of an ARIMA (Autoregressive-Inte. (irated-Moving 
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Average) model. This requires an appropriate data set, which is available only 
to analyse the Second World War as an upheaval. The model around a 
deterministic trend was identified for the log of real total governinent 
expenditure per capita and total nominal government expenditures as a share of 
nominal GDP for the post-war period, 1947-87. The deterministic trend was 
included to account for the long-run growth, whereas the ARIMA components 
was included to capture the deviation of the series from their trend value. The 
results by Henrekson disproved any upward displacement, and instead a 
permanent downward shift in government spending was found after the Second 
World War for the UK and Sweden. Overall., the results vary according to the 
interpretations of the hypothesis, the data set, and the applied methods. 
2.2.2 PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACHES 
The explanations of government growth summarised earlier are essentially 
based on the organic view of state which argues that govermnent exists to 
provide public goods and eliminate externalities, except the Peacock-Wiseman 
Hypothesis which acknowledges some political elements. It has been argued by 
recent public choice analysts that this is essentially a normative definition of 
government, and in reality, government does not always do what they ought to 
do. So, the question should be what government actually does. The traditional 
approach of organic state is rather a proposition to the initial creation of the 
state. However, problems arise when the state goes beyond its initial purpose, 
and the tools of analysis also have to be modified. 
In fact,, the theories previously explained are also positive, however. they are 
based on different assumptions: It is assumed in standard (normative) theories 
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of public finance that the state is a single decision-making, unit acting for 
society as a whole, and government's objective is to maximise social welfare. 
Since the 1950s, studies of the decision making process accelerated and 'public 
choice theory' emerged as a systematic approach to the economics of the 
political processes by the pioneering studies of Buchanan. Buchanan (1960) 
argued that governmental decisions have also some endogenous elements as 
private economic decisions, and analysis of public economy will be 
unsatisfactory unless examined in a collective decision making framework. 
Public goods are produced by governments the level of which is an outcome of 
the political process in a typical representative democracy. Thus, the level of 
public goods is an outcome of the political decision making process based on 
the interactions between voters (and groups of voters; ie. pressure groups), 
politicians, and bureaucrats. In this framework, governments are ruled by 
individuals (ie. politicians, bureaucrats, etc. ) who are not necessarily 
benevolent, and whose self-interest is no less important than any other 
individual. 
The Median Voter Hypothesis 
Public Choice theory, as a new stream of political economy, departs from the 
assumption that social welfare is maximised by governments, and sticks by the 
standard assumption of individual utility maximisation in economics. The 
question whether individual preferences can be aggregated, posed by Arrow 
(1951), received a positive answer from public choice theorists: in a majority 
decision model for which preferences are single-peak-ed it is the median voter's 
preferences that produce the minimum welfare loss for the whole group. This is 
demonstrated by Black (1958) for committee type majority rule decisions, by 
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Bowen (1943) in a referendum setting, and by Do\viis (1957) under a 
representative democracy. The Downsian model is the one which this stud), 
will concentrate on. 
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Figure 2.1 The decisive role of the median voter 
Figure 2.1 illustrates how the median voter, who is in the centre of the voters' 
range of preferences, converts a minority to a majority under simple majority 
rule. Following Frey (1978), let three voters (A, B, Q constitute the whole 
population, and one good (G) is produced/supplied by the government (the 
analysis may be extended to any number of voters and goods without altering 
the basic result). The three voters must agree on a joint volume of 
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consumption, and this is determined by simple majority vote. Each voter has a 
different evaluation of G. The curves of marginal willingness to pay (MWP) 
and net benefit (NB) are shown at the top and in the bottom parts of Figure 21 A- 
respectively. Voter A has little interest in the consumption of G and 
correspondingly has a low MWP for all quantities. Voters B and C are assumed 
to have a medium and a high MWP resPectively. 
The total production cost of G must be covered by corresponding tax receipts. 
In contrast to private goods, each consumer (voter) pays a different tax-price 
(unless a lump-sum tax is introduced) for an amount of G determined by a 
simple majority, and the sum of tax-prices of consumer-voters (P,, A, P-B- P-C) 
I 
must thus be equal to the marginal production cost of G. ' As shown in the 
upper half of the Figure 2.1, the individual optima of the three voters (OA, OB, 
OC) are determined by the equality of MWP and marginal tax-prices. Voter A 
experiences a positive net marginal utility up to quantity GA and beyond that 
point a negative net marginal utility, and so on. 
A step-wise procedure is used to reach a collective decision about the amount 
of G. Start from Gc: GA is supported by voter A only while B and C have a 
higher net utility with a larger amount of G. The same happens to all motions 
proposing an amount below Gc because in each case the first voter Is in the 
minority. All motions proposing an amount beyond Gc will be supported by 
voter B but rejected by the majority. For voters A and C an amount larger than 
G,. means a loss of net utility in comparison with amount GC,. The proposition 
This assumption is relaxed in practice when the voters' exact tax-prices cannot be identified. 
We do this in the time-series analysis of government expenditures in Chapter I t) 
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to produce Gc is the only one to reach a majority. Voter C Is In this case the 
median voter because his optimal demand for G is in the centre (median) of all 
voters in cated by Gm in the figure). Thus. the median voter is the marginal 
voter who establishes a majority. 
This outcome is possible under the assumptions of a single dimensional vector 
of public goods and single-peaked voters' preferences in that one dimension. 
Single-peakedness refers to a homogeneous preference ordering where the 
paradox of voting does not occur. It should be noted that preference orderings 
such as these can lead to cycles. If voters A and B are not satisfied with the 
outcome of the election in so far as they are not at their individual optimum 
given the tax-prices, they will make an effort to change tax-prices, and will be 
successful if this decision also is taken by simple majority rule (For more 
discussion of majority rule and multidimensional issues, and a proof of the 
median voter hypothesis under multidimensional case, see Mueller, 1989: 67- 
74). 
The median voter model was heavily criticised by Niskanen (1971), who 
analyses the role of bureaucracy in a representative government; and Romer 
and Rosenthal (1978) who argued that a budget maximising agenda setter can 
manipulate the alternatives in such a manner as to produce an outcome larger 
than would be most preferred by the median voter. The median voter 
hypothesis refers to the demand side of the provision of public goods, while 
studies of vote maximising politicians and budget maximising bureaucrats 
explain the supply side. Indeed, under the light of these discussions, the 
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distinction of supply and demand sides has been introduced to public choice 
models of public goods in recent studies. 
A distinct characteristic of public choice theory is the emphasis on political 
process. However, this does not necessarily deny the role of economic and 
social structure of societies. It rather analyses their impact through political 
process, investigating how the changes in socio-economic settings affect the 
agents' (voters, politicians etc. ) behaviour in the political process. In this 
section, the demand and supply side explanations of government size will be 
surnmarised. The relevant theories are income distribution, pressure groups, 
bureaucracy, and fiscal illusion. 
Income Distribution 
This group of studies was pioneered by the rational theory (? I'the size qf 
government, which argues that politicians' competition for votes and voters' 
demand for income distribution is one of the most important reason for 
government growth (Meltzer and Richard, 1978). 
With nearly universal suffrage, the median voter has less incorne than the average 
earner. The voter with an income below the median can gain if incomes above the ZD 
average are taxed, and the benefits are distributed to himself and others. Large 
government thus results from the difference between the distribution of votes and the 
distribution of income (Meltzer and Richard, 1978: 116). 
A more systematic theory of the size of government was developed by Meltzer 
and Richard (19 8 1), and then was empirically tested (see Meltzer and Richard, 
1983). The reasons for government growth suggested were: extensions of the 
franchise which change the position of the decisive voter, and changes in 
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relative productivity which leads the skilled individuals to earn more than the 
unskilled and then this greater inequality results In voting for redistribution. 
The empirical results show that the share of distributed income increases with 
income, but the size of the response depends on the level of median income. 
and also, as income rises, people choose relatively more distribution in cash. 
which permits them to maintain consumption with less work. Overall, their 
findings support the argument that a substantial part of government growth is a 
response to voters' demand. 
Brunner (1978), pointing out a wide range of social, political, and economic 
reasons for the existence and behaviour of government, also focused on the 
distributional character of politics. In addition to the extension of the franchise, 
Brunner also noted the self-interested behaviour of politicians and bureaus, 
who find, as (political entrepreneurs', that offering new programs or variations 
on existing themes assures a higher survival value in the 'political market'. 
It is also argued by Peltzman (1980) that, in a median voter framework of 
public goods analysis, the ratio of public spending to GNP ought to be roughly 
constant across space and time. In fact, this ratio has grown over time and 
varied considerably across countries. Thus, Peltzman (1980: 221) noted that 
incentives to redistribute wealth politically are important determinants of the 
relative size and growth of public sector, though did not deny the importance of 
the public good aspects of government activity. Unlike Meltzer and Richard, 
Peltzman argued that special interest groups should be the focus of voting 
models. It is argued by Peltzman (1980: 272) that the early twentieth-century 
expansion of government coincides with the emergence of broad-based interest 
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groups which successfully strained influence on the political process. and 
concluded that governments grow where groups which share a common interest 
in that growth and can perceive and articulate that interest become more 
numerous (for more discussion on interest groups, see below). 
Pressure Groups 
The effect of pressure groups on government size is a special case of the 
distributional nature of political processes, based on the logrolling under t::, 
majority rule model of Tullock (1959). Tullock argued that majority rule might 
lead to an excessive level of government expenditures for two reasons: one is 
that governments spend more on publicly provided goods than they would 
spend under the unanimity rule, and the other is that there would be no 
incentive to have governments to produce a certain public good, if the 
unanimity rule were in use. 
More systematic explanations came from Olson (1982), in his well-known the 
i-ise and decline of nations, who argued that 'the accumulation of distributional 
coalitions increases the complexity of regulation, the role of government, and 
the complexity of understandings, and changes the direction of social 
evolution' (p. 73). Becker (1983) developed a model of the influence of 
pressure groups, specifying Olson's hypothesis, and argued that taxes, 
subsidies, regulations, and other political instruments were used to raise the 
welfare of more influential pressure groups. 
The direct effect of pressure groups on the size of governnient has been 
analysed more specifically by Mueller and Murrell (1986), and a positive 
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relationship was found between the number of interest groups and government 
size for OECD and some other democratic countries (see also, Murrell. 1984. 
Coughlin et al., 199-33-, Tullock, 1993). The empirical studies of this subject are 
quite limited, because of the implicit difficulty of measuring political variables. 
Bureaucracy 
Considerable attention has been devoted to the positive relationship between 
bureaucracy and government size. Niskanen (1971) argued that 'pay. prestige, 
power, and promotion' are all positive utility sources. and are direct functions 
of bureaucrat's budget. Therefore, bureaucrats have particular reasons to 
maximise budgets. 
Romer and Rosenthal (1978) argued that a budget maximising agenda setter 
can manipulate the alternatives in such a manner as to produce an outcome 
larger than would be most preferred by the median voter. The empirical results 
are generally in line with their arguments (see Romer and Rosenthal, 1979a, 
1979b, 1982). Borcherding et al. (1977) also reports evidence that suppliers of 
public services charge higher prices if they have monopoly power. 
Another stream of studies addresses the behaviour of public employees who 
will typically wish to protect and expand their own sector (see, for instance,, 
Bush and Denzau, 1977, Borcherding et al, 1977, Gernmell, 1990b; and 
Libecap and Johnson, 1991). Borcherding et al (1977) found evidence that 
public employees are able to expand their budgets through representation by 
unions, while Libecap and Johnson (1991) found no evidence that voter 
participation is higher for federal workers than for private workers. 
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Mueller (1987) noted that both Niskanen's and Romer and Rosenthal's models 
were static, because they explain why government will be larger than optimal, 
but they do not directly explain how government grows. In recent work, Cullis 
and Jones (1993) used UK data for post-war period in a dynamic analysis. and 
did not find support for the hypothesis that bureaucrats could drive relative 
public sector growth. It is clear that these studies analyse different cases: it 
might well be possible that agenda setters and/or public employees have the 
ability to drive a greater government budget under certain circumstances, 
however, this may not be persistent over time. 
Some studies of bureaucracy, such as Romer and Rosenthal (1979a), were 
regarded as assaults on the median voter approaches. Although similar 
arguments were used to invalidate the hypothesis, in fact, they are 
complementary rather than rival. For instance, in their rational theory Qf the 
size of government, Meltzer and Richard (1983) recognised that their analysis 
neglected most features of the political process, and a useful extension of their 
model would have incorporated supply factors, such as bureaucracy. The 
median voter hypothesis refers to the demand side of the provision of public 
goods, while studies of vote maximising politicians and bureaucracy explain 
the supply side. 
2.3 FISCAL ILLUSION AND PUBLIC SPENDING 
Fiscal Illusion, as a normative consideration, goes back to early scholars such 
as Mill (1848), and McCulloch (1851). However, the positive theory of fiscal 
illusion dates to the Italian economist Puviani (1903). The idea is based on the 
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information asymmetry between the suppliers (such as bureaucrats) and 
consumers (voter-taxpayers) of public goods. It is acknowledged in the 
standard economic theory that the performance of the market depends on the 
information maintained by economic agents in the decision making process. 
Similarly, the efficiency of the public goods market, in a typical democracy, 
depends on the available information related to costs and benefits of public 
goods. It is argued in recent public choice theories that government agents hold 
more information than voter-taxpayers do, and hence this asymmetry allows 
the magnitude of public spending to go beyond the voters' preferences. 
Although fiscal illusion may operate in evaluation of both taxes and 
expenditures, the related theories essentially concentrate on the revenue side, 
arguing that assessments of benefits from public goods are highly subjective 
and the cost is more certainly identified (Goetz. 1977: 177). 
The budget constraint was acknowledged also by Wagner (1883)) who noted 
that 'financial stringency may hamper the expansion of state activities, causing 
their extent to be conditioned by revenue'. Peacock and Wiseman (1961) 
argued that 'people will accept, in a period of crisis, tax levels and method of 
raising revenue that quieter times they would have thought intolerable'. The 
implicit assumption behind these arguments is that taxpayers are aware of their 
'actual' tax burdens. Fiscal illusion theories go beyond the circumstances 
which allow the government to raise taxes, and argue that 
... 
the actions of the government could best be explained by the hypothesis that the 
government always acts to hide the burden of taxes frorn the public and 1-nagnIfy the 
benefits of public expenditures... When the governing group is successful in these t) 
attempts, fiscal illusions are created which effectively i-nodify human behavior 
(Buchanan, 1960: 60). 
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Subsequent scholars have emphasized that certain features of tax structure can 
affect voter's perceptions of their tax burden so that they underestimate how 
much they are paying for public goods; such fiscal illusion implies that actual 
expenditure will be greater than predicted by a simple voter demand model. 
To illustrate the issues mentioned we combine the diagrammatic expositions of 
Wagner (1976) and Gemmell (1997b). Figure 2.2 shows the relationship 
between fiscal illusion and demand for public goods. Under the assumption of 
fully perceived tax-prices, voter-taxpayer i's (true) tax-price is P',,,, the amount 
consumed by 1 is Gil, K (on UI) is the equilibrium point for i corresponding to 
point a which is the cross-point of the demand curve (D) and marginal cost (= 
average cost (AC) = P'gi). EF is the 'true' budget constraint, and EXl is the 
amount of tax paid by i. 
Looking at the upper half of Figure 2.2, it should be noted that while 1 prefers 
Gi2 under the perceived tax-price (Pgi), government actually extracts an 
amount of tax which imposes a tax-price of P'gi. Therefore, voter-taxpayer i 
perceives [PgidGi20] as the total cost of public goods, while the real cost is 
[P'9jbGi2O1, and the actual utility level is at point L which is lower than both K 
and M. Proposed sources of this illusion are: revenue complexity (and visibility 
of taxes), tax elasticity, and the extent of deficit finance. Two other sources of 
illusion have also been proposed with particular reference to local governinent 
finance: the flypaper effect and renter illusion. 
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Figure 2.2 Fiscal Illusion 
Revenue Complexity 
The pioneering study of revenue complexity was by Wagner (1976) who asked 
the question whether a choice between financing public output from a single 
tax or from a variety of smaller taxes would affect the stock of taxpayers' 
knowledge about tax-prices, and hence, affect public budgetary choices. 
Wagner argued that the ability of fiscal institutions to create fiscal illusion 
depends on the ability of such institutions to influence the hypothesis a person 
forms about the cost of government. A tax system is characterised as 
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containing various 'fiscal extraction devices' (FEDs) which transfer resources 
trom citizens to the treasury. The simplest revenue structure would be one in 
which all extractions during some time interval were made by one FED at one 
point in time, and more FEDs lead to a more complex system which make the 
formation of an accurate perception regarding the price of public output more 
difficult. 
Wagner (1976) used the Herfindahl index to measure the degree of complexity, 
and found a positive and significant relationship between the complexity of tax 
system and goverm-nent expenditures. 4 All subsequent empirical studies of the 
revenue complexity have employed this index as a measure of fiscal illusion. 
Some significant results were also found by Baker (1983), Breeden and Hunter 
(1985), and Heyndels and Smolders (1994), while Clotfelter (1976), Henrekson 
(1988), and Misiolek and Elder (1988) found the effect of complexity to be 
insignificant. 
The Herfindahl index as a measure of revenue complexity have beeii criticised 
on the grounds that it does not take into account the visibility of revenue 
categories (Wagner himself acknowledged the deficiency of the index). The 
index assumes similar degrees of visibility for all revenue categories, while 
actually some types of revenues may not be perceived similar to others. Oates 
(1988), for instance, argued that user charges may be more visible than 
equivalent excise taxes. Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) showed that the 
42 (Ri) The followint- formula was used to proxy revenue complexity: H NN, Iiere H is 
the Herfindahl index, and Ri is the share of ith revenue category. 
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impact of complexity is even stronger when the revenue categories were 
weighted by visibility. 
Pornmerehne and Schneider (1978) also found that the share of 'highlý, visible' 
taxes has a significant negative effect (and the share of 'highly invisible' taxes 
has a positive effect) on expenditures. Few analysts have included measures of 
tax visibility: Merrifield (199 1) used the share of states' own tax revenues from 
income or sales taxes as a proxy for the visibility hypothesis, and found 
negative and significant effect on per capita tax revenues, suggesting that 
politicians are more reluctant to increase the more visible taxes-, Misiolek and 
Elder (1988) found no support for tax visibility having an effect; Clotfelter 
(1976) who uses the ratio of direct to indirect taxes as his measure, obtained 
insignificant results. Insignificant results were also found by Henrekson ( 19 8 8) 
who uses the ratio of direct taxes to total tax revenues. 
The alleged causal relationship has also been criticised, as the Herfindahl index 
may not reflect fiscal illusion, but may rather be the effect of revenue 
diversification. Brennan and Buchanan (1982) argued that revenue-maximi sing 
governments rely not on taxes that are obscured but rather rely on taxes that 
cannot be avoided: as the percentage of goods that are taxed increases, the 
opportunities for consumption switching are accordingly reduced, and thus 
citizens find it difficult to avoid the tax. Oates (1988) also argued that 
authorities with relatively high levels of public spending are associated with 
more diversified revenue structure, because governments will introduce new 
sources of revenue in order to prevent producer and consumer tax-related 
mobility across localities. 
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Breeden and Hunter (1985). for instance, found a positi\'e effect of tax 
complexity on the revenue and spending, however. they were careful not to 
interpret their findings as support for information asymmetry. but as support 
for the more general Brennan and Buchanan model of tax structure: the greater 
the proportion of commodities or services that is taxed. the larger are the per 
capita tax revenues. Misiolek and Elder (1988) found that the evidence for tax 
diversification as a result of the need for revenue stabilisation was stronger than 
the evidence for fiscal illusion caused by tax di versi fication- induced 
information asymmetry. 
Tax Elasticity 
The tax elasticity hypothesis is another form of fiscal illusion argued by 
Buchanan (1967) that the more elastic the tax system the more responsive is 
revenue to growth in national income, hence it is easier to sustain a higher 
volume of public spending if income is growing. The empirical study of the 
relationship between tax elasticity and public spending was pioneered by Oates 
(1975) who regressed US state expenditures against various socio-economic 
variables, along with a measure of tax elasticity, and found a positive and 
significant relationship between tax elasticity and public expenditures. Oates 
used a crude measure of elasticity represented by the ratio of income tax 
revenues to total revenues, and the same measure was also employed by Baker 
(1983), Feenberg and Rosen (1987), and Heyndels and Smolders (1994) whose 
findings did not support the elasticity hypothesis (Feenberg and Rosen also 
calculated different elasticities of personal income and sales tax, and the results 
were also insignificant). Misiolek and Elder (1988) found a positive and 
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significant effect of tax elasticity on tax revenues, and the elasticity measure 
appeared to be insignificant when expenditures were used as a dependent 
variable. Some significant results were also found by Craigy and Heins (1980) 
who used Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations elasticity 
estimates instead. 
DiLorenzo (1982) tested the fiscal illusion hypothesis versus Tiebout mobility, 
and found significant but negative effect of the share of income tax on public 
spending. Those results were interpreted by DiLorenzo as a support for the 
presence of Tiebout mobility: "In a system of competing local governments 
those jurisdictions with more income-elastic tax structures and, consequently, 
higher tax burdens, may experience outmigration as a result, as citizen- 
taxpayers vote with their feet. Such migration would diminish the demand for 
governmental services and lead to lower rates of expenditure growth" (p. 391). 
Despite these explanations, DiLorenzo did not deny the validity of the fiscal 
illusion hypothesis, and noted that the effects of Tiebout mobility i-night have 
outweighed the fiscal illusion effect. Negative results were also found by 
Merrifield (199 1) who concluded that voters seemed to be aware of and 
sensitive to more income elastic taxes, and legislators were under greater 
pressure to periodically re-evaluate the tax rates of the most income elastic 
taxes. 
Hunter and Scott (1987) and Greene and Hawley (1991) used an alternative 
approach, and tested the elasticity hypothesis by estimating the effect of 
income tax progressivity on the probability of a state enacting a statutory 
income reduction. Their findings provided some indirect support for a negative 
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relationship that states with a higher degree of income elasticity haN, e a Iiigher 
probability of cutting tax rates, and they concluded that there \\, as a limit 
beyond which automatic tax increases built into a system through progressiN, 'e 
income taxation could serve the budget maximisers. 
Debt Illusion 
It is argued that the greater the share of deficit finance relative to spending, the 
greater the likelihood that taxpayers underestimate the tax-price and vote for 
higher levels of government expenditure (Goetz, 1977). Buchanan (1967) 
proposed two types of debt illusion: one is based on Puviani's Approach where 
the subjective assessment of the alleviation of the value of assets is not treated 
in the same manner as a lump-sum tax; and the other is based on Vicluey's 
(1961) approach where consumers' subjective assessment of future tax 
liabilities (compared with current debts) are undervalued. Iii both cases, 
subjective criteria dominate at the time of the selection of debt. and the 
objective costs are recognised only in subsequent time-periods. 
Early empirical studies of debt illusion by Oates (1969) and Epple and 
Schipper (198 1) tested the impact of taxes and expenditures on capitalisation. 
The former attempted to examine the effect of local expenditure programs and 
property taxes on property values, using US cross-sectional data, and the 
results showed that housing values are negatively related to tax rates and 
positively related to expenditures. This has been interpreted as indirect 
evidence for the absence of debt illusion. The latter included a more direct 
proxy of debt illusion (unfunded pension liabilities), and their findings did not 
support the debt illusion either. 
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Dalamagas (1993.1994a, 1994b) undertook a different approach. and tested the 
Keynesian view (stimulatory effect of debt financed tax-cuts) versus the 
Ricardian view (the equivalence of tax and debt finance) of the ii. -iipact of debt 
illusion on private consumption. Dalamagas concluded that the presence of 
debt illusion 'irrationalises' individuals, who tend to interpret the substitution 
of debt for taxes as a net addition to their wealth, and this effect diminishes 
when the level of indebtedness rises. The relevance of these studies here is 
limited, because their concern is the impact of debt illusion on private 
consumption rather than public expenditure. 
Time-series studies of the effect of budget deficits on government expenditures 
were pioneered by Niskanen (1978), who found a positive and significant 
relationship. Subsequent studies by Diamond (1989), Tridimas (1992), and 
Ashworth (1995) have also found supportive evidence. Using UK data for the 
period of 1955-88, Tridimas (1992) found a significantly positive effect of 
budget deficits on the demand for government expenditures, and some 
evidence for the presence of deficit illusion 'in the sense that the deficit 
changes the perception of true price of government services'. Following a 
slightly different approach, Ashworth (1995) also found supportive evidence 
for the positive relationship between budget deficits and government 
expenditures. 
The Flypaper ýffect 
Recent public choice approaches to local government finance have emphasised 
that the combination of local taxes and central grants is likely to give rise to 
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voter misperceptions of the tax-price of local public goods (Goetz. 1977). The 
form of fiscal illusion caused by central grants is called the 'flypaper effect': 
lump-sum grants increase public expenditure more than an equivalent increase 
in income. The term 'flypaper effect' originated in studies by Courant et al. 
(1979) and Oates (1979) who argued that budget-maximi sing political agents 
(politicians and bureaucrats) camouflage the lump-surn nature of orant 
revenues: instead of the income being returned to tax-payers, either directly via 
a rebate or indirectly via a reduction in tax contributions, the grant is used to 
expand the public budget, and this causes voter-taxpayers to underestimate the 
tax-price and vote for higher levels of government expenditures. 
A group of studies incorporate the effect of grants into general studies of fiscal 
illusion, and the empirical results showed that intergovernmental grants are an 
important determinant of the level of local public spending. Wagner (1976), for 
instance, included intergovernmental revenue as an explanatory variable in 
addition to other socio-economic and tax structure related variables, and found 
positive impact on local expenditures. Similar evidence was also found by 
Munley and Greene (1978), Craig and Heins (1980). DiLorenzo (1982), and 
Breeden and Hunter (1985). 
Other studies directly tested for the flypaper effect. Winer (1983), utilising 
Canadian provincial data, regressed provincial expenditures on income, federal 
grants and interprovincial grants, and found that the grant system did increase 
expenditure and that the elasticity of grants with respect to expenditure for 
ýpoor' jurisdictions (recipient) was roughly twice as large as for 'rich' 
jurisdictions (donor). Logan (1986) also made a distinction between recipient 
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and grantor, and tested the two effects of grant-induced illusion: an increase in 
recipient output and a decrease in grantor output. The results from US time- 
series support the fiscal illusion hypothesis in the sense that tax-prices were 
modified in the opposite direction for recipient expenditures (Logan. 1986). Z7 
Grossman (1990), using various categories of grants (conditional/unconditional 
and federal/state), also found evidence for the stimulatory effects of grants. 
Significant results were also provided by Nelson (1986), Heyndels and 
Smolders (1994) and Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994). On the other hand, 
Turnbull (1993) found a positive effect of grants on expenditure demand; 
however, the elasticity values revealed that a marginal grant's impact on 
expenditure was less stimulative than that of income. Becker (1996) also 
argued that the flypaper effect was sensitive to model specification; using US 
data, she found no evidence of a flypaper effect. 
Renter Illusion and Accountability 
The notion of renter illusion hypothesis is based on the fact that the primary 
source of local government revenue is the property tax, and it is argued that 
only those voters directly liable (homeowners) will correctly perceive the tax- 
price of the local public good (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973). Barr and Davis 
(1966) found that property holding was an important determinant of 
expenditure decisions, and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) found a negative 
and significant relationship between the percentage of owner occupied 
properties and public spending. Peterson (1975) also found that renters do not 
think- that they bear the full cost of property taxes. 
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Martinez-Vazquez (1983) criticised the theoretical foundations of renter 
illusion, and proposed 'renter rationality' instead. Apart from the different 
household characteristics of renters (having lower incomes and more school 
age children, for instance), Martinez-Vazquez argued that the renters' voting 
behaviour will vary because, given their income level, they have lower housing 
consumption, and any increase in local expenditures will entail larger net 
benefits to renters than homeowners of the same income level. The empirical 
results found by Martinez-Vazquez confirmed the positive relationship between 
local expenditures and the percentage of renters, however, when net benefits 
was used as a dependent variable, a positive relationship was also found. This 
was considered as support for the hypothesis of renters' rationality. yet does 
not necessarily exclude some degree of fiscal illusion. Carroll and Yinger 
(1994) also found supportive evidence for renter rationality. as property tax 
increases were exactly offset by increases in rents. Heyndels and Smolders 
(1994), who includes the percentage of residences that are non-owner occupied 
as an explanatory variable to Flemish municipal expenditures, found no 
evidence for renter illusion. It should be noted that most of these studies used 
data from US local governments, and the assumptions are based on US 
property tax practices. The hypothesis of renter illusion is essentially based on 
the renters' status with respect to local tax, and this may change under different 
local tax systems. 
UK local government has experienced major changes to the form of local tax 
over the past ten years or so. A domestic property tax was replaced in 1990 by 
an essentially flat rate Poll Tax (the Community Charge) which in turn was 
replaced by a mildly progressive tax based on property value bands (the 
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Council Tax). The notion of 'local accountability' entered local tax debates. 
Cullis et al. (1993b) argued that while the introduction of the Poll Tax was 
presented as a measure to reduce fiscal illusion and thereby increase local 
accountability, a careful analysis of the equity and efficiency implications of 
the Poll Tax combined with the mechanism of allocating Central Grants 
suggests that fiscal illusion persists. In fact, Cullis et al (1991) argue that if 
median voters have imperfect Imowledge of how grants and local taxes interact, 
public perceptions of the Poll Tax would induce increased fiscal illusion. In 
neither paper, however, did they explicitly test for fiscal illusion. Barnett and 
Knox (1992) tested two hypothesis for Northern Ireland: individual 
accountability (all those who are eligible to vote in local elections should be 
liable to pay taxes), and collective accountability (the full marginal cost of a 
local government expenditure should be borne by local tax-payers). The 
empirical findings showed that individual accountability was not significant, 
while collective accountability was found to significantly influence local 
goverm-nent expenditure per capita. There has been very little research on this 
issue because of the difficulty in driving an empirical measure for 
accountability. 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The review of the literature on the factors identified as contributing to the long- 
standing tendency of public sector growth reveals a variety of approaches 
ranging from the highly aggregated analysis of socio-economic factors to the 
micro-analysis of public choice economists who model those factors which 
influence the demand for, and supply of, public spending. It should be noted 
that the relatively new public choice approaches are complementary rather than 
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rival theories of the *structural' approaches. It might well be possible that a 
stable set of political procedures deliver expenditure growt1i as a result of 
changes in the economic setting in which they operate, and it miglit also be the 
case that the changes in the political realm delivered a relatively stable 
economic conditions with growth of expenditure. 
Taken on their own, none of those factors could be sufficient to explain the 
growth of public spending. There is progress in the tools of analysis along with 
economic and democratic progress. The social, economic and political 
differences across the countries also force analysts to alter their methods in 
different cases. The review of the empirical studies shows that evidence for 
specific factors is mixed. This might be because of the socio-economic changes 
over time and/or the differences across countries. In addition- the methods 
employed to test majority of those theories are sensitive to data sets, and the 
increasing availability of more appropriate data also i-nay cause those 
differences. 
Regarding the effect of fiscal illusion on government size, a number of writers 
have identified some variables, but few have rigorously tested them. There are 
many conceptual and practical difficulties to test for fiscal illusion. The 
difficulty to measure the public output and tax-prices, and the crude nature of 
aggregate data in terms of measuring fiscal illusion do not allow appropriate 
empirical testings. In subsequent chapters, we relate the tax structure of the UK 
to those illusions summarised in this chapter, and incorporate them to a public 
choice model of demand for public spending: in Chapter 3) for a time-series 
analysis of general government expenditures, in Chapter 4 for a cross-section 
Chapter 2 LileratureSurvc. v 44 
analysis of local public spending; and in Chapter 5 for a micro-data analysis of 
voter-taxpayers' attitudes to taxation and public spending. 
CHAPTER 3 
TAXATION AND THE DEMAND FOR GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES IN THE UK: A TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There has long been observed a tendency for the public sector to grow faster 
than the economy as a whole. More than a century ago, Wagner asserted that 
this tendency was inevitable. With the increasing availability of time series 
clata, many writers have tested Wagners Law, narrowly defined as asserting 
that the income elasticity of demand for government output is greater than 
unity, there is little empirical support for this strict definition (Diamond, 1989; 
Gernmell, 1990a and 19933). Alternative explanations for public sector growth 
contend that this tendency is not inevitable. Peacock and Wiseman (1961) 
argued that external shocks, such as wars, caused sudden increases in public 
spending which did not revert back to its pre-shock level once the shock had 
passed; during 'non-shock' periods there was no necessary tendency for public 
sector share of national income to increase, rather it tended to hover around its 
existing share. 
We adopt an alternative approach to trying to explain trends in British 
government expenditure (as a measure of the size of the public sector). Public 
choice theorists have argued that the level of government spending should 
reflect voter-taxpayer's demand for public goods-, in this vein models of the 
demand for public expenditure have been developed by Borcherding and 
Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). Puviam (190-3) observed 
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that certain features of the tax structure affect voter's perceptions of their tax 
burden so that they underestimate how much they are paying for public goods, 
such fiscal illusion implies that actual expenditure will be greater than 
predicted by a simple voter demand model. To develop this we add a number 
of fiscal illusion variables to a model of the demand for public (foods in order 
to try and explain trends in public expenditure using UK data for the period of 
1955-94. 
Section 3.2 discusses the public choice literature on fiscal illusion to identify 
which features of tax structure are likely to affect perceptions. and then 
presents trends in tax structure in the UK. Section 3.3 presents our model, in 
which fiscal illusion is represented by the visibility of taxes, the extent of 
deficit finance, revenue complexity and tax elasticity. Section 33.4 discusses the 
data and fiscal illusion measures used in the study, and Section 33.5 presents the 
empirical results. The conclusions are in Section 3.6. 
3.2 FISCAL ILLUSION AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
Fiscal illusion arises if certain features of tax structure lead taxpayers to 
underestimate how much tax they truly pay and thus creates 'excess' demand 
for government-provided goods, ie. more public expenditure is demanded than 
would be in the absence of fiscal illusion (for detailed reviews see Oates, 1988; 
Dollery and Worthington, 1996). Proposed sources of fiscal illusion are: the 
degree of visibility of taxes; the extent of deficit finance; revenue complexity; 
and tax elasticity. The greater the share of 'less visible' taxes in tax revenue 
(Pommerchne and Schneider, 1978), and of deficit finance relative to spending 
(Goetz, 1977), the greater the likelihood that taxpayers underestimate the tax- 
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price and vote for higher levels of governinent expenditure. A more complex 
tax system will make it more difficult for voter-taxpayers to identify their true 
tax burden hence increases the likelihood of underestimatim-, the tax-price of 
(yovernment-pro, vided goods (Wagner, 1976). The more elastic the tax systern 
the more responsive is revenue to growth in national income. hence it is easier 
to sustain a higher volume of public spending if income is growing (Buchanan, 
1967). 
Table 
-'). I summarises the results of a number of studies that have included 
fiscal illusion in time series studies of public expenditure (there are also many 
cross-section studies including fiscal illusion variables to help explain 
variations in local authority spending; we refer to some of these below). The 
most commonly included variable, in five of the nine studies. was deficit 
illusion; the estimated coefficient was significant and associated witli excess 
spending in all five studies. The second most common illusion variable \\-as 
some measure of elasticity, but the results \\-ere mixed: the estimated 
coefficient was negative (the wrong sign) in two of the three studies in o'-hich it 
was significant; this could reflect the use of an inappropriate measure of 
elasticity, a point we return to below. Of these time-serles studies only 
Henrekson (1988) included variables for visibility and complexity, neither of 
which was found to be significant. 
Chapter 3 Taxation and Go vernment Expenditure 48 
Table 3.1 Time-Series (and Pooled Time-Series) Studies of Government Expenditures and Fiscal Illusion 
A uthor(s) Case Study Fiscal Illusion Evidence 
N T iskanen (197 ) U. S. (1947-67; TS) Deficit Illusioi-i (R 1) Craig and 
Heins (1980) U. S. (1970 and 1975-, Tax System Elasticity PTS) 
Feenberg and 
Rosen (1987) U. S. (1978-83: PTS) Tax System Elasticity 
Hunter and Tax System Elasticity 4 Scott (1987) U. S. (1976-83; PTS) 
Henrekson (19 8 8) Sweeden (1950-84; Tax System Coinplexjtý' (H) 
TS) Visibility (DRT/']-]-) 
Deficit Illusioi-i (1,. 'R) 
+1 
Diamond (1989) Canada, France, Deficit Illusloji (R/E) 
Germany (F. R. ), Italy, 
Japan, U. K., U. S. 
(1955-85, TS) 
Greene and Tax System Elasticitý- 4 
Hawley (1991) U. S. (1977-84; PTS) 
Tridimas (1992) U. K. (1955-88; TS) Deficit Illusion (R/E) 
Ashworth (1995) U. K. (1955-91; PTS) Deficit Illusioi-i (R/F) 
Found to be significant for government investment expenditures 
2Use Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) elasticit\ nicasure 
instead of Oates (1975). 
30ates (1975) measure and their own measures all found negative. 
4Use tax cuts as dependent variable which is affected positively by tax progressivit"'. 17, - 
Key: TS: Time-series; PTS: Pooled Tirne-series. R: Government Revenues, 
E: Government Expenditures, H- Herfindahl Index, 
DRT: Direct Taxes, TT: Total Tax Revenues. 
(*) refers to the significant results. 
The evidence for deficit illusion is contrary to the Ricardian Equivalence 
Theorem, which holds that individual consumers recognise the government's 
intertemporal budget constraint and are thus aware that any change in current 
taxes must be offset by a change in future taxes. If this holds, we NNI, -ould expm 
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government expenditures to be negatively related to deficits. as votci--taxjýayers 
will be reluctant to incur future tax liabilities. Buchanan and Wagllei- (1977) 
argued that voters tend to discount future liabilities. so budget deficits can 
support excess governi-nent spending because they reduce the perceived price 
of public services to the current generation of voters. The evidence in Table 
-I 
supports this more myopic view. 
The inclusion of tax elasticity as a determinant of public expenditure deriVcs 
from the seminal study of Oates (1975) who found a positive and significant 
effect of a measure of tax elasticity on general government expenditures. 
Subsequent empirical evidence has been mixed: Craig and Heins (1980) found 
support for Oates; Misiolek and Elder (1988) found a positive and significant 
relation between tax elasticity and tax revenues, but the effect oil government 
expenditures was not significant; Baker (1983), Feenberg and Rosen (1987), 
and Heyndels and Smolders (1994) did not find significant results for 
elasticity; DiLorenzo (1982), Greene and Hawley (199 1) and H unter and Scott 
(1987) all found a negative but significant relationship between elasticity and 
government expenditures. 
The pioneering study of the effect of revenue complexity oii government 
expenditure is Wagner (1976) who found a negative relationship between the 
simplicity of the revenue structure and total expenditures. The Herfindahl 
index, suggested by Wagner, has subsequently been used bý- others as a 
measure of revenue system complexity: Baker (1983)). Breedeii and Hunter 
III t-- 1 (1985), and Heyndels and Smolders (1994) found a positive and significant 
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effect of revenue complexity, while Misiolek and Elder (1988) and Henrekson 
(1988) found no support for the significance of complexity. 
Few analysts have included measures of tax visibility. and those that have 
obtained mixed results: Pornmerehne and Schneider (1978) found that the 
share of 'invisible' taxes has a significant positive effect oii cxi)eiiditures: 
Misiolek and Elder (1988) found no support for tax visibility haviiig an effect; 
Clotfelter (1976) who uses the ratio of direct to indirect taxes as his measure. 
obtained insignificant results. Insignificant results Nvere also found by 
Henrekson (1988) who uses the ratio of direct taxes to total tax i-evcmies. It is 
clear that the empirical evidence for the influence of fiscal illusioii oii public 
expenditure, however measured, is ambiguous. I 
Trends in Tax Structure in the UK 
Figure 1.1 shows that government expenditure tended to rise steadily from 
1955 until the early 1980s, the Thatcher era witnessed a marked reduction in 
the expenditure/GDP ratio, although this has been largely reversed in the 
1990s. Revenue tended to keep pace with spending until the late 1960s 
(running ahead in 1968-71); a deficit emerged in the light of the oil crisis 
which peaIced in 1974, was reduced significantly in the early 1980s. re- 
emerged, was eliminated in 1987-88 and re-emerged again. One could identify 
three broad patterns from Figure '). I: revenue and expenditure tracked fairly 
closely over 1955-72, although a deficit wedge was inserted, re\ýeiiue and 
expenditure still tended to track over 197-33-1989, however, since 1990. the t,, \-o 
I More details can be found in Chapter " 
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have diverged, with revenue falling while spending rose. implyim-, a steadily 
increasing deficit. 
The elements of fiscal illusion identified above may offer irisigglits into these 
trends in at least two ways. First, governments can avail of fiscal Illusion to 
increase spending, either by allowing the deficit to increase or by an 
appropriate tax structure, such as more reliance on less visible taxes. This type 
of relationship may be observed over the long-run. Second, faced with a 
sudden need to increase spending (eg. a Peacock-Wiseman effect). 
governments may have recourse to fiscal illusion to disguise frort-1 votci-s the 
need to finance the increase. Thus, an increased deficit is aii obviOLIS I-espoilse 
to an external shock which immediately increases the demaild for spending 
(while it is difficult to adjust tax revenue quickly, and may be politically 
difficult to cut spending). The fiscal illusion hypothesis would be that over 
time, to maintain spending and reduce the deficit (because of its 
macroeconomic effects), the tax structure will evolve iii ari 'expenditure- 
supporting' manner. This second set of effects should be apparent over the 
short-run. 
If one considers the entire period 1955-94, the UK tax structure is remarkably 
stable, as shown in Figure 3.1. Taxes on expenditure. conventionally referred 
to as indirect taxes and, in the UK context, the relative1v iiivisible taxes (as the 
amount paid is not always known at the point of spending). \\cre sorne 40-4-5 Z7 
per cent of total revenue oN, 'er 1955-72 and 1978-94. Direct taxes oil personal 
income, the relatively visible taxes in the UK context (as the amount paid is 
printed on pay slips and tax returns). showed more movement: rising steadily 
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-frorn about 20 per cent of revenue in 1955 to 25 1961 and '0 per per cent I 
cent by 1973, and remaining within a band of about 25-330 per cent over 1977- 
94. During the crisis of 1974-78, both these taxes moved 'Out of their baiids' 
but that period can be considered an aberration. 
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The other major revenue sources exhibit gentle trends. Social Security 
Contributions (SSCs, the relative visibility of which is questionable) rose from 
a share of about ten to over 15 per cent. Corporate income taxes, which are not 
paid directly by voters and therefore should be considered invisible to 
individuals, moved around pretty much within a 5-10 per cent band. Noii-tax 
revenues. which are also in principle 'invisible' (from the fiscal illusion 
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perspective) declined slightly in importance from about twelve to ei(-, ht per 
cent of total revenue. An examination of Figure 3.1 does not reveal an 
influence of fiscal illusion, in the sense that it is not clear that the share of less 
visible taxes rose as expenditure increased, but our enipirical analysis will 
address the question with greater rigour. 
The observation of remarkable stability in tax structure is consistent with the 
literature on party political influences on British taxes. Rose (1984) argued that Z: ) 
the impact of parties on trends in the economý' is minimal compared vvith 
secular forces, and that similarly, contrary to their rhetoric. parties have no 
partisan influences on trends in the level and composition of taxation. Karran 
(1985) found no evidence for a significant impact of parties oii taxatioii. 
although, at least prior to Blair, Labour were perceived to be a higher tax party 
than the Conservatives, the evidence was that taxes tended to rise and the 
composition remained stable irrespective of which party was in power. 
Morrissey and Stemmo (1987) argue that the impact of parties is ori the 
distribution of the burden within taxes: Conservative governments tended to 
levy lower tax rates on the rich, increased nominal rates of consumption tax, 
and encouraged corporations to distribute their profits to shareholders: Labour 
governments were more likely to increase income tax rates on the rich and 
consumption tax rates on luxury goods, and encouraged corporations to 
reinvest. 
If the propensity to utilise fiscal illusion is stronger among some parties than 
others, for example if one posited that Labour will xvish to increase expenditure 
by more than the Conservatives would, use of data based on tax categories 
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rather than the distribution of the burden within tax categories may not be able 
to pick up some effects of fiscal illusion. However, the more general 
implication of the partisan influence literature 1 in power does is that the party i 
not affect general trends in revenue or its composition, and we do not need to 
test for partisan influences in our empirical work. 2 
3.3 A MODEL OF EXPENDITURE AND FISCAL ILLUSION 
The demand for government-provided goods can be modelled following 
Borcherding and Deacon (1973) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973): 
Gi 
=a Yi (I Pgl ý, i-1,2,..., N (3.1) 
where G, is voter-taxpayer iIs consumption of government provided goods. Yi 
is 1 .1s income, Pgi is is tax-price paid for Gi. The coefficients a and ý capture 
income and price elasticities of demand for governi-nent-provided goods, 
respectively. 
The tax-price is specified as Pgi =Ti C N11, where Ti is i's tax share, C is the 
unit cost of G, and N is population with the degree of publicness il. 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) assume nondiscrimination in taxation and 
specify the tax-price as Pgj =C VI-1 as all pay the same amount of tax. 3 
Eliminating Pgj- from the model, the following specification is obtained: 
2 We did test for this, but party dummies were not significant. 
3 If the same arnount of tax is paid by every voter-taxpayer, then the tax share is computed by 
the following formula: Ti=(TIN)IT= A/-', where T is total tax revenue, and (TA) is i's tax bill. 
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Gi a, Yiu CO NO( (33.2) 
In a time-series context, if there is a productivity lag in the public sector- the 
implied difference between private and public sector prices should be taken 
into account: government expenditures must be appropriately deflated as the 
variables in the model are defined in real terms, and a measure of public- 
private price differences should be included in (3.2). Using relative prices and 
aggregating to express demand in terms of total expenditures: 
G=a Yýl Prý Ný where ý= (3.3) 
where G and Y are total government expenditures and gross domestic product, 
respectively, both in real terms, and Pr (::::::::: ClPx) is the relative price where Px 
is price of private sector goods. 4 Obviously, the relative price measures the 
demand responses to a combination of the public and private sector prices. 
Specification (3.3) is the standard model of demand for government-provided 
goods used in previous empirical studies. 
Such a specification adopts the theory of democratic process in which it is 
assumed that citizens are fully aware of the costs and benefits of government- 
It should be noted that Gi Pýýj N11 (=E) is nominal total government expenditures where Gi 
=GIV'. To compute the real government expenditures (G), ideally E should be divided by the 
tax-price (P,,, i ). However, since the degree of publicness is not known, it is divided by the unit 
cost of the govern ment-prov i ded goods (C), and for the model to capture this, the coefficient 
for population is modified accordingly (see Appendix 3.1). 
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provided goods. However, as noted above, recent studies within the public 
choice field have challenged this assumption, suggesting that voter-taxpayers 
may not be aware of their 'true' tax-prices because of some features of tax 
structure. The relevant arguments in the case of central goverm-nent 
expenditures are deficit illusion (D), the invisibility of indirect taxes (P), the 
complexity of the tax system (H), and the tax elasticity (L). D is typically 
proxied by the ratio of government revenues to government expenditures, V by 
the ratio of 'less visible' taxes to government revenues, H by a Herfinclahl 
concentration index, and L by the ratio of income taxes to government 
revenues. 
Let the perceived tax price be a function of the perception parameter (IFI) and 
I 
the 'true' tax-price, as 
Pg' 
= T-1 Pgi, where FI is a function of D, V, H. and L as 
follows: 
fl 
=D 7E] ýý2 Hn3 L7r4 (3.4) 
Replacing Pgj by P 9' in (3.1), and substituting (3.4), the model (3.3) can be 
written in the following logarithmic form: 
InG = Ina + u, InY +p InPr +ý InN 
61 InD +62 InV + 63 InH + 64 InL +u (3.5) 
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where 61,62,63, and 64 represent Tilp, 72P, 713P, and 7T4P respectively. The 
coefficients 6] and 63 are predicted to be negative while 62 wid 64 to be 
positive. This is the model we estimate. 
3.4 DATA AND ILLUSION MEASURES 
Data for UK general government expenditure and revenue for the period of 
1955-94 are used in our analysis. Goverm-nent expenditure (G) in real terms is 
the sum of three categories: government final consumption at 1990 prices, 
about half of total government outlays; government gross domestic fixed 
capital formation, deflated by the private sector deflator for that expenditure 
category; and transfers, consisting of current grants and subsidies, capital 
transfers and debt interest, deflated by the consumer price index. ' Gross 
domestic product (Y) is also at 1990 prices, while the relative price (Pr) is 
approximated by the ratio of the public sector deflator to the GDP deflator; the 
public sector deflator is computed as the weighted average of the three 
government expenditure deflators mentioned above. 
As identified in equation (3.4), four measures are used to capture fiscal 
illusion. Deficit illusion (D) is captured by the ratio of revenue to expenditure: 
a value greater than unity implies a budget surplus, and the lower the value 
below unity the greater the deficit, thus the anticipated coefficient is negative. 
The value for D is plotted on Figure 3.2. In line with our discussion of Figure 
Public sector deflators would, ideally, be used for all cate, -Do 
,, 
ries. However, general 
government fixed capital formation (GGFCF) data at constant prices is available from 1962, 
and the last category at constant prices is not available in the UK national accounts. Hence the 
private sector deflators for the same categories were used for the last two categories for the 
consistency in the data set. The deflator for the GGFCF for the period of 1962-94 was also 
calculated, and the correlation between the deflators for government and private sectors was 
found very high (0.98). 
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L 1, one can identify four distinct periods: 1955-1968. when the deficit tended 
to move around zero (i. e. D= R/E moves around unity): 1968-7-3). a period of 
turmoil; 1974-89, when the deficit was steadily reduced, and post- 1989. \vhen 
the deficit has increased dramatically. We acknowledge now. and \\TIII return to 
this in discussing results, that these movements in the deficit are more likely to 
reflect secular trends and macroeconomic shocks than any government 
intention to use the deficit as part of an illusory plan to increase spendim4 
beyond the level that would be supported by fully informed voters. 
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Figure 3.2 Tax Revenue/Expenditure Ratio 
The second measure of fiscal illusion is the visibility of taxes. In the UK, 
although the standard rate of VAT is generally known, taxes on expenditure 
are hldden in market transactions (some goods are zero rated for VAT, and 
(3) CY') r, 
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Chapter 3 Taxation and Government Expenditure 59 
consumers are typically Unaware of how much excise duty tliey pay on certain 
goods) and can be considered relatively invisible. On the other hand, taxpayers 
can know what they pay in income tax, so this is relatively visible (for most 
employees, tax paid is printed on their pay statement: voters fill in their income 
tax return). The ratio of expenditure taxes to total goverrmient revenues (V) 
provides one measure of the invisibility of taxes. Corporatc income tax and 
non-tax revenues are not paid directly by individuals and could therefore be 
considered as 'invisible' sources of revenue; similarly, it is less obvious 
whether taxpayers correctly perceive the amount of SSCs paid. We explicitly 
test for which revenue categories should be included in V. 
To measure tax system elasticity we follow Oates (1975) and use the ratio of 
personal income taxes to total governinent revenues (L). It should be noted 
however that L will reflect more than simply the 'automatic effects' 
(elasticity) of the tax system. Firstly, discretionar changes in tax rates Y !I 
thresholds etc. will also affect L; indeed Gemmell (1997a) estimates that the 
elasticity of income taxes has fallen since the 1960s so that the revenue share 
of total income taxes may be an increasingly poor proxy for tax system 
elasticity. Secondly, to the extent that income taxes are relatively elastic, fiscal 
illusion arguments suggest that an increased income tax share will be 
associated, ceteris paribus, with increased expenditures. However,, to the 
extent that income taxes are relatively visible, fiscal illusion arguments suggest 
an increased share will reduce expenditures. Thirdly, in the UK tax system, 
where personal income and expenditure taxes are the dominant revenue 
sources, changes in the expenditure tax share, tend to mirror changes in income 
taxes (see Figure 3.2). Indeed, since the two are highly negatively correlated (r 
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= 
-0.86) we must be cautious about using both fiscal illusion variables in our 
regressions (see below). 6 
The complexity of the tax system (H) is measured by the Herfindahl 
concentration index: the sum of squares of the shares of various tax categories. 
Twelve categories of government revenues are available to compute H: (1) 
income tax on the personal sector, (ii) income tax on companies, (iii) income 
tax on non-residents, (iv) social security contributions, (v) expenditure tax on 
durable goods, (vi) expenditure tax on tobacco, (vii) expenditure tax on 
alcoholic drinks, (viii) expenditure tax on petrol&oil, (ix) expenditure tax on 
r- food, clothing, and fuel&power, (x) expenditure tax on services (vehicle excise 
duty and other services), (xi) other expenditure taxes (on capital formation, 
companies and public corporation, and overseas sector), (xii) other government 
revenues. In fact, we experiment with two alternative computations of H: (i) 
using all twelve taxes, and (ii) aggregating the various expenditure taxes into a 
single expenditure tax category and calculating H from the resulting five taxes. 
In a time-series context, where the number of revenue categories does not 
change much in the period of this study, H essentially relfects the relative 
magnitudes of major revenue categories, and consequently is highly correlated 
with both V and L. When the twelve categories mentioned above are used,, H 
reflects the trends in L (the ratio of personal income tax) and r(H, L) = 0.99. On 
the other hand, when the various expenditure taxes are aggregated, H primarily 
reflects the trends in V (the ratio of expenditure taxes) and r(H, V) = 0.65. 
6 Partly for this reason, our preferred classification of invisible taxes includes additional 
revenue sources yielding a lower correlation between Fand L. I 
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Thus, in a time-series context with a fixed number of taxes as in the UK, the 
complexity of the tax system (as measured by a Herfindahl index) cannot 
readily be separately identified from invisibility/elasticity aspects. We are 
therefore unable to explore the effects of tax complexity in our regressions 
analysis below. The sign predictions for our variables in equation (_3 3.5) are: 
income (Y) positive; 
population (N) positive; 
relative price (P,, ) negative; 
deficit (D) negative; 
invisible taxes (V) positive. 
The coefficient on income taxes (L) is expected to be positive if 'elasticity' 
effects dominate, but is predicted to be negative if the measure primarily 
reflects the visibility of direct taxes. 
3.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Prior to Tridimas (1992) and Ashworth (1995) most time-series studies used 
OLS techniques to analyse government expenditures. However, as these 
techniques assume the data generating process to be stationary (which it is 
not), it is now known that standard diagnostic tests may fail, and the results 
may not be interpreted confidently. An ad hoc partial aqjustment mechanism 
and a first order autoregressive structure is used by Tridimas (1992) to analyse 
data from the UK for the period 1955-88. Although previous empirical 
specifications are rejected by Tridimas' findings, it is argued by Ashworth 
(1995) that the ad hoc dynamic specifications may still be misleading. Instead, 
Ashworth uses cointegration techniques, and extends the period of analysis to 
1991. However, the only fiscal illusion variable included in either study is the 
deficit illusion measure, D. We follow a similar approach to Ashworth in this 
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paper, extending the period under investigation further. to 1994, and exploring 
a range of fiscal illusion variables. 
The two methods used to test for cointegration are the Engle-Granger and 
Johansen approaches. The former approach essentially assumes unique 
cointegrating vector and requires a stationarity test for a linear combi 1 *nation of 
the variables. It is argued that assuming only one cointegrating vector- when in 
fact there are more, leads to inefficiency in the sense that only a linear 
combination of these vectors can be obtained when estimating a single 
equation model. The drawbacks of this approach extend beyond its inability to 
estimate validly the long-run relationships between the variables: Even if there 
is only one cointegrating relationship, estimating a single equation is 
potentially inefficient, i. e. it does not lead to the smallest variance against 
alternative approaches. 7 Thus, the Johansen procedure is preferred in a 
multivariate system (for more details of time-series analysis, see Appendix 
'33.2). As mentioned in the previous section, the proxies used to capture fiscal 
illusions are closely related, and the Johansen procedure allows us to perform 
the likelihood ratio tests to identify the relative significance of those proxies. 
The variables in the model developed in Section 3.3 are first tested for 
stationarity both in levels and first differences, as seen in Table 
-3 3.2, where all 
the variables were found to be l(l). 8The next step is to test these variables for 
7 For more discussion see Hall (1991) and Harris (1995: 62-66). 
8 The first difference of InN was found to be stationary only when 12 lags were included in the 
regressions. For InD, our earlier discussion of various deficit 'episodes' (see Fl(, "Lire 33.33) might 
suggest that InD is stationary but with one or more structural breakes. However, despite 712-D 
investigating several candidates for such breakes (1969-71; 1988-89; 1992-94), ADF tests 
continue to support an I(]) conclusion for InD. 
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cointegration; we use the Johansen procedure applied to equation (3-5), 
ornitt ng InH for the reasons discussed earlier. In specifying invisible taxes, V, 
we noted earlier that expenditure tax (ET), corporate income tax (CIT), and 
non-tax revenues (NTR) may each be considered relatively invisible, and can 
create illusion. In the UK, SSCs could also be considered in this category. 
Further tests show that the CIT/Revenue ratio is stationary [ie. 1(0)] so that it 
cannot cointegrate with l(l) variables. 9 We therefore initially include three 
revenue categories (expenditure tax, non-tax revenues, and SSCs) in our 
definition of V, examining sensitivity to the definition later. 
Table 3.2 Stationarity of the Variables 
Variable Levels 
(ADF) 
number 
of lags 
First Differences 
(ADF) 
number 
of lags 
InG 
-1.14 0 -4.18"-'* 0 
InY 
-1.05 1 -4.90**-" 1 
InD 
-2.37 1 -4.46*-'-* 0 
InPr 
-2.23 3 -5.73*** 1 
InN 
-1.85 1 -3.42"* 12 
InH 
-1.50 0 -3.59**'- 0 
InV 
-2.20 1 -4.02"*'- 0 
InL 
-2.33 1 -4.14*1-* 0 
1 In 1 
-1.73 1 -3.81 "**I II 
The critical values are 
-2.93 at 5%, and -3. 
-)S at PJ/o level, quoted as ýý an(] 11ý 
respectively. All the tests were also run including the time trend, however, none of the 
variables was found trend stationary. 
Notwithstanding the fairly high negative correlation between InL and In V noted 
earlier, we begin by including both variables in our search for a cointegrating 
vector, and also excluding each in turn. The trace and maximum eigenvalue 
statistics, using maximum likelihood estimation, are reported in Table 3.3. The 
The ADF statistics for ln(CITIR) and ln(SSCIR) are -3.14 and -2.18 respectively. 
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null hypothesis of "no cointegration- is rejected in all cases, sLiggestii1g, that there 
exists at least one cointegrating vector. 
Table 3.3 Cointegration tests by Johansen AiDproach 
Rank=r ý-max kmax CV(5%) ktrace ktrace CV(5%) 
(T-nm) (T-nm) 
_ Variables in the Model: InG, In Y, InPr, 1nN, InD, In V, InL. 
r=O 73.3 60.1 45.3 166.5 136.6 124.2 
r<=l 39.8 32.7 39.4 93.25 76.5 94.2 
r<=2 24.4 20.0 33.5 53.5 43.9 68.5 
Variables in the Model: InG, InY, InPr, InN, InD, InL. 
r=O 62.6 53.0 39.4 123.6 104.6 94.2 
r<= 1 32.3 27.3 33.5 61.0 51.6 68.5 
r<=2 17.04 14.4 
. 
27.1 
. 
28.7 24.3 47.2 
Variables in the Model: InG, In Y, InPr, InN, InD, In V 
r=O 71.42 60.43 39.4 139.4 118.0 94.2 
r<= 1 34.96 29.58 33.5 67.98 57.52 68.5 
r<=2 18.73 15.85 27.1 3 33.02 27.94 47.2 
Variables in the Model: InE, InY, InPj-, InN, InD, In(ETIR), In(SSCIR), In(NTRIR). 
r=O 74.26 59.03 51.4 202.4 160.9 156.0 
r<= 1 44.02 34.99 45.3 128.2 101.9 124.2 
r<=2 36.69 29.17 39.4 84.13 66.88 94.2 
** Significant at 1%, " Significant at 5%. CV: critical values. ki-nax is the inaminal eigenvalue statistic, 
ktrace is the trace statistic. The (T-nm) version is the corrected statistic for the small samples suggested 
by Reimers (1992). The critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). The restricted constant is 
rejected in all cases. The Regressions include one lag (see Hall, 1991). 
On the question of whether InL and/or InV should be included in the 
cointegrating vector, when both are included coefficient estimates of 2.35 and 
0.36 are obtained respectively suggesting, plausibly, that there are strong 
'invisibility' effects from expenditure taxes. When InV is omitted from the 
cointegrating vector the parameter on InL becomes -0.47. suggesting that Z: ) 
(visibility' effects from direct taxes dominates any 'elasticity' effects. When 
only InL is included in cointegrating regressions however. other parameters are 
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often wrongly signed (population becomes negative or relative prices become 
positive). This is not the case for InV'- To test more formally for the inclusion 
of In V and InL in the cointegrating relationship, we conducted tile Likelihood 
Ratio tests suggested by Johansen and Juselius (1992). testing the null 
hypothesis: 6i 
=0 (I = 2,4) in equation (3.5). These strongly supported the 
inclusion of InV in the regression but the exclusion of InL. 10 We therefore 
prefer the vector excluding ln-L. Further analysis supports the null hypothesis 
of a "unique cointegrating vector" from both trace and maximum eigenvalue 
statistics. The preferred cointegrating regression IS: 12 
InG 
= 0.81 InY 
- 
0.58 InPr + 1.65 InN 
- 
0.44 InD + 1.67 In V 
The positive signs on the coefficients for income and population, are in line 
with the previous findings of Diamond (1989), Tridimas (1992), and Ashworth 
(1995), though direct comparison can be made only with Ashworth (1995) who 
uses a similar method. The income coefficient here is somewhat lower than 
obtained by Ashworth (who obtains values of 0.89 and 0.97 in alternative 
specifications) though, like Ashworth (1995), a likelihood ratio test suggests 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on income equals 
10 LR-ratios (probabilities) of 1.26 (0.26) and 34.04 (0.00) were obtained for InL and InV 
respectively. 
There is some weak evidence from the maximal eigenvalue test that there are two 
cointegrating vectors in the VAR model. However, this is rejected by other diagnostics; the I 
null hypothesis of a 'unique cointegrating vector' is accepted by the LR-test (= 0.28; CV[10, 1: 5 
5%]= 18.3 )). Furthermore, Reimers (1992) suggests that in case of small samples, the Johansen 
procedure over-rejects when the null is true. Thus, the number of parameters to be estimated in 
the model are also taken into account, and an adjustment is made for degrees of freedom by 
replacing T by T-mn, where n is the number of variables in the model and in is the number of 
lags in the model. A unique cointegratinu vector is accepted by the modified statistics (see 
Table 3.3)). 
12 The vector has been norinalised on InG. and the weak exogeneitý, is 1-eiected býý LR-test 
(LR= 20.66, prob. = 0.0009). 
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unity. Nevertheless, since government expenditures appear to increase 
proportionate y (or less than proportionately) with national income the simple 
Wagner's Law hypothesis is clearly rejected. 13 
Regarding the degree of publicness, il, this must be extracted from ý in 
equation (3.5) using the expression 
-(j] froin equation (3.3). 
This yields il = 2.03) which is outside the expected range between zero and 
unity. Nevertheless, similarly large values have been found in previous studies 
(see Gernmell, 1990; Ashworth, 1995) and the results here tend to support the 
evidence of previous studies that, overall, government-provided goods are 
highly 'private' in nature. 14 
The effect of relative prices is found to be negative and price-inelastic demand 
for government-provided goods is supported. The negative sign confirms both 
Diamond and Ashworth's findings, while Tridimas found a positive sign. It is 
well Imown that the relative price of government-provided goods demonstrates 
a secular upward trend over time in the UK (as in many other countries), 
whether due to 'real' or purely statistical reasons. The evidence here would 
appear to suggest that, ceteris paribus, this has had a reductive effect on public 
expenditure presumably because resistance from voters against rising 
(nominal) public expenditures forces governments to respond with 
compensating reductions in real government output, in order to minimise these 
expenditure increases. 
13 The restriction imposed on the P rnatrix is rejected at 1% level (LR-Test = 35.1, CV(10, 
5%)= 18.3). 
1-4 Since il is determined by a combination of the coefficients on P, and N, both of which show 
some evidence of non-robustness across specifications, the calculated value of q probably 
has 
a large associated standard error. t) 
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The negative effect of the tax ratio, D, is also in line with previous findings. 
I- and appears to support the public choice argument for deficit illusion: over the 
long-run there is a higher demand for government expenditures when a lower 
proportion is financed by taxes. This is consistent with the argument that voter- 
taxpayers do not fully perceive their future tax liabilities, posing a challenge to 
Ricardian Equivalence. 
The proxy for (in)visibility, InV, has the predicted positive sign, being 
consistent with the fiscal illusion hypothesis that voter-taxpayers demand more 
goverm-nent expenditure when tax structure shifts towards a higher share of 
indirect taxes (plus other less visible taxes). Investigating the relative roles of 
the components of In V suggests that it is expenditure taxes which have the 
strongest revenue effects. The cointegrating vector with the three separate 
revenue components is (diagnostics are reported in Table 3.3 )): 
InG 
= 
0.72 InY 
- 
0.59 InPj, + 1.70 InN 
- 
0.44 InD + 0.98 ln(ETIR) 
0.43 ln(SSCIR) + 0.23 ln(NTRIR) 
The long-run impact on expenditures of switching tax structure towards 
expenditure taxes (and implicitly away from direct taxes) appears to be more 
than twice the effect of increasing social security contributions and roughly 
four times the effect of increasing non-tax revenues. That is, in public choice 
terminology, expenditure taxes are particularly 'Invisible' and appear to be 
able to support 'excess' expenditure. 
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Oates (1975) and Baker (1983) have argued that the structure of the tax system 
may be endogenous and public officials (politicians, bureaucrats) may prefer a 
higher level of government spending, and so design a complex tax system or 
focus on those 'less visible' and 'elastic' taxes in order to obtain more 
revenues with less public reaction. Whatever the direction of causality it seems 
that in the UK case, governments relying more on indirect taxes than direct 
taxes have, other things equal, been able to sustain higher government 
expenditures. Notice also that this is not merely an association of a rising 
indirect tax share over time with rising expenditures; despite the introduction 
of VAT in mid-1970s, the share of indirect taxes has not been increasing over 
our perio o investigation (the introduction of VAT appeared to halt a prior 
long-term decline in the expenditure tax share). 
Though it can be argued that switches to invisible (ie. indirect) taxes have 
permitted increased expenditures (compared to what they otherwise would 
have been), this should not be interpreted as indicating substantial scope for 
additional government spending by further moves towards indirect taxation. 
Clearly the marginal expenditure impact of raising V above its current share of 
around 43 per cent could be substantially less and could be expected to fall 
further as V approaches its limit of unity 
We would not be equally confident to interpret InD as support for fiscal 
illusion. This could probably be explained by the determination of 
expenditures and revenues simultaneously, and is consistent with the 
observation that a shock leads to an increase in the deficit as revenue cannot 
quickly be increased while expenditure is not easily reduced quicklý-. Of 
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course, as noted earlier, higher levels of expenditures, if not matched by 
revenue adjustments in the current period, imply a lower tax ratio (D = RIG) 
which may appear as an inverse (contemporaneous) relationship between 
expenditures and tax ratio (due to a direct 'accounting* effect, as distinct from 
an 'economiC or 'fiscal illusion' effect, on the budget deficit). Governments 
do utilise budget deficits, and this may imply a lower political risk, but usually 
in response to a shock which increases expenditure (or suddenly reduces 
revenue). 
In testing for fiscal illusion using equation (3). 5) in a time series context, we 
have required that adjustments in tax or deficit variables precede, aqjustments 
to goverinnent expenditures, as a necessary condition for those to be regarded 
as capturing fiscal illusion effects. 15 It could be argued of course that 
governments which are aware that it is easier to increase expenditures when the 
financing can be 'hidden' in deficits or indirect taxes, are not bound by such 
temporal precedence. Thus governments may increase expenditures today, 
Imowing that a combination of increased deficits and/or increased use of 
indirect taxes in the future can finance this. That is, if voters are relatively 
unaware of increases in deficits and indirect taxes they are also likely to be 
unable to associate these with expenditure increases in partictilor years. While 
this argument would allow us to interpret the deficit- expenditure interactions 
as consistent with the fiscal illusion hypothesis, it is also the case that the 
evidence is consistent with governments using deficits in a standard 
Cconsumption smoothing' manner analogous to a private individual with no 
15 In fact, the weak exogeneity for both InD and In V is accepted by LR-test (the LR ratios and 
probabilities are 9.57 [0.088] and 5.087 [0.405], respectively). 
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money illusion but volatile income levels. Since the present approach cannot 
discriminate between these alternative hypotheses, we are reluctant to interpret 
our results (on deficits) as evidence of fiscal illusion. 
Finally, we noted earlier that some commentators have argued that the political 
party in government may influence expenditure levels. We have investigated 
this by adding dummies to equation (3.5) for periods of Conservative and 
Labour governments. Consistent with the arguments and evidence of 
Morrissey and Steinmo (1987), we find no support for the view that, ceteris 
paribus, expenditure levels differ between party political regimes. 16 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter approached an explanation trends in British government 
expenditure utilising public choice theories that the level of government 
spending should reflect voter-taxpayer's demand for public goods. Such 
theories argue that certain features of the tax structure affect voter's 
perceptions of their tax burden so that they underestimate how much they are 
paying for public goods; such fiscal illusion implies that actual expenditure 
will be greater than predicted by a simple voter demand model. Previous 
public choice based studies of the demand for public expenditure have found 
mixed evidence for the impact of fiscal illusion, though none use the range of 
specifications of illusion variables employed here. 
16 When a dummy for Labour governments is included in the cointegyratinc, regression, a 117,1-71 inclusion of the coefficient of 0.02 is obtained, and the Likelihood Ratio test rejects the II 
dummy (LR-test= 0.37; prob. = 0.54). The coefficient on the first difference of the dummy 
appears to be 0.00 1 in ECM (and insignificant). 
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To test these theories we add fiscal illusion variables to a model of the demand 
for public goods using UK data for the period of 1955-94. I'lle Included 
sources of fiscal illusion are: the visibility of taxes, the extent of deficit 
finance; revenue complexity; and tax elasticity. The greater the share of "less 
visible' taxes in tax revenue, and of deficit finance relative to spending, the 
greater the likelihood that taxpayers underestimate the tax-price and vote for 
higher levels of government expenditure. A more complex tax system will 
make it more difficult for voter-taxpayers to identify their true tax burden 
hence increases the likelihood of underestimating the tax-price of government- 
provided goods. The more elastic the tax system the more responsive is 
revenue to growth in national income, hence it is easier to sustain a higher 
volume of public spending (if income is growing) without generating public 
reaction. 
The results obtained are consistent with comparable studies of public 
expenditure. Our innovation was in a more complete specification of sources 
of fiscal illusion. We found quite consistent evidence that invisible taxes and 
deficit financing were associated with increased levels of spending, but for 
various reasons the measures of elasticity and complexity performed less well 
(largely because they were highly correlated with the measure of visibility). 
Closer examination suggests that deficit financing is less an illusory plan to 
hide expenditure increases from voters and more a short-term necessity when 
shocks cause (trends in) spending and revenue to diverge. The support for 
illusion due to invisible taxes is stronger. We found some evidence that 
governments relying more on indirect taxes than direct taxes have, other things 
equal, been able to sustain higher goverrinient expenditures. This is consistent 
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with the fiscal illusion hypothesis that where public off icials prefer a higher 
level of government spending they can focus on less visible taxes in order to 
obtain more revenues with less public reaction. We would not, however. argue 
that this necessarily offers a ineans to increase future expenditure beyond the 
levels supported by voter-taxpayers. The current indirect tax share is at the 
upper end of the historical range of observed values and it ren-mins unclear 
whether still higher rates of indirect tax would allow these taxes to remain 
relatively 'invisible'. Our evidence would suggest however, that future 
governments pursuing a policy of switching the mix of taxes mray, firom 
indirect taxes may find it more difficult (over the long-run) to sustain political 
support for a given aggreg(tte level of tax revenues and expenditures. 
CHAPTER 4 
FISCAL ILLUSION AND THE DEMAND FOR LOCAL PUBLIC 
SPENDING IN ENGLAND AND WALES: 
A CROSS-SECTION ANALYSIS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
A distinguishing feature of British local government finance over the past ten 
years or so has been the series of major changes to the form of local tax. A 
domestic property tax was replaced in April 1990 by an essentially flat rate Poll 
Tax (the Community Charge) which in turn was replaced by a mildly 
progressive tax based on property value bands (the Council 'Fax). These 
'experiments' proved fruitful for testing Public Choice theories. Cullis et al 
(1993a) argued that while the introduction of the Poll Tax was presented as a 
measure to reduce fiscal illusion and thereby increase local accountability, a 
careful analysis of the equity and efficiency implications of the Poll Tax 
combined with the mechanism of allocating Central Grants suggests that fiscal 
illusion persists. In fact, Cullis et al (1991) argue that if median voters have 
imperfect Imowledge of how grants and local taxes interact, public perceptions 
of the Poll Tax would induce increased fiscal illusion. In neither paper, 
however, did they explicitly test for fiscal illusion. In this paper we use a 
median voter model and test for the existence of fiscal illusion under the 
Community Charge regime. 
The Community Charge generated considerable voter opposition, largely 
because it was seen as an affront to equity. This is detailed in Cullis et al 
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(1993a), who use a model of central goverru-nent rent-seeking to provide an 
explanation of why the Conservative Government chose to implement such a 
reform, and combine this with a politico-economic model of voter behaviour to 
offer an explanation of why the reform failed and why opposition was so great 
as to induce a policy 'U-Turn' with the introduction of the Council Tax. This is 
consistent with the cogent argument of Hudson and Jones (1994) that the 
revealed preferences of voters will display some altruism, ie. there are 'ethical 
voters' who will place the public interest before self-interest, hence the 
opposition to a tax perceived as inequitable. The Council Tax has not attracted 
strong public opposition, perhaps because it embodies some equity. But 
commentators have not investigated the implications for the (stated) desire for 
local accountability: fiscal illusion erodes accountability as it implies tax 
burdens are misperceived, and we test for fiscal illusion in a median voter 
model of the Council Tax regime. Though accountability is difficult to 
measure,, if the degree of illusion is greater under the Council tax, 
accountability is probably lessened (see also Barnett and Knox, 1992); we also 
however attempt to incorporate a more direct measure of accountability. 
A source of fiscal illusion commonly proposed in local finance of relevance to 
the British case is renter illusion. If the local tax is property based then it has 
been argued that only those who pay it are likely to correctly perceive the local 
tax-price, so renters may feel they do not pay the full tax price and therefore 
vote for higher expenditures (Goetz, 1977). Such an argument was made to 
justify the introduction of the Community Charge: only the heads of owner- 
occupied households were liable for property rates, hence more than half of 
voters were not liable. Cullis et al (I 993b) reject this claim on the basis that the 
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tax will be perceived as a household tax (thus concerning members other than 
the head) and is built into rents (which the landlord must pay). In their study of 
Belgium, Heyndels and Smolders (1994) found no evidence of renter illusion, 
although evidence has been found for the US (Bergstrom and Goodman, 19731). 
We test for the possibility of renter illusion under both the Community Charge 
and the Council Tax regimes, by including the ratio of renters to local 
population as an explanatory variable. If, as we suspect, both types of local 
taxes are paid by dwellers, no matter whether they are homeowners or renters, 
this variable should not be significant. However, the difference in the tax base 
of the two local tax regimes may produce different outcomes. 
A potential source of illusion that has attracted a certain amount of interest is 
the 'flypaper effect' which hypothesises that central grants 'stick where they 
hit'. If the median voter (correctly) perceives a grant as equivalent to an 
increase in the voter's income, the effect of the grant should be the same as that 
of an increase in income 
- 
the 'equivalence theorem' (Bradford and Oates, 
1971). However, much empirical evidence suggests that the effect of grants on 
spending is much greater than that of income 
- 
the flypaper effect (Barnett, 
1993; Oates, 1979). While evidence supports this flypaper effect in British 
local government, interpretations differ: Barnett et al (1991) demonstrate that 
the effect can be observed even if voters correctly perceive the budget 
constraint,, whereas Cullis et al (1991,1993a) argue that the effect arises 
because voters misperceive the budget constraint. Testing these interpretations 
directly is best achieved by using survey evidence, which is beyond the scope 
of this study. However, our findings are generally in line with Preston and 
Ridge (1995), who use survey data. 
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In outline, the remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. A brief 
theoretical background of the recent public choice studies of local spending 
will be discussed in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents our public choice model 
of the demand for locally provided goods and services, which incorporates 
representations for a number of possible sources of fiscal illusion. Section 4.4 
then presents our data for 54 local authorities in England and Wales. covering 
the fiscal years 1991/92 (when the Community Charge was in place) and 
1993/94 (when the Council Tax had been introduced). The empirical results are 
set out in Section 4.5, and Section 4.6 provides a summary with concluding 
comments. 
4.2 LOCAL PUBLIC SPENDING AND FISCAL ILLUSION 
Recent public choice approaches to local government finance have emphasised 
that the combination of local taxes and central grants is likely to give rise to 
voter misperceptions of the tax-price of local public goods (Goetz, 1977). This 
fiscal illusion causes voter-taxpayers to underestimate the tax-price and vote 
for higher levels of government expenditures (Oates, 1988, provides a review). 
This has spawned numerous empirical studies of fiscal illusion and the demand 
for locally provided public goods (an extensive review is provided by Dollery 
and Worthington, 1996). The early studies applied standard demand theory 
with voter-taxpayers assumed to maximise utility from private and (local) 
public goods subject to a budget constraint (Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; 
Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973). 
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The majority of studies take the decisive voter as being the voter \ý-Ith median 
income (see Holcombe, 1989). While a number of authors haN, e compared 
results using mean and median income (Inman, 1978; Pornmerehene and Frey. 
1976; Turnbull and Djoundourian, 1994), these studies did not specifically 
relate to fiscal illusion. In an attempt to assess which is the more appropriate to 
represent the decisive voter, we compare results based on both median and 
mean income. 
Thus far empirical studies of fiscal illusion effects on the demand for local 
govern-ment-provided goods have yielded mixed results. The flypaper effect 
has generally had strong empirical support in median voter models (see, for 
instance; Nelson, 1986; Grossman, 1990; Turnbull and Djoundourian, 1994; 
Heyndels and Smolders, 1994), while the evidence for renter illusion has been 
weaker. Renter illusion was first modeled by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), 
and a negative and significant effect was found between the percentage of 
owner occupied households and the level of local government expenditures. On 
the other hand,, studies which find no significant impact of renter illusion 
include Heyndels and Smolders (1994). 1 
4.3 MODELLING FISCAL ILLUSION IN LOCAL LEVEL 
Following standard practice, the voter-taxpayer i's demand for local 
government provided goods is hypothesised to depend on i's income, i's tax- 
price, and a vector of local taste variables as follows: 
Gi 
=a Yja Pgiß 2-, 1=1,2,..., N (4.1) 
1 More details can be found in Chapter 2. 
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where Gi is I's consumption of government-provided goods, Yj is i's disposable 
income,, Pgj is i's (true) tax-price for Gi, and Z is a vector of taste variables. The 
price of private goods is assumed to be similar across localities and is 
normalised at unity. Multiplying both sides by Pgj, the following specification 
is obtained: 
Ei 
=a Yio'Pgi ß+I Z" (4.2) 
where Ej (==Pgi G) is i's demand for local government expenditures. 
The tax-price is defined by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973) as 'Pgi =T, C Y", where Tj is i's tax share, C is the unit cost 
of G, and N is population with the degree of publicness measured by il. 
Substituting for Pgj in (4.2), yields: 
Ei =a Ya (TiC)ß+' Yl(ß+1) Z, - (4.3) 
An important issue is the measurement of the tax-price. Due to an absence of 
data on C, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) were forced to assume that the ratio 
of prices of public to private goods differs little between local governments. 
Thus, implicitly C= 1, and the tax-price becomes 
Pgi =Ti Y, 
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They then compute the tax bill on the house of median value. This is divided 
by total property tax revenue for the municipality to produce an estimate of the 
share of the real property taxes paid by the consumer with median income. T,. 2 
Such a specification adopts the theory of democratic process in which it is 
assumed that citizens are fully aware of the costs and benefits of government- 
provided goods. However, as noted above, recent studies within the public 
choice field have challenged this assumption, suggesting that voter-taxpayers 
may not be aware of their 'true' tax-prices because of some features of local 
finance. Thus 
, 
if voter-taxpayers are subject to fiscal illusion due to some 
characteristics of the local taxation, their demand for local public spending will 
depend on the perceived tax-price rather than the "true" tax price. The 
A 
perceived tax-price may be defined as Pgi = Hi Pgj, where fli is a 'perception 
parameter' for individual i, which is hypothesised to be a function of the local 
fiscal structure. In this paper, three relevant features are considered: the 
flypaper effect, renter illusion, and local accountability. Let Hi be a function of 
those features as follows: 3 
r1i IFI Y)i 711 (REN) 7T2 (A T13 kA ý (4.4) 
2 The case of the UK will be discussed in the next section. It is also assumed that the consumer 
with the median income pays the same share of other municipal revenues as s/he 
does of the 
property tax. This is purely an assumption of convenience which should 
be modified wherever 
better information is available. 
3 Other fiscal illusion arguments, such as tax elasticity, tax complexity and tile invisibility of 
indirect taxes are not included here because they are irrelevant in the case of local governments 
in the UK. 
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where FLYj is the per capita central grants, REN is the ratio of renters to the 
local population, and ACN is the ratio of local non-taxpaying adults to local 
taxpayers. These three variables are proxies for the flypaper effect, renter 
illusion, and local accountability, respectively. Substituting the perceived tax- 
A 
price ( Pi ) for the tax-price (Pgi) in equation (4.2), the model to be estimated 
becomes: 
InEi 
= 
Ina +a InY, + (P+I) In(TC) +il(p+]) InN 
+61 InFLYj +6, InREN +63 InACN +DZ + it (4.5) 
where 61 =n/(P+]), 62 = Tc? (P+]), and 63 = 7C3(P+])- 
The sign predictions for our variables are as follows: Income per capita (Y) is 
expected to have a positive effect on the demand for local public spending, 
while a combination of the coefficients for tax share (T) and population (N) 
will provide some measure of the degree of publicness. M 1, REN, and ACN 
are expected to have positive effects if the alleged fiscal illusions operate. 
Furthermore, a coefficient on FLYj greater than that on Yj is expected if the 
flypaper effect exists. 4 
4.4 DATA AND MEASURES FOR FISCAL ILLUSION 
The data for the local governments used in this paper are for England and 
Wales in 1991/92 and 1993/94. Relevant data are available for 39 non- 
4 If the equivalence theorem is true, as explained in Section 4.2, we would expect to obtain 
equal coefficients on both variables, meaning that the receipt of an additional f of central grant Z: ) 
by a local authority is analogous, in expenditure effects, to the receipt of an additional f by the z::, 
median incorne earner. 
Chapter 4 Fiscal Illusion and Local Public Spending 81 
metropolitan counties and 7 metropolitan counties in England, and 8 non- 
5 
metropolitan counties in Wales 
. 
Table 4.1 The Local Government Expenditures and Personal Income 
(f, per capita) Local Expenditures Mean Income Median Income 
1991/92 1993/94 1991/92 1993/94 1991/92 1993/94 
Full Sample 602.5 667.2 13,260 13,796 10,417 10,813 
England (Non-metr. ) 
z:: ) 560.8 622.6 13,644 14,100 10.670 10,960 
Wales (Non-metr. ) 701.3 711.6 11,728 12,5633 9,290 10,133 
Metropolitan 
Counties 1 722.2 865.0 12,871 13,514 10,294 10,770 
Local goverm-nent expenditures (LGE) per capita are computed by dividing the 
total local government expenditures by local population. Table 4.1 shows that 
the mean of the per capita local government expenditures in all counties is 
about E602 in 1991/92. Greater London is the (metropolitan) county with the 
highest per capita LGE at about E975, while Dorset has the lowest per capita 
LGE at about f557. The figures exhibit a similar pattern in 1993/94. 
Metropolitan counties have substantially higher LGEs on average than all 
counties in England and Wales as a whole. As expected, the county average for 
median income is lower than the county average for mean income both in 
1991/92 and in 1993/94. There is a substantial range of mean (and median) 
5 The metropolitan counties in England are Greater London, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, 
South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, West Midlands, and West Yorkshire; the non-inetropolitan 
counties in England are Avon, Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, 
Cheshire, Cleveland, Cornwall, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Devon, Dorset, Durham, East Sussex, 
Essex, Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Hereford & Worcester, Hertfordshire, Humberside, Isle of 
Wight, Kent, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Northamptonshire, 
Northumberland, North Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Shropshire, Somerset, 
Staffordshire, Suffolk, Surrey, Warwickshire, West Sussex, Wiltshire; the non-metropolitan 
counties in Wales are Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwent, Gwynedd, Mid Glai-noi-lan, Powys. South 
Glamorgan, West Glamor-an. t:: ) 
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income values across local authorities. the highest mean income In 1991/92 for 
example being Surrey with f 18,700, and the lowest Dyfed with E9.920. 
Table 4.2 The Local Government Revenues in England and Wales 
(f million) 
Full Sample England 
(Non-metrop. ) 
Wales 
(Non-metrop. ) 
Metropolitan 
Counties 
1991/92 1993/94 1991/92 199-3/94 1991/92 1993/94 1991/92 1993/94 
Total 
Expenditures' 605.2 684.1 432.5 482.8 251.5 255.7 1971.4 2294.9 
)2 CC (CT 164.7 171.0 139.7 142.1 33 1 
.5 33 9.6 456.4 481.5 (0.27) (0.25) (0.32) (0.29) (0.1") (0.15) (0.23)) (0.21) 
NDR 239.5 198.3 200.0 158.5 65.6 47.8 658.1 592.7 
(0.40) (0.30) (0.46) (0.33) (0.26) (0.19) (0. 
-3) 3) (0.26) 
RSG 201.0 314.7 92.8 182.3 154.4 16 93' 857.0 1218.7 
1 1 
(0.33) (0.46) (0.21) (0.38) (0.61) (0.66) (0.43 )) (0.53) 
CC: Community charge, CT: Council tax, NDR: Non-domestic rates, RSG: Reveiiue support grants. 
I These are the expenditures rnet by local tax, non-domestic rates, and revenue support grant. 
2 The figures in parentheses are the ratio of each category of revenues to total expenditures. 
The three major categories of local government revenues in the UK are local 
taxes (community charge (CC) in 1991/92 and council tax (CT) in 1993/94), 
non-domestic rates (NDR), and revenue support grants (RSG). As seen in 
Table 4.2, about 27% of local government expenditure was financed through 
the CC in 1991/92, while the CT ratio was about 25% in 1993/94. The ratio of 
NDR is around 40% in 1991/92, and there is a substantial decrease in 1993/94 
to 30%. Conversely about 33% of local government expenditure was financed 
by the RSG in 1991/92, and this ratio had increased to around 46% in 1993/94. 
In English non-metropolitan counties, the highest proportion of local 
government expenditures is financed by NDR in 1991/92. The CC is the 
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second largest, while RSG provides the lowest share. On the other hand, in 
Wales the highest proportion of the local government expenditures is financed 
by RSG followed by NDR and CC. The relative shares of the three categories 
of local government revenues remain roughly the same in 1993/94 for Wales, 
while the RSG becomes more important in England. 
For voter-taxpayers, the only local tax is the community charge in 1991/92 and 
the council tax in 1993/94. The former is a flat rate tax on all adults with a few 
exemptions and reductions, and the latter is a tax on households (also with 
some reductions). The 1991/92 mean tax share (for the community charge) is 
computed by dividing the average (per person) CC by total CC revenues as 
follows: 
, t, y 
Tl, pollt( ,::::::::: (TCCINLTP)ITCC=IINLTP 
where TCC is total community charge revenues, and NLTP is the number of 
taxpayers. This is also used for the median voter-taxpayer since it seems 
reasonable to assume similar mean and median tax shares for a tax levied at a 
common per-adult rate. 
The computation of the mean and the median tax shares in the case of the 
council tax (CT) is not so straightforward. Firstly the CT is levied on 
households rather than individuals, and secondly the level of council tax paid 
by a household depends on the CT 'band' to which a property is allocated 
(depending on its estimated market value). The CT bill for the households 
therefore has to be modified to obtain the individual tax shares which must take 
. 
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into account the composition of households. Assuming that the council tax bill 
is equally shared by each adult within a household, the 1993/94 mean tax share 
(for the council tax) is computed by dividing the average (per person) CT by 
total CT revenues (that is, similar to the CC case). 
A similar complication exists for the median individual council tax share. The 
median individual in terms of council tax payments may not be the same as the 
individual who lives in a household with a median council tax band. A 
comparison of the number of adults per household (from census 1991) shows 
that the individual with median tax share is the one who lives in a household 
with two adults. Therefore, the median individual tax share is computed by 
dividing the average council tax bill per household by two, and then dividing 
by total council tax revenue in each county as follows: 
Ti, 
collIlcil lax = (TCT1NDH12)1TCT, -: t; IINDH 
where TCT is total council tax revenues, and NDH is the number of 
households. That is statistically equivalent to the ratio of the average CT per 
household to total CT revenue. 6 
As noted earlier, the variable C measures the unit cost of local publicly- 
provided goods relative to the prices of private sector goods. While the latter 
probably do not vary substantially across localities in Britain. differences in 
local public sector wage rates could create substantial differences in local 
6 Despite these differences, the cornputed mean and median tax shares are highly correlated 
(around 0.97). A similar pattern also emerges when council tax per household is used instead 
of per adult. Using any of these proxies produced similar regression outcornes below. t) 117) 
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public sector marginal costs. Data on local public sector \vages specifically are 
not available, but employment income (for public and priv, 'Ite sectors 
combined) by local authority are available. We use these data to proxy local 
differences in public sector marginal costs. 
To compute aC index for our purposes, the employment income in each 
county is divided by the average for all counties. If the employment income is 
around the average of all the counties, the index is close to unity, and there is a 
negligible effect on the tax-price. However, if the employment income in a 
county is significantly below (above) the average, the index will be 
significantly lower (higher) than unity, and the tax-price will similarly be lower 
(higher). The tax-price measure which we use is therefore a function of the 
individuals' tax share, the unit cost of local government-provided goods, and 
population, such that: 
Pgi = [(Ri IR] C Yl 
where Ri is individual i's community charge (or council tax) bill, and R is total 
receipts from the community charge (or council tax). 
The two major components of central grants are Revenue Support Grants 
(RSG) and non-domestic rates (NDR). The former is a proportion of standard 
spending assesment (SSA) determined by the Consultative Committee on 
Local Government Finance in aimual meetings, and the latter. also known as 
the "uniform business rate", is collected from local business, placed in a 
national NDR pool, and are distributed in a similar way to the RSG. Both 
Chapter 4 Fiscal Illusion and Local PublicSpending 86 
7 forms of grants can be treated as lump-sum unconditional grants 
. 
Therefore. 
FL) i is computed as follows: 
FLYj 
= (RSG+NDR)IN 
The data from the 1991 census are used to compute the proxy for renter illusion 
(REN). Around 30% of local population, on average, live in rented houses, with 
the percentage substantially higher in metropolitan counties (around 39%). The 
following formula is used to compute the proxy for local accountability (A CN): 
A CN 
= (NOA 
- 
NLTP)INLTp 
where NOA is the number of adults, and NLTP is the number of local 
taxpayers. The ratio is only around 0.03 on average in 1991/9-33, because, there 
are only few exemptions under the community charge. 8 For the 1993/94, an 
additional proxy was calculated as: 
A CNH 
= 
(NOA 
- 
NDH)INDH 
where NDH is the number of households. The intuition behind this proxy is the 
argument that the council tax is paid by the head of the household and only one 
7 Many of the specific grants have been replaced by lump-sum grants in the UK, except some 
payments such as mandatory student awards, rent allowance, and sorne offier services such as 
in-service teacher training, education support, urban development, mental Illness, alcohol and t) 
drug abuse etc. These are inairily non-discretionary and subject to separate arrangements. 1 8 These are resident hospital patients, those being looked after iri residential care, the severely 
ineritally handicapped, members of religious corrilliuriities, people stayirig iii soine maht 
shelters or short-stay hostels, those witli no homes etc. 
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of the adults is responsible for it, such that, the remaining adults in the 
household may not be aware of the local tax. 
Finally we include a number of other variables in our regressions to allo\\, - for 
some 'taste' effects. One is the population aged 5-15 years. which may have 
stimulative impacts on some forms of expenditure such as housing, education 
etc. A dummy variable (Dl, h,,,, ) is used to capture the impact of the party 
politics, where Dl, bmtrý--l if the Labour Party holds the niýjority of the seats in 
the county, and Dlabour=O otherwise. The Labour Party is often argued to spend 
more on public services, ceteris paribus, so DIabour is expected to have positive 
impact. Furthermore, dummies for counties in Wales (D,,,, I,, ) and for the 
metropolitan counties in England 
(Dmetropolitan) 
are included in some regressions 
to allow for possible effects of urbanisation on expenditures. These are 
expected to be positive in metropolitan authorities and negative in Welsh 
authorities which are predominantly rural. Welsh authorities also benefit from 
(central government) spending by the Welsh Office which potentially allows 
reductions in Welsh local authority spending. 
4.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section we estimate the model outlined in Section 4.3. We begin by 
estimating equation (4.5) by OLS for the median voter (ie. using median 
income) separately for the 1991/92 and 1993/94 tax regimes. Results are shown 
in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, and these suggest that the model overall performs 
fairly 
well 
- 
coefficients obtained generally have the expected signs, and F-ratios and 
aqjusted R2s are high. 
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Table 4.3 Local Government Spending per capita-1991/92 (Median Income) 
England (non- 
metropolitan) 
England (non- 
metropolitan) 
England (Inc. 
metropolitan 
England 
&Wales 
Constant 1.58** 1.38** 1.0** 1.20** 
(0.61) (0.59) (0.45) (0.39) 
Inymedian 0.16" * 0.16** 0.15** 0.11** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
InTi 0.026"-* 
(0.0125) 
111N 
-0.027** -0.0241- -0.021 (0.0127) (0.013) (0.01-)) 
In(FLY) 0.67*** 0.67"" 0.73-1-"* 0.741-1-* 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(ACN) 0.01 * 0.011 ** 0.008 0.002 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
In(REN) 
-0.022 -0.023 - 0.03' 5 -0.01 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
In(P515) 
-0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
DLabour 0.0 6**" 0.06*** 0.05*"* 0.041-1-* 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) 
DMetropolitan 
-0.008 -0.013 (0.03) (0.03) 
DWales 
-0.15*** (0.02) 
F-ratio 35.9 36.2 86.6 108.3' 
7,2 (Het) 1.52 1.54 4.12 7.88 
R2 (adjusted) 0.87 0.87 0.94 0.95 
F-ratio is ajoint significance test for the set ot-variable included in the regressions, and it is 
2 highly significant in all cases. x (Het) is the Breusch-Pagan test foi- heteroscedasticity: all the l. ) Z13 
regressions pass this test. 
Results are reported for non-metropolitan authorities in England, all authorities 
(including metropolitan) in England, and all authorities in England and Wales. 
In the last two cases shift dummy variables are included to allow for the 
possible differences discussed in Section 4.4 between Welsh (Dll,,, I,, ) and 
metropolitan (Dmetropolitan) authorities compared to English non-metropolitan 
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authorities. Results for these dummies confirm that, ceteris paribus, Welsh 
authorities have lower local expenditure levels in both fiscal years, while the 
dummy for metropolitan counties is significant only in 1993/94.9 
Looking first at the results for median income) regression coefficients are all 
positive and significant as expected, suggesting that local government-provided 
goods are normal goods. The income elasticity of demand for local 
government-provided goods is an issue which is frequently discussed and all 
regression estimates suggest that this is substantially lower than unity. and 
significantly so as confirmed by Wald test statistics in Table 4.5. 
Regarding the tax-price elasticity, the nature of the computations of tax shares 
and unit cost does not allow us to draw clear-cut conclusions. As mentioned in 
Section 4.4, alternative tax-price specifications include measures of tax shares 
which are highly (negatively) correlated with population, while the measure of 
unit cost (C) is highly (positively) correlated with income (over 0.9 in all 
cases). 
9 Expenditure appears to be about 15% lower in Welsh Authorities in 1991/92, while it is 
around 10% lower in 1993/94. Metropolitan counties seem to have higher expenditures 
(around 5%) in 1993/94, while there is no evidence in 1991/92. This may well reflect the 
variability of mandatory payments for sorne specific services which are particularly 
high in 
metropolitan counties. However, our expenditure data does not include those specific grants 
which are non-discretionary and subject to different arrangements. A durnilly for Greater 
London was also tested, and it was found to be positive and significant (at 10%) In 1993/94, 
while insignificant in 1991/92. 
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Table 4.4 Local Government Spending per capita-1993/94 (Median Income) 
England (non- 
metropolitan) 
England (non- 
metropolitan) 
England (Inc. 
metropolitan 
England 
&Wales 
Constant 1.52*** 1.34*** 1.07** 0.97*'! 
-' (0.43) (0.44) (0.45 (0.45) 
InYmedian 0.16*1- 0.17* ** 0.18` ** 0.17- 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
InTj 0.023"** 
(0.008) 
InN 
-0.025*** 
-0.021 *"* -0.021 *** (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
ln(FLY) 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.71 *** 0.74"** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
ln(ACN) 0.0064-1- 0.007** 0.006 0.0007 
(0.0035) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
ln(REN) 
-0.081-** -0.08"', -0.08"', -0.07"--! -- (0.03) (0.03) (0.0-1) (0.03) 
ln(P515) 
-0.16* -0.15* -0.20"** -0.20*** (0.085) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
DI-abour 0.025** 0.025** 0.022* 0.013 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01) 
DMetropolitan 0.05*-' 0.04* 
(0.02) (0.02) 
DWales 
-0. 
(0.02) 
F-ratio 36.4 37.5 175.2 165.4 
y2 
, 
(Het) 8.58 8.70 7.94 7.33 
2 R (adjusted) 0.87 0.87 0.97 0.97 
F-ratio is a joint significance test for the set of variable included in the regressions, and it is 
2 
x 
-Pa- highly significant in all cases. 
, 
(Het) is the Breusch Dan test for heteroscedastIcIty: all the 
regressions pass this test. 
The regressions suffer from multi 
-collinearity problems when these variables 
(InN, InTi, and InTC) are all included. To accomodate this, we drop C, and test 
each of the other variables separately in our estimates, as seen in the first and 
second columns of Tables 4.3 and 4.4.10 InN has a negative effect while InTj is 
10 Despite the fact that C appears in the theoretical model, and it is often measured by wage 
rates, we can confidently assurne that the unit cost of local public services does not vary much 
between the local authorities in UK. 
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positive. The former implies some degree of publicness in the provision of 
local public services. The positive sign on the tax share also confirms this: we 
would expect a negative sign, if InTj captured any price effect: I lowever. the 
positive sign implies that either of those variables essentially capture the 
impact of scale economies. 
Table 4.5 Hypothesis Testings 
1991/92 
Null Hypothesis England (non- England (inc. England 
metropolitan) metropolitan &Wales 
GC=1 110.7 _ 135.9 203.9 
(Income Elasticity) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tj=l 5.25 3.88 8 
(Degree of Publicness) (0.022) (0.049) (0.070) 
U=6 1 35.01 4 1.39 64.24 (Equivalence Theorem) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1993/94 
o(= 1 239.6 281.6 316.4 
(Income Elasticity) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
11=1 6.16 5.20 5.57 
(Degree of Publicness) (0.013) (0.023) (0.018) 
OC=6 1 55.15 70.14 64.24 (Equivalence Theorem) 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
The figures in the cells are y, --statistics tor the Wald test, and the ficures in parantheses are the t) tý' 
associated probabilities. The critical values are 3.84 at 5%, and 2.71 at 10%. TI is the degree of 
publicness, (x and 61 are the coefficients for income and lump-sum grants respectively. Tile null 
hypotheses are rejected in all cases. 
Further tests (see Table 4.5) show that the null hypothesis of i1=1 (that local 
government services are purely private) is rejected in all cases, ' I but the degree 
of publicness (ij) is around 0.97 in English non-metropolitan counties, and 
slightly higher in metropolitan and Welsh counties (around 0.98). 12 These 
11 The coefficient for population will simply be (-q-1) by the exclusiori of T, alld C. Therefore, 
an empirical findings of "q- 1 =-0.02", for instance, implies that fl=0.98. 
12 This difference may be an outcorne of tax shares which behave sli, flitly different in those Z71 
- 
counties. The tax share is substantially lower in metropolitan counties due to 
hlgher number of 
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results lead us to accept the hypothesis that the degree of publicness is uniform 
across all authorities and, though we confirm that -q is less than unity. there 
appear to be only small sharing economies (at most) associated with local 
authority expenditures. 
Fiscal Illusion 
As mentioned earlier, both revenue support grants (RSG) and non-domestic 
rate revenues (NDR) can be used to test for 'grant illusion' 
- 
the flypaper effect. 
When the RSG only was used to test for this effect, positive and significant 
results were obtained. When the NDR is treated similarly to the RSG and the 
sum of the two included in the estimation, results continue to be positive and 
significant (with higher F-ratios and R2s), suggesting that both NDR and RSG 
have similar influences on voter-taxpayers' perceptions. Further investigations 
are required to test for the flypaper effect. The argument that the lump-sum 
grants are income equivalent and likely to have a similar stimulative effect on 
the voter-taxpayer's demand may also be tested. When the restriction a 
was imposed on the estimated equations, it can be seen in Table 4.5 that the 
computed statistics are substantially higher than critical )C2 values, suggesting 
that the null hypothesis of equality is rejected. It would seem therefore that the 
impact of lump-sum grants on expenditure is not equivalent to the impact 
expected when the median voter's income is similarly boosted. Moreover, the 
coefficients for Yj and FLYj show that a one percent increase in lump-sum 
grants stimulates around four times greater increase in local public spending 
tax-payers, and only a sinall arnount of local spending is financed through local taxes in Wales. 
However, any explicit impact cannot be observed due to the limitations of the existing 
specifications. 
13 (x and 6, are the coefficients for Yj and FLYj respectively. 
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than does an increase iii the median voter's personal income by the same 
amount. 
ACN measures the proportion of non-taxpaying voters to taxpayers, proxying 
local accountability, and it appears to be positive in all cases, as expected. but 
significant only for non-metropolitan counties in England. The positive and 
significant results suggest that non-taxpaying voters support higher demand for 
local spending, or equivalently voters who face the direct local tax burden 
demand less local spending, providing some support for accountability. It also 
seems to be slightly lower under CC than CT. 14 
This effect is not significant when metropolitan and Welsh counties are 
included in regressions (the coefficients are still positive i ics are 111 while t-statisti 
lower). The reason may be that the number of taxpayers in metropolitan 
counties is higher on average, and the ratio of local taxes to local spending is 
substantially lower in Wales. It should be noted that A CN captures the effect of 
non-taxpaying/taxpayer voters, and it is not clear how different ways of sharing 
a given tax bill between the electorate would affect the level of local spending. 
This also applies to "non-taxpaying" adults in council tax paying households. 
Despite the fact that the results do not provide strong support for less 
accountability under the council tax, it is not clear, either, how far the "non- 
14 As mentioned earlier, households also were considered as tax paying units under the council 
tax (1993/94), and ACNH was used to proxy accountability in regressions. The results were 
insignificant, giving support to Cullis et al. (1991,1993b) who challenge the view that 
property tax was less visible than the community charge to taxpayers. We are therefore 
inclined to concur with Cullis et al. that, though only a proportion of the electorate are legally 
liable for local taxes, directly non-taxpaying voters are not necessarily unconcerned about local 
taxes and spending. 
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taxpaying" adults in a council tax paying household are aware of their local tax 
burdens. This would require more detailed investigation of intra-household 
behaviour. 
As a further check for fiscal illusion, we include an additional 'renter illusion' 
proxy (REN) 
- 
the ratio of renters to total households. This appears with a 
negative sign in all cases suggesting that renters are not suýject to any illusions 
due to their tenancy status. As noted earlier, this is as we expected in the case 
of British local taxes (either community charge or council tax), because the 
local tax is often paid directly by tenants or added explicitly to rents. 
Furthermore, the coefficient is negative and significant under council tax. This 
is consistent with renters being more strongly opposed to local spending than 
homeowners (perhaps because, they can reap the benefits of local spending less 
readily than equivalent homeowners. This would be reinforced if tenants are 
less permanent residents in a locality compared the homeowners). 
Other 'Taste' Variables 
We included a number of other taste variables which might account for 
differences across local authorities in the demand for local expenditures. We 
noted earlier that more children could give rise to demands for higher 
expenditures on such things as education and housing. Testing the ratio of 
population aged 5-15 to total population (P515) in our regressions did not 
suggest any positive influence on local govermuent expenditures in either year. 
In fact the coefficient on P515 is negative and significant for 1993/94 which 
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may reflect the tendency for expenditure cutbacks in that year to fall most 
heavily on authorities with large education budgets. " 
The other taste variable is a 0-1 dummy which takes the value I for Labour 
dominated county councils and 0 otherwise. It is often argued that the Labour 
Party has a tendency to tax and spend more than Conservative Party, and the 
positive and significant signs in most cases support this: ceteri. ý' paribus, the 
level of local spending in Labour dominated counties is highel- than those in 
other authorities. The positive effect is weaker (smaller estimate, and/or 
insignificant) when the Welsh counties are included in the sample. This is 
probably because the majority of the county councils in Wales are dominated 
by independent councillors, so reducing the positive effect when those counties 
are included in regressions. 16 
Mean Versus Median Income 
Finally, we use our data on mean income differences across local authorities to 
see whether the power of the decisive voter on the local government budget 
process, is particularly associated with the median-income, rather than mean- 
incoine, individual. Table 4.6 reports similar regressions to those given in 
tables 4.3 and 4.4 in order to compare the performance of mean and median 
income as representing the decisive voter. It is immediately obvious that the 
'mean-voter' model behaves very similarly to the 'median-voter' model in the 
15 The average ratio of education expenditures to total local expenditures is 46.7% In 1991/92 
and 42.6% in 1993/94. Clearly the expenditure cuts fell especially heavily oil education. 
16 The slightly lower significance level when metropolitan counties are included in the sample I 
in 1993/94 may be a consequence of the separate inclusion of the dummy for metropolitan 
counties (D,,,, 
-0,, Oh,, M). The majority of the seats in those county councils are held by Labour, 
and some of the effect is captured by Dlell, politan - However, when the mo durnmies (D1,17our and 
Djjjc11-()j)o1jj, j? ) are included separately, consistent results were obtained. 
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two years, and the results are very much in line with those found for median 
income. As with our accountability variables, this approach only capture the 
, average' effect of personal income (either mean or median) levels on 
expenditures. 
Table 4.6 Mean versus Median Income 
Full Sample 1991/92 1993/94 
Constant 1.20** 1.36*** 0.97** 0.71 
(039) (035) (OA5) (039) 
Inymedian 0.11** 417*** 
(0.05) (404) 
InY,.,, 019** 
(014) (0.03) 
1 nN 
-0.021 -0121 -0.021 -0.023*** (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0107) 
In(FLY) 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.76*** 
(0.04) (014) (014) (013) 
ln(ACN) 0.002 0003 01007 
-0.001 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (4004) 
In(REN) 
-0.01 -0.001 -407** -016** (014) (014) (013) (013) 
In(P515) 
-0.06 -0.04 -0.20*** -0.20*** (0.07) (0.07) (106) (106) 
DLabour 404*** 014*** 0.013 4017* 
(0112) (0.012) (011) (0109) 
DMetropolitan 
-0.013 -0.017 014** 014** (0.03) (013) (012) (012) 
-0.15*** -0.15*** -0.10*** -0.10*** (0.02) (012) (012) (0.01) 
Pratio 108.3 106.9 165.4 187.2 
X2 (Het) 7.88 9.38 7.33 10.0 
R2 (a, )1 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 
F-ratio is a joint significance test for the set of variable included in the regressions, and it is highly 
significant in all cases. )(' (Het) is Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity: all the regressions pass 
this test. 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined a public choice model of demand for local 
government-provided goods incorporating a number of representations of fiscal 
itures in the UK. Data for illusion, and applied this to local government expendi I 
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two fiscal years, 1991/92 and 19933/94, have been used, reflecting two verv 
different local tax regimes 
-a community charge (poll tax) in 1991/92 and a 
property tax (council tax) in 1993/94. An important distinction between the two 
is that the former was levied on individuals at a flat rate payable by almost all 
adults, while the latter was levied on households using different tax rates. 
Our empirical results suggest a positive impact of median income on the 
demand for local government expenditures with an elasticity lower than unity. 
The price elasticity of demand for local public services could not be addressed 
explicitly; however measures of fiscal illusion appeared to have similar 
responses for both the community charge and council tax. The results for a 
proxy for local accountability show that though only a proportion of the 
electorate are legally liable for local taxes, directly non-taxpaying voters are L- 
not necessarily unconcerned about local taxes and spending. Renter illusion 
finds no support under either of the local tax regimes. However, there is some 
evidence that voter-taxpayers in rented accommodation demand lower 
spending under the council tax compared with the community charge. The 
results also suggest only very small sharing economies associated with local 
authority spending: local publicly-provided goods are quasi-private in nature. 
We also investigated the possibility of fiscal illusion resulting from central 
government grants and business rate revenues. Significant support was found 
for the so-called flypaper effect associated with government grants, which 
appeared to apply equally to (direct) grant and business rate revenues. Further 
evidence suggested that the receipt of an additional f of central government 
grant by a local authority was much higher, in its expenditure effects, to the 
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receipt of an additional E by the median income earner. The results show that 
such illusion persists under both local tax regimes, supporting Cullis et al 
(1991) who argue that if median voters have imperfect knowledge of how Z7 
grants and local taxes interact, public perceptions of the Poll Tax would not 
reduce fiscal illusion. 
Finally, comparing mean and median income. it was found that the 'mean- 
voter' model behaves very similarly to the 'median-voter' model in both years, 
suggesting that mean and median income work equally well to represent the 
decisive voter. The effect of income distribution on the demand for public 
spending, and different ways of sharing a given local tax bill among electorate 
are interesting areas for further research. 
CHAPTER5 
TAX PERCEPTIONS AND THE DEMAND FOR PUBLIC SPENDING 
IN THE UK: A MICRO-DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The standard approach adopted to analyse the demand for publicly provided 
goods generally assumes that individuals (or households) maximise their utility 
by consuming private and public goods. Most early empirical studies of public 
good provision use macro-data where individual choices are aggregated, as 
individual demand for publicly provided goods cannot easily be determined. In 
the absence of explicit (market) prices for public goods and services, voter- 
taxpayers make choices based on perceptions. Using a median voter framework 
from public choice theory, aggregated data has been used in the literature to 
estimate the demand for government expenditures, and the effect of possible 
tax-price misperceptions on the outcome (see, for instance, Borcherding and 
Deacon, 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973, Wagner, 1976; Henrekson, 
1988; Heyndels and Smolders, 1994). 
An important shortcoming of these studies is that individual tastes are either 
omitted or roughly represented in the models. In the case of voters' 
perceptions, a similar problem arises as various 'aggregate' proxies are used to 
pick up these perceptions while the actual source of the relevant information is 
the individual. Other approaches, such as surveys and budget games. may be 
helpful to overcome these failings and provide more direct information about 
individual preferences. A considerable difference 
between these two 
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approaches is that the former is quantitative while the latter is mainly 
qualitative in nature. An important feature of qualitative data is that the nature 
of the data and collection procedures has a substantial influence on the 
accuracy and stability of responses (see Throsby and Withers. 1986: Groot and 
Pornmer, 1989), hence, specific techniques are required to generate data which 
are 'truthful' and appropriate for statistical analysis (a brief survey is provided 
in Section 2). 
In this chapter, we use the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS)-1995 to 
analyse tax perceptions and their impact on preferences for government 
spending. The outline of the chapter is as follows. A brief literature survey of 
micro-data studies of public goods and fiscal illusion hypotheses is provided in 
Section 5.2. Descriptive statistics are discussed in Section 5.3, whereas 
empirical results are discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 draws some 
conclusions. 
5.2 MICRO-DATA STUDIES OF PUBLIC GOODS AND FISCAL 
ILLUSION 
The micro-study of individual preferences for fiscal issues was pioneered by 
Mueller (1963) who examined public attitudes to taxation and spending. I She 
uses data collected by the Survey Research Center of the University of 
Michigan on an experimental basis, and evaluates the responses related to 
various fiscal issues. The rank ordering of public preferences showed that 
people judge fiscal programs from the point of view of both national and 
IA useful literature survey is provided by Lewis (1982: 39-65). 
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personal benefit. The relationship of fiscal preferences to personal benefit is 
more pronounced, yet it appears to be only a partial determinant. 
Regarding attitudes toward public debt and taxes. Mueller (1963) found that 
the status quo was accepted by the majority of people. though opiiiions were 
dependent on individual circumstances. Despite evidence of strong support for 
the extension of a number of government programs, only a minority of 
respondents favoured tax increases, and hardly anyone wanted to see those 
expenditures financed by deficits. Comparisons of the answers by different 
subgroups of the population showed that upper income groups were not less 
favorably disposed toward the extension of government programs than lower 
income groups. It was also found that party identification had only a weak 
relationship to fiscal policy attitudes. 
Some recent studies have also used survey data and budget games to evaluate 
the demand for publicly provided goods and fiscal illusion. CUllis and Lewis 
(1985) used data from a survey of public awareness of econon-iic affairs in 
Britain. The survey was based on a sample of people aged over 18 from various 
social classes, and questions were asked concerning beliefs about the sources of 
government revenue to pay for services. The cross-tabulations of various 
responses showed that the majority of respondents preferred to keep the level 
of taxation and expenditure at present levels, but if taxes had to be increased 
these should be levied on goods rather than incomes. The overall results 
showed widespread ignorance of govermuent sources of revenue. Utilising 
some questions in the same survey, Cullis and Jones (1987) showed that it was 
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income tax that had high visibility, and also revenue was more visible than 
expenditure. 
Strauss and Hughes (1976) argued that individuals' stated preferences may not 
represent their maximum utility if they do not face a budget constraint. and 
they develop a coul-? on scale method to measure the demand for public goods. 
This method allows respondents to make hypothetical expenditure and tax 
recommendations with moveable penny coupons, which can be 'spent' on 
expenditure increases in any of the programs and/or reductions in the major 
taxes. The method was applied to a random sample of residents of North 
Carolina, and the responses were used to investigate the qualitative demand 
functions for public goods. The qualitative nature of the data forced them to use 
a multinomial logit model. The results showed that personal characteristics 
systematically affect the preferences for public goods: Elderly people preferred 
to reduce taxes rather than to increase spending; higher income was associated 
with a greater desire for more public goods; parents living with children desired 
more post-secondary education. Groot and Pornmer (1987) apply a similar 
method to a representative sample of the Dutch population, and the results 
showed that the largest marginal social demand was for public services for the 
elderly, followed by mental health care, primary and secondary education and 
higher education. Apart from 'right-wing' voters who favoured defense, 
general government, police and justice services, no strong dependence on 
political orientation was found. 
Willingness-to-pay is another method which seeks to establish individual 
demand prices for public goods by experimental or survey techniques, and has 
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been used to measure deinand for pure public goods. such as environmental 
quality and mixed goods (Throsby, 1984). A sample of adults (aged 18 years 
and above) in Sydney was asked about their preferences for the arts as a public 
good and about their willingness to pay for arts support out of taxes. In addition 
to questions about personal characteristics, one question was 'what is the 
maximum you would want paid out of your taxes each year to support the arts 
at their current level', and it was asked under the two assumptions that the 
respondents' total taxes would have to change and not to change. Standard 
OLS was then applied: the empirical results showed that aii incentive might 
exist for individuals to overstate their willingness to pay if they perceive the 
possibility of an improvement in their private consumption that outweighs the 
tax costs involved, and in this case, private good demand is a significant 
determinant of willingness to pay. 
A further group of studies apply microeconometric techniques to survey data to 
analyse the demand for local public services (see, for instance, Gramlich and 
Rubinfeld, 1982; Bergstrom et al., 1982; Preston and Ridge, 1995). Evidence 
generally supports the findings from aggregate data for demand elasticities, and 
significant socio-economic differences in preferences for particular spending 
and tax categories have been found. However, the mLýjority of those studies do 
not incorporate fiscal illusion; an exception being Preston and Ridge (1995) 
who use data from BSAS-1990 to analyse local public spending in the UK. 
Applying the ordered probit model to the essentially qualitative data, they 
found a price elastic demand for local public goods which appear to be 
imperfectly congested, while there is also evidence for income elastic demand 
and voters' tax-price misperceptions due to lump-sum grants. 
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Most previous studies, such as Cullis and Lewis (1985) and Cullis and Jones 
(1987), only considered responses to a few survey questions, where the 
respondents' income level, for instance, was not available. Another limitation 
is that they used non-discrete data which did not allow more rigorous statistical 
analysis. On the other hand, though Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982) and 
Bergstrom et al. (1982) used discrete data, they did not incorporate fiscal 
illusion. One advantage of this paper is that the BSAS-1995 contains more 
detailed information about tax and expenditure preferences to allow us to 
explore fiscal illusion more fully, while the discrete nature of the data allows 
more sophisticated statistical analysis and modelling of preferences for tax and 
expenditure. 
The two central questions to be addressed are: (i) how do voter-taxpayers 
perceive tax-cost?; and (ii) how do these perceptions influence their 
preferences for public spending? To answer these, we have utillsed relevant 
questions in BSAS-1995, which allow us to investigate both overall tax-cost 
perceptions and the relative visibility of certain taxes. Fiscal economists have 
often been curious about whether tax-payers perceive their tax burdens 
accurately, and when the source of this information is the tax-payers 
themselves, their responses, per se, are not always sufficient to answer this 
question. Therefore, wherever possible, a comparison of responses with actual 
situations are especially helpful. We attempt to investigate this, firstly, for the 
iax-cost perceptions for income tax and VAT, and secondly, for the relative 
visibility of these two taxes. 
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5.3 BSAS-1995 AND TAX PERCEPTIONS 
BSAS-1995 covered 33,633-33 adults in the UK, 1.234 were selected for the 
particular questions about tax and expenditure preferences; 81 ') of which are 
suitable for statistical analysis (those who did not answer none, don't knoiv, 
and rqfusalINA). The survey contains questions about individual characteristics 
and tastes (including income levels), and questions about tax and expenditure 
preferences. 2 Some personal characteristics of respondents are as follows: 
46.6% male, 52.2% married, 24.5% with at least one school aged (5-15) child, 
20.2% retired, and 6.5% unemployed. Respondents were asked to place their 
households within one of sixteen income groups (as seen in Appendix 1). We 
have divided the sample into four income sub-groups 3: the percentage of 
households within each are: 10.5% low income, 46.9% lower middle income, 
21.2% upper middle income, and finally 21.5% high income. 
Tax-Cost Perceptions 
The two questions placed in the survey concerning the income tax (IT) and 
value-added tax (VAT) costs are as follows: 
-About how much do you think that an extra one penny in the pound on the 
basic rate of income tax would cost your household? 
-About how much do you think that a one percentage point increase in the rate 
of VAT (that isftom 17.5 percent to 18.5 percent) would costyour household? 
=1 I ix 2 The questions selected frorn BSAS- 1995 for the purpose of this study are given 
in Append' 
5.1. For the details of the survey see Jowell et al. (1996). 
These groups are chosen with respect to income tax liabilities: Households with 
low income 
< E-3,999) are not liable for income tax; households with lower middle incorne (f4,000- 
f 14,900) pay a lower rate of 20%; households with upper middle incorne (f 15,000-f 25,999) 
pay a marginal rate of 25% (basic rate); households with high income 
(E26,000+) pay a 
t) Z71 
marginal rate of 40% (higher rate). These are approximate boundaries, because allowances 
may alter individuals' status. 
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Five options were offered to respondents (as seen in Appendix 1): (1 ) nothing 
(2) <f I per week or <E5 0 per year, (3) f1 
-2 per week or E5 0-100 per year, (4) 
E2-3 per week or fI 00-f 15 0 per year, (5) >0 per week or >f 15 0 per ýýear. One 
way to identify any possible misperceptions is to compare the sui-\7cy responses 
with the actual situation (where known). The nature of those questions allow us 
to estimate "actual" tax-cost for individuals and compare these to their 
responses. We have calculated the "actual" cost of one extra penny on the basic 
rate of IT,, and one extra percentage point on the rate of VAT for each income 
group, and coded each household into one of the five options given for the two 
questions. Data for the 1994-95 fiscal year are used in those computations (see 
Appendix 5.2). 
The extra cost from IT is firstly computed for a single person (aged under 65) 
as seen in Table 5A. 1. The average income within each income band is used in 
income level for the first band is the comPutationsý except the first band. 4 The 11 
upper bound of the group, though this does not affect results because it is 
below the lower tax band, and the concern here is with an increase in the basic 
rate of income tax. The extra costs for other groups of income taxpayers with 
married couple's and age allowances are computed similarly and shown in 
Table 5A. 2. The cost for high income groups does not change a lot, as the 
higher IT rate remains the same. The major difference between the various 
groups is that some taxpayers who benefit from age or married couple's 
4 it should be noted that by taking rnid-point estimates within income bands, the tax payments 
of some are underestimated whilst overestimated for others. It is assumed that these cancel Out. 
for the convenience of analysis, because the exact income level of each individual is not 
known (we also test for sensitivity, see tables 5A. 6 and 5A. 7). 
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allowances shift to a lower code (codings for various groups are shown in 
Table 5A. 2). 
The extra cost from a one percentage point increase in the rate of VAT is 
computed using data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES). The 
household expenditures are provided for ten income deciles in the FES, while 
BSAS-1995 is based on sixteen groups. Our approach is that, firstly, household 
expenditures are estimated for each income group according to the income tý 
boundaries given in the FES (see Table 5A. 3). 5 Then VAT is computed for 
both rates (17.5% and 18.5%). The expenditures on housing, food and non- 
alcoholic drink-s are excluded because they are either zero-rated or exempt. 6 it 
appears from the computations, as seen in Table 5A. 4, that every household 
pays some amount of VAT (none of the households appears in Code 1). So, it 
is unlikely for a household not to experience any additional cost when the rate 
of VAT is increased from 17.5% to 18.5%. 
Using the responses to those questions (Q589-Q590) and the 'actual' tax-costs, 
taxpayers' (mis)perceptions (PERC) for each tax category is computed as 
follows: 
PERC = CODER 
- 
CODEC 
We have tried to match the income groups as accurate as possible. There are slight 
differences in the boundaries given in the two survey (i. e. FES and BSAS- 1995), however, this 
does not affect the results much. We also test for sensitivity of our estimations 
(see below). 
6 Previously, VAT on dornestic fuel and energy was also zero-rated, and a lower rate of 8% 
was imposed in 1993. However, the question regarding the VAT cost explicitly pointed 
to the 
increase (frorn 17.5% to 18.5%), and this does not make any difference for this question 
(for 
further discussion, see below). Children's clothim, is zero-rated, however it does not appear 
separately in the FES. 
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where CODER is the code chosen by respondents (from the options provided 
for those questions), and CODEC is the code assigned from the computations 
for each respondent. PERC=O, if a respondent 'truly' estimated his/her tax-cost 
in the sense that both 'actual' and perceived tax payments fall within the same 
range (code). PERC<O, if the tax-cost was underestimated, and PERCA, if the 
tax-cost was overestimated. Finally, the extent of divergence of PERC from 
zero provide a crude measure of the degree of misperception. 
The frequency distributions of PERC for IT and VAT are reported in tables 5.1 
and 5.2,, respectively. It appears from Table 5.1 that about 40% of respondents 
'truly' perceived the IT-cost (PERCIT=O), about 28% of them underestimated 
(PERCIT ": ýO), while about 32% overestimated (PERCIT >0)- If we allow for 
some possible inaccuracy in our estimates of 'actual' tax-cost by aggregating 
the middle bands (-I :!! ý PERC1T ýý 1), it is still the case that only about 75% of 
respondents appeared to have either 'truly' perceived (or slightly misperceived) 
the IT-cost. Inspecting Table 5.2, about 30% of respondents seein to have 
'truly' perceived VAT-cost (PERCI 'AT ::::::::: 0), while about 22% underestimated 
(PERC, 
'A T<O) and about 48% overestimated (PERCI,,,,,, I, >0). Again, aggregating 
the middle bands (-I :! ý PERC, AT ! ýý 1) shows that about 72% of respondents 
appeared to have 'truly' perceived (or slightly misperceived) the VAT- 
cost. There, seems to be a tendency for tax-cost overestimation both for IT and 
VAT, however, the descriptive statistics show that the mean of IT-cost 
perceptions is almost zero, while the mean of VAT-cost perceptions is 
substantially higher (see Table 5A. 6, and figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
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Table 5.1 Income tax-cost perceptions (1p increase in the basic rate) 
All Income Low Lower Upper High 
PERCIT* Groups Income Middle Middle Income 
Inc. Inc. 
-4 5 (0.6) 1 (0.6) 4(2.3) 
-3 26(3.2) 4(2.3) 22(12.6) 
-2 64(7.9) 3 (0.8) 35 (20.3) 26(14.9) 
-1 131 (16.1) 35 (9.2) 42(24.4) 54(30.9) 
0 322(39.6) 61 (71.8) 145 (38.1) 47(27.3) 69 (39.4) 
1 155 (19.1) 13 (15.3) 105(27.6) 37(21.5) 
2 70(8.6) 7(8.2) 57(15.0) 6 (3.5) 
3 31 (3.8) 33 (3.5) 28 (7.3)) 
4 9(1.1) 1 (1.2) 8(2.1) 
Total 813 (100) 85 (100) 381 (100) 172(100) 175 (100) 
*PERCIT ý CODERI-F 
- 
CODE C,,,, where CODERITis the code chosen by respondents (Q589) 
and CODECIT is the code assigned frorn the com putations for each respondent ( both are 
ordered from I to 5). PERC11- 0, PERCIT`ýO, and PERCITýýO imply 'true' perception, 
underestimation and overestirnation, respectively. 
Table 5.2 VAT-cost perceptions (an in crease in VAT from 17.5 % to 
18.5%) 
All Income Low Lower Upper High 
PERCVAT* Groups Income Middle Middle Income 
Inc. Inc. 
-3 13 (1.6) 1 (0.6) 12(6.9) 
-2 38(4.7) 5 (1.3) 11 (6.4) 22(12.6) 
-1 125(15.4) 10(11.8) 55(14.4) 24(14.0) 36(20.6) 
0 247(30.4) 28(32.9) 96(25.2) 48(27.9) 75(42.9) 
1 216(26.6) 24(28.2) 106(27-8) 56 (3 ) 2.6) 
_330 (17.1) 
2 125 (15.4) 1 3) ( 15.31) 80(21.0) 32 (18.6) 
3 49(6.0) 10(11.8) 39(10.2) 
- - 
Total 813 (100) 85 (100) 381 (100) 172(100) 175 (100) 
*PERCVAT = CODERVAT 
- 
CODECVAT, 
where CODERVAT is the code chosen by respondents (Q590) 
and CODECVAT is the code assigned from the computations for each respondent (both are ordered frorn I 
to 5). PERCVAT=O, PERCNIAT<(), and PERCVATýýO imply 'true' perception, underestirnation and 
overestimation, respectively. 
For further analysis, we have performed a t-test, and the results show that the 
mean of IT and VAT under- and over-estimations are significantly different, 
confirming the VAT overestimation (further details of the test are provided in 
Chapter 5 Tax Perceptions and Spending PrýfLrences 110 
Appendix 5.3). 7 It should be noted that the mid-point of each income range was 
used in calculations. To test the sensitivity of choosing mid-points and other 
personal characteristics which might have not been accurately captured In the 
survey, we have recalculated the extra costs from IT and VAT by adding and 
substracting 10% (see Table 5A. 7). Despite some respondents shifting to 
higher and/or lower codes, the results do not seem to be sensitive to these 
calculations (for descriptive statistics, see Table 5A. 6). A t-test was also 
performed for these calculations, and in each case the results confirm the 
difference between IT and VAT cost perceptions. 8 
As seen in tables 5.1 and 5.2, income level seems to be an important 
determinant of tax-cost perceptions. Furthermore, those two questions 
(concerning IT and VAT cost perceptions) are different by nature. The question 
concerning IT asks respondents to consider the extra cost from an increase in 
the basic rate, while clearly some respondents are not liable for this rate at the 
margin (around 19% of the sample). As a result, it appears from Table I that 
none of the respondents in the low income level underestimated the IT-cost, 
while none of the respondents in high income level overestimated it. 
7 We have performed the t-test for PERC <-I (underestimation) and PERC >I 
(overestimation). The t-ratios are 4.99 for underestimations and 5.01 for overestimation (the 
degree of freedom=812, and both are significant at 1%). 
8 The t-ratios are 5.54 and 6.27 for -10% computations, and 4.78 and 4.27 for +10% 
computations. 
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This is a consequence of the data, as the lowest option to be chosen by 
respondents and the assigned code for the low income group is 1. Thus, in this 
method,, it is technically impossible for this income group to underestimate IT- 
cost. A similar problem arises for the high income group (around 3 1% of the 
sample) who are not technically 'allowed' to overestimate IT-cost by this 
method. In the case of VAT, low income groups can underestimate tax 
payments (actually about 12%, because none of the respondents appeared in 
Code 1), and high income groups can overestimate (actually about 17%). As 
seen in Figure 5.3, an increase in the basic rate of income tax does not affect 
some respondents in low and high income groups, while this is not true for 
VAT. Other questions may allow more direct comparisons of the two taxes (see 
below). 
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Relative Visibility (? I'IT and VAT 
Comparing IT and VAT perceptions can be further assessed using other BSAS Z7 
questions which ask respondents to choose one of the taxes. Those questions 
are: 
-#'these were the only options. fbr the government, which do you think that it 
should choose? 
1. A penny in the pound. /br all [income] taxpayers, 
2. Five pence in the pound. lbr higher [income] taxpayers 
3. Raise VAT by one percent 
The cross-tabulation of responses (see Table 5.3) shows that about 58% of 
respondents preferred '5p for high income' as the first tax priority, while about 
30% preferred 'lp for all' and about 10% preferred 'VAT by 1W. Another 
question asks for the second preference, and the responses show that about 
49% of respondents preferred 'lp for all', while about 29% preferred '5p for 
high income' and about 19% preferred 'VAT by I%'. These questions concern 
the general preferences which may not be based purely on self-interest. In fact, 
other questions ask for the respondents' perceptions regarding whether those 
taxes will make the respondent's family best off and worst off. The responses 
to those questions, as seen in Table 5.3, show that an even higher percentage 
(about 67%) of respondents thought '5p for high income' will make their 
family best off, while 7% of respondents (that is lower than the one for general 
preferences) thought 'VAT by IW will make their family best off. This 
difference 
, 
ie. the evidence that some respondents preferred the VAT option 
even though they did not believe it was best for them, might be explained by 
some other preferences and perceptions (for further empirical analysis, see 
Section 5.4). 
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Tax Preferences Tax Perceptions 
First Second Best for the I orst for the Tax categories (Q626) (Q629) family (Q63 )2) family (Q63 5) 
All income g roups 
Ip for all 246(30.3) 400(49.2) 192 (23.6) 180(22.1) 
5p for high inc. 470(57.8) 237(29.2) 542(66.7) 60(7.4) 
VAT for 1% 84(10.3) 155 (19.1) 57(7.0) 565(69.5) 
Others 
_I 
3(1.6) 21 (2.5) 22 (21.8) 8(0.9) 
Total 813) (100) 813 (100) 81-33 (100) 813 (100) 
Low income group 
Ip for all 17(20.0) 45(52.9) 25(29.4) 8(9.4) 
5p for high inc. 56(65.9) 22(25.9) 49(57.6) 4(4.7) 
VAT for 1% 11 (12.9) 14(16.5) 4(4.7) 72(84.7) 
Others 1 (1.2) 4(4.8) 7(8. ) 1 (1.2) 
Lower middle income group 
lp for all 12 8 (-')' 
-3.6 181 (47.5) 93(24.4) 75(19.7) 5p for high inc. 220(57.7) 116(30.4) 257(67.5) 9(2.4) 
VAT for 1% 25 (6.6) 74(19.4) 18(4.7) 292(76.6) 
Others 8(2.0) 10(2.6) 13 (3 
-. 
3) 5 (1.3) 
Upper middle income group 
Ip for all 47(27.3) 93 (54.1) 24(14.0) 50(29.1) 
5p for high inc. 105(61.0) 48(27-9) 137(79.7) 8(4.7) 
VAT for 1% 17(9.9) 29(16.9) 11 (6.4) 113 (65.7) 
Others 3 (1.7) 2(1.2) 1 (0.6) 
High income group 
Ip for all 54(30.9) 81 (46.3) 50(28.6) 47(26.9) 
5p for high inc. 89(50.9) 51 (29.1) 99(56.6) 39(22.3) 
VAT for 1% 
-3 )I (17.7) 38(21.7) 24 (1 -3.7) 88(50.3) Others 1 (0.6) 5 (2.8) 2(1.1) 1 (0.6) 
Q626. If these were the only options for the government, which one do yoLi think that it should 
choose? 
Q629. And which one do you think should be the government's second choice? 
Q632. Which one these three would leave you and your family best off? 
Q635. Which one these three would leave you and your farnily worst off? 
We concentrate on the options 'income tax by Ip for all' and 'VAT by I%' to 
compare the relative visibility of these taxes. Even if the respondents perceived 
the option '5p for high income' as the best for their family, they may still 
prefer either 'lp income tax for all' or 'VAT by 1W. This can be determined 
for the first and second preferences, because the relevant questions appear in 
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the survey. We combined the two questions asked separately (the first and 
second preferences for tax increases) to identify the respondents whose first or 
second preference is either IT (lp for all) or VAT. The frequency distribution 
of the two questions shows that about 75% of respondents preferred IT to VAT 
(and about 23% of them preferred VAT to IT). 
The information about the perceptions is limited: we know which option of tax 
increases is best (or worst) for the respondents' families but we do not Imow 
which they regard as second choice for their families. Nevertheless we use the 
responses to those questions to test the relative visibility of IT and VAT. 
Firstly, we have calculated the costs of 'Ip income tax for all' and 'VAT by 
l%' for various income groups (see Table 5A. 4). 9 Our results show that the IT- 
cost exceeds VAT-cost for about 46% of respondents (371), and VAT-cost 
exceeds IT-cost for about 44% of them (355), while the costs from those taxes 
are not substantially different for about 11% (87). 10 
9 The domestic fuel and energy is included in the expenditures subject to VAT, though a lower 
rate is paid, because the question is general. 
10 Any difference between IT and VAT costs up to f 10 is ignored; only differences higher than 
f 10 are chosen. The intuition behind this is that the mid-point of each income range is used in I 
calculations, and a respondent with an income about the lower bound (about fl, 000 less) will 
pay LIO less, while a respondent with an income about the upper bound (about f 1,000 more) 
will pay EIO more incorne tax when an extra income tax is imposed for 'lp in pound'. A 
sirnilar situation applies to the VAT increases by 1%. 
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Table 5.4 IT (1% flat-rate) and VAT (1% increase) misperceptions 
IT-cost<VAT-costl- I IT-cost>VA-F-cost" Total 
Best for the family (Q632) 
IT for I p/f for all 95(54.9) 78(45.1) "(100) 17) 
VAT for 1% 16(31.4) 
-' 
35 (6 8.6) 51(100) 
Worst for the family Q635) 
IT for I p/f for all 53 (33.1) 107(66.9) 160(100) 
VAT for 1% 289(57.5) 2 14 (42.5) 5 03 )(100) 
I IT- and VAT-cost (a flat-rate of Ip and I%, respectively) computed for individuals with 
respect to their incomes, expenditures subject to VAT, and personal characteristics, and the 
differences more than f 10 are considered. 
Q632. Which one these three would leave you and your family best off?. 
Q635. Which one these three would leave you and your farnily worst off? 
These are cross-tabulated with the IT and VAT perceptions in Table 5.4. 
Allowing that the majority of respondents choose '5p for high incon-ic' as first 
preference, we concentrate only on the two residual responses to compare 
directly 'I p on income' ver. yus '1% VAT increase'. The results show that about 
55% of respondents seem to be consistent: they thought IT was the best for 
their family, and their actual VAT-cost did exceed IT-cost. On the other hand, 
about 67% of respondents who thought VAT was the best for their family were 
consistent as their actual IT-cost did exceed VAT-cost. Regarding the visibility 
of IT and VAT, the nature of those questions (and the responses) do not allow 
us to evaluate each tax, because only about 28% of respondents thought either 
IT or VAT is the best for their family, but the second best is not known. 
However,, it appeared from the responses that a higher percentage of 
respondents was inconsistent when choosing IT as the best option, either 
because they underestimated IT or overestimated VAT. Other responses show 
that about 67% of respondents seem to be consistent: they thought 
IT was the 
worst for their family, and their actual IT-cost did exceed 
VAT-cost. On the 
other hand, about 58% of respondents who thought 
VAT was the worst for 
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their family faced an actual VAT-cost which did exceed IT-cost. Responses to 
this question may be i-nore representative, as about 82% of respondents thought 
either IT or VAT is the worst for their family. The responses slio\v that a higlier 
percentage of responses was inconsistent when choosing VAT as the worst 
option, either because they underestimated IT or overestimated VAT. 
7 We use these responses to derive proxies of IT and VAT visibilities (I ISITand 
VIS T) to test for the consistency of tax-cost perceptions discussed earlier. The 
respondents who thought IT was the best for their family and whose IT-cost did 
exceed VAT-cost are considered to have underestimated IT ("ISIT::::::::: 
-1); on the 
other hand, the respondents who thought IT was the worst for their family but 
whose VAT-cost did exceed IT-cost are considered to have overestimated IT 
(VISIT 1) 
-, and VISIT: -- 0 otherwise (a similar approach was applied to VIST, A T) 
- 
The frequency distributions Of VISIT and VISFAT show that about 10% of 
respondents underestimated IT, and about 7% overestimated- on the other hand, 
2% underestimated VAT, and about 26% overestimated. II These results are 
generally consistent with the tax-cost perceptions (PERCIT and PERC,,, IT). 
It appears from this evidence (obtained from both proxies of tax-cost 
perceptions and relative visibility of taxes) that IT is more accurately perceived 
(in the sense that more people are consistent in their responses), while tax- 
payers are confused more about VAT, and frequently overestimate their VAT 
liabilities. The visibility of IT is generally in line with the previous findings by 
Cullis and Lewis (1985) and Cullis and Jones (1987) who showed that a large 
of was II The mean of VIS11. appeared to be almost zero (-0.0-) while the niean 
substantially higher than zero (0.244). 
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majority (93%) of people mentioned IT as a revenue source. whilc a small 
majority (56%) did for VAT. Our evidence indicates that there is both a higher 
degree of confusion about VAT liabilities and frequent VAT overestimation. 
One reason might be the changes in voter-taxpayers' preferences over time. 
The earlier survey was carried out in 1981, while we use a 1995 sLirvey. The 
time-gap and the changes in the fiscal climate of this period might have caused 
this difference. In fact, the time-series analysis of taxation and public spending 
in the UK shows that governments have relied more on indirect taxes over the 
1981 to 1995 period. Furthermore, prior to the BSAS-1995, there have been 
some important changes concerning VAT. In 1991 the VAT rate was raised 
from 15% to 17.5%. In 1993 a decision was taken to impose VAT on domestic 
fuel and energy which was previously zero-rated, and the proposal was to 
impose an initial rate of 8% and one year later move to the full rate of 17.5%. 
Considerable publicity and political debate followed this proposal, leading to it 
being overturned in parliament. This might have induced citizens' reactions 
against VAT, and it is consistent with the view that there is a limit on the 
governments' ability to utilise fiscal illusion. We relate these perceptions to 
expenditure preferences in Section 5.4. 
5.4 MODELLING ATTITUDES TO TAX AND SPENDING 
Tax preferences and perceptions have been generally discussed in the previous 
section. A further question is what determines the attitudes to taxes, and 
whether those attitudes have any influence on spending preferences. A number 
of personal characteristics, such as income level, political affiliation and other 
tastes, are used in the statistical analysis in this section. 
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Tox Prqferences and Perccphons 
Firstly, the tax preferences (5p/L for high incomes, Ip/f for all taxpayers. and 
I% VAT) and perceptions (PERCITand PERCI,, 4T) have been regressed on a 
number of variables, including some taste variables. For a purely self-interested 
tax-payer, a negative relationship is expected between income (INCOME) and 
'5p/E for high incomes' option. Reverse expectations apply to the 1% VAT' 
option; for a purely self-interested tax-payer, a positive effect of income is 
expected. The situation for 'Ip/f for all taxpayers' option is less clear. since the 
outcome depends on the respondents' perceptions about those alternative 
options. Respondents are, ceteris paribus, expected to prefer the taxes they 
underestimate: we test this by using proxies of relative visibility of IT and VAT 
in the regressions (VISIT and VIS1, AT). 
Other personal characteristics and tastes were also used in the regressions, and 
the expected relationships are as follows: marital status (AlfARRJED) may 
influence respondents' preferences and perceptions, due to either the 
allowances they get or the method they pay taxes (whether they are taxed 
together or separately), respondents who are engaged in different economic 
activities 12 may have different tax perceptions (eg. the respondents in a paid 
work may realise IT more directly than others); variables such as having school 
age children (CHILDREN) may influence tax-payers' perceptions because of 
12 These variables are as follows: unemployed (UNEMP), wholly retired (RETIRED), full-time 
students (STUDENT), permanently sick or disabled (SICKIDISAB), lookIng after home 
(HOME), working at least ten hours a week (WORK). We included dummies for each category 
except WORK which acts as a base frorn which the other categories differ. The reason we have 
chosen this category is that it covers about 50% of respondents, and those respondents are the 
ones who directly face IT. The situation is less clear for VAT, as almost all tile respondents 
face it. 
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zero-rated children's clothing. A dummy is used to capture the impact of 
political affiliation: the respondents intending to vote for Labour (LABOUR) 
would be expected to prefer a more progressive tax. 
One BSAS question concerned the overall tax burden as follows: 
-Generally, how would you describe levels of'taxation? those i0th high 
incomes, middle incomes and /ow incomes). 
1. Much too low, 2. Too low, 3. About right, 4. Too high, 5. Much too high. 
This question was asked separately for different income groups, and then the 
respondents were asked to place themselves in one of those income groups. We 
have derived the self-assessed tax burden (TAX BURDEN) from those 
questions, and include this in our regressions. 
The empirical results for tax preferences are reported in Table 5.5.13 The 
constant term is significant in all cases, and it is positive for '5p/f for high 
incomes', and negative for other options. We infer from this that the mqjority 
of respondents prefer more progressive taxes to the less progressive ones, 
which is consistent with the descriptive statistics discussed earlier. Income 
level has a significant influence on the preferences for '5p/L for high incomes' 
and VAT, being negative in the former, and positive in the latter. This implies 
that taxpayers are generally aware of the effect which the progressivity (or 
regressivity) of those taxes has on themselves. The respondents with lower 
income are more likely to prefer extra tax for high incomes, and vice versa. 
14 
We have also included a dummy for "high income earners", but the results 
13 The probit model was used, because the responses are binary [0,1] (see Appendix 5.4). 
14 The coefficient on incorne is insignificant when the dummy for Labour is included, perhaps 
because lower income groups have tendency to vote for Labour, and the negative income 
effect is partly captured by this dummy. 
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appeared to be insignificant (not reported here). The positivc effect of income 
on VAT preferences shows that, controlling for the general aversion to VAT 
(as captured by the negative constant), respondents with higher income are 
more likely to prefer VAT. These results suggest that the self-interest is the 
principal determinant of tax-payers I preferences. 
Table 5.5 also shows that the respondents with a tendency to overestimate a 
flat-rate income tax and VAT preferred '5p/f for high incomes', while the ones 
who tend to underestimate the VAT-cost preferred VAT. Income level does not 
seem to be a significant determinant of preference for a flat-rate (I p for all) 
income tax, perhaps because this tax concerned everybody rather than a certain 
income group. The evidence shows that the respondents, who preferred a flat- 
rate income tax, are also those who underestimated that tax. Regarding taste 
variables, the respondents intending to vote for Labour, ceteris paribus, 
preferred a more progressive tax. On the other hand, they opposed the more 
regressive ones, though the result is only significant for a flat-rate tax at 10%, 
and insignificant for VAT. Permanently sick or disabled people appeared to 
prefer a more progressive tax relative to the economically active people. 
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Table 5.5 Tax vreferences (nrobit modell 
'5p for high incomes Ip for all VAT for 1% 
CONSTANT 0.44*** 0.19 
-0.4')*** -0.14 -2.12*** - -). 14* (0.16) (0.21) (0.17) (0.22) (0.2' )) (o. -)o) INCOME 
-0.14* 
-0.09 -0.05 -0.11 0.40*** 0. ')8*** (0.06) (0-07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
TAX 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.031 0.01 
-0.01 BURDEN (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
VISIT 0.23* 0.21 * 
-0.30** -0.30** 0.01 0.06 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17) 
V1 SVAT 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.09 0.09 
-1.20*** -1.19*** (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) 
MARRIED 
-0.05 0.06 0.10 (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) 
CHILDREN 
-0.06 -0.07 0.16 (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) 
LABOUR 0.22** 
-0.17* -0.17 (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) 
UNEMP. 0.07 
-0.16 0.40 (0.20) (0.21) (0.25) 
RETIRED 0.15 
-0.10 -0.20 (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) 
STUDENT 0.14 0.002 
-0.25 (0.29) (0.29) (0.43)) 
SICK/DISAB 0.43' * 
-0.41 * -0.07 (0.22) (0.24) 
HOME 0.05 0.22 0.25 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.20) 
LLI 
-544.7 -5 '38.8 -494.7 -490.7 -238.0 -232.0 
LL2 
-553.6 -553.6 -498.4 -498.4 -270.2 -270.2 
x2 17.7 29.5 7.5 15.5 6 4.3 7 6.3' 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.113) (0.216) (0.000) (0.000) 
LL I: The maximised value of the log-likelihood function 
LL2: The restricted log-likelihood function (computed with only 
the constant term) 
Y2: A test of joint significance of all the coefficients in the regressions (probabilities in 
parantheses). 
Table 5.6 shows the empirical results for IT- and VAT-cost perceptions. 
15 
Respondents' income seems to be a highly significant determinant of tax-cost 
perceptions. The results suggest that tax-payers with higher incomes tended to 
underestimate the tax-costs, while the lower income groups tended to 
15 The ordered probit model is used, because the dependent variable is ordered [-L 0,1] (see 
Appendix 4). 
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overestimate. Clearly, respondents with higher incomes feel less burden from 
IT and VAT, and vice vei-sa. The perception regarding tax burden is 
insignificant, perhaps because the income variable already captures that 
eff ect. 16 There is a positive association between overestimating IT and 
perceived IT-cost, and between overestimating VAT and VAT-cost 
perceptions; we regard this as evidence for the consistency of responses. Those 
overestimating VAT appear to underestimate IT-cost, suggesting that these two 
taxes are regarded as alternatives to each other. However, the case of VAT-cost 
perceptions does not support this, perhaps because all respondents are, more or 
less, concerned with VAT, while this may not be true for IT (actually around 
half of the respondents appeared to be in a paid work). Therefore, the IT tax- 
payers are likely to have more chance to compare the two taxes. 
Some interesting results come out of taste variables. Married respondents 
appear to overestimate both IT- and VAT-cost. Taxing the incomes of couples 
was changed in 1990, and husbands and wives have been taxed separately since 
then. Although the retained allowances reduced those households' tax bill, the 
structure of allowances and rapid changes created some confusion. The 
empirical results show that married couples overestimate IT-cost, probably 
because they think about the total amount they pay, and the allowances are not 
very visible. The VAT-cost overestimation might be a consequence of a higher 
propensity to consume by married couples, though the evidence is weak. 
16 About 70% of respondents with low Income thought their tax burden was too lij-h, and more 
than 60% of respondents with high or upper middle income thought their tax burden was either 
too low or about right. The correlation coefficient between incornes and tax burden perceptions t) 
is 
-0.28 (pr. =0.000). 
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Table 5.6 Tax- cost perception s (ordered prob it model) 
IT-cost p erceptions VAT-cost perceptions CONSTANT 2.12*** 2.51*** 1.84*** 1.86*** (0.20) (0.23) (0.15) (0.20) INCOME 
-0.51 *** 
-0.63)*** 
-0.44*** 
-0.50*** (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
TAX BURDEN 
-0.01 
-0.002 0.06 0.0ý (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) VISIT 0.28** 0.26** 0.01 
-0.02 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
VISVAT 
-0.44*** 
-0.47*** 0. ')2*** 0.3)0*** (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
MARRIED 0.27*** 0.17* 
(0.09) (0.09) 
CHILDREN 
-0.12 0.18* (0.11) (0.11) 
LABOUR 
-0.13 0.09 (0.08) (0.09) 
UNEMP. 
-0.01 
-0.01 (0.17) (0.18) 
RETIRED 
-0.19 
-0.19 (0.13) (0.12) 
STUDENT 
-0.08 0.37 (0.25) (0.27) 
SICK/DISAB 
-0.52*** 0.11 (0.19) (0.21) 
HOME 
-0.33** 
-0.06 (0.14) (0.14) 
1.29*** 1.3) 1 *** 0.90*** 0.9 1 *** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
LLI 
-76 1.3' -750.6 -808.4 -799.9 
LL2 
-884.6 -884.6 -850.1 -850.1 2 246.6 268.0 83.3' 100.4 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LLI: The maximised value of the log-likelihood function 
LL2: The restricted log-likelihood function (computed witli only ZD 
the constant term) 
7,2 :A test of joint significance of all the coefficients in the regressions (probabilities in 
parantheses). 
ýt : The estimated parameter of the boundaries of responses. 
Households with school aged children appear to have overestimated VAT. As 
mentioned earlier, we have not been able to take into account the zero-rated 
itive sign might capture a children's clothing in our computations. So, the posi 111 
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slightly overestimated VAT bill for those who have children. ' 7 The dummies 
for economic activity all seem to be negative in explaining IT-cost perceptionsl 
suggesting that those respondents underestimate IT when compared with the 
respondents who are in paid work for more than ten hours a week (or those in 
paid work tend to overestimate compared with others, perhaps because they are 
the ones who face IT more directly). Regarding the VAT-cost perceptions. the 
respondents' economic activities had no significant effect. 
S- )pending Prqprences 
Another question concerns whether misperceptions distort voter-taxpayerc" 
.s 
preferences for public spending. Given a budget constraint, the fiscal illusion 
hypothesis argues that respondents who underestimate tax burdens are expected 
to demand higher public spending, and respondents who overestimate tax 
burdens are expected to demand less public spending. Of course, some 
respondents may think that they will not bear the cost of extra spending. Thus, 
expecting others to pay the extra cost, they may desire more spending even 
when they overestimate tax burdens. 
A question in the BSAS asks respondents preferences for tax and spending as 
follows: 
-Suppose that government had to choose between the three options on this 
card Which do you think it should choose? 
1. Reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and social benefits 
2. Keep taxes and spending on these services at the same level as now 
3. Increase taxes and spend more on health, education and social benefits 
17 The dummies for married couples and children are positively correlated, however, when 
each dummy was put separately, both appeared to be significant by slightly higher levels. 
Since only 33% of married couples appeared to have school age children, these two dummies 
capture different effects. 
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Table 5.7 Spending Preferences (Q65) 
All Income Low Lower Upper High 
Order Groups Income Middle Middle Income 
Inc. Inc. 
1 35 (4.3) 6(7.1) 16(4.2) 6(3.5) 7(4.0) 
2 244(30.0) 19(22.4) 125 (32.8) 53 (30.8) 47(26.9) 
3 534(65.7) 60(70.6) 240(63.0) 113 (65.7) 121 (69.1) 
Total 813 (100) 85(100) 381 (100) 172(100) 175(100) 
Q65. Suppose the government had to choose between the three options oil this card. Which do 
you think it should choose? 
1. Reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and social benefits 
" Keep taxes and spending on these services at the sarne level as now 
3. Increase taxes and spend i-nore on health, education and social benefits 
The frequency distribution of responses, as seen in Table 5.7. shows that about 
4% of respondents chose the first option (tax and spend less). while 30% of 
them chose the second (keep taxes and spending), and about 66% chose the 
third (increase taxes and spending). 18 The frequencies for various income sub- 
groups do not seem to be substantially different, though slightly higher 
percentages of respondents with low and high incomes desired more tax and 
spending, while a slightly higher percentage of respondents with low income 
also desired less tax and spending. 19 These responses are treated as expressions 
of demand for public spending which are assumed to be determined by 
respondents' income level, tax preferences (and perceptions). and personal 
characteristics. Let Gi be i's demand for public spending as follows: 20 
18 Responses to other questions show that the first priority for extra spending is health while 
education appears to be the second. 
19 The tax consequences of higher spending are spelled out in this question. The previous 
BSAS surveys showed that the popularity of increases in public spending fell markedly, in 
some cases by up to one half, when the tax consequences were spelled out (see Brook et al., 
1996). 
20 We are going, to use an ad hoe modelling in this study. Although an explicit modelling of 
demand for publicly provided goods, which incorporates tax-price misperceptions, is provided 
by Gemmell (1997b), our study is limited by the scope of the BSAS-1995, and various forms 
of tax-price misperceptions cannot explicitly be determined. Instead. we utillsed some 
questions related to tax preferences and perceptions. 
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Gi = cc X, ui 
where X, is a vector of explanatory variables, and ui is the error term. It should 
be noted that Gi is not known, instead the expressed preferences are used in the 
analysis. Those choosing the first option (reduce taxes and spending) or third 
option (increase taxes and spending) are taken to have a desired level of 
spending differing from current, actual spending, whereas those choosing the 
second option (keep the level of taxes and spending) are takeil to have a desired 
level of spending not differing from the actual level sufficiently. 21 
The explanatory variables are income, perceived tax burden. IT- and VAT-cost 
perceptions, and other taste variables, such as school aged children, political 
affiliation etc. The sign predictions for our variables are as follows: The 
respondents' income level is expected to have a positive effect on the demand 
for public spending, however, in our regressions the situation is less clear 
becasue taxes are not held constant. 22 The perceived tax burden (too high, too 
low etc. ) is expected to have a negative effect. 23 Given the tax burden, the IT- 
and VAT-cost perceptions are expected to have negative impacts, if they are 
visible: the respondents who have tendency to overestimate those taxes are 
21 This is represented by a treshold parameter, ýL (for more details, see Appendix 5.4). 
22 Assuming that the publicly provided goods are normal goods, a positive effect of mcorne on 
the demand for public spending would be expected. However, the respondents are warned that 
the taxes would also increase if they prefer a higher level of spending. So. tile coefficient for 
income will be a combination of positive effect of incorne and negative effect of the tax-price. e) 
23 If the respondents think that the level of taxation is too high, it can be assurned that the 
marginal cost of the current tax level is higher than the marginal benefit Of Current public 
expenditure, and they are expected to vote for a lower level of taxes and expenditures. On the 
other hand, the marginal cost of the current tax level is assumed to be lower than the marginal : 
--n I benefit of current public expenditure for those respondents who think that tile level of taxation 
is too low, and they are expected to vote for even higher level of taxes and expenditures. Z: ) 
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expected to demand less public spending, while the ones who tend to 
underestimate thern are expected to demand more. Other personal 
characteristics and tastes were also used in the regressions: A dummy is used to 
capture the impact of political affiliation, and the respondents intending to vote 
for Labour would be expected to prefer more public spending. The marital 
status, having school age children, employment status, and age will also be 
included in the regressions. The unemployed people and the households with 
school aged children may also demand more of those public services. The 
respondents' age is another variable which might have significant effect on the 
demand for public spending, e. g. via health demands. 
The results from the ordered probit model are reported in Table 5.8. The 
coefficient ýt support the specification of ordered preferences, and the 
-ratio, 
which tests for the joint significance of all variables, is significant. The income 
level is insignificant, while the impact of tax buden is negative and highly 
significant. Other things being equal, the respondents who think their tax level 
is too (or much too) high prefer spending (and taxes) to be cut. 
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Table 5.8 Spe nding (and tax) preferences (or dered probit m odel) 
T he dependent variab le= Responses to Q 65 CONSTANT 1.87*** 1.77*** 1.66*** 1.56*** (0.17) (0.17) (0.23)) (0.18) INCOML-' 
-0.03 0.02 
-0.001 0.02 (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) TAX BURDEN 
-0.20** 
-0.20** 
-0.24*** 
-0. -) 1 *** (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) VISIT 0.06 
(0.12) 
VISVAT 0.20* 
(0.11) 
PERCIT 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.04 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
PERCVAT 0.14** 0.10* 0.10* 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
MARPUED 0.11 
(0.10) 
CHILDREN 0.05 
(0.12) 
LABOUR 0.40*** 0.42*** 
(0.09) (0.09) 
UNEMP. 0.03 
(0.20) 
RETIRED 
-0.11 (0.1-)) 
STUDENT 0. ) "I 
(0.33) 
SICK/DISAB 0.39 
(0.24) 
HOME 
-0.24* (0.14) 
AGE 18-24 
-0.29* (0.16) 
25-34 
-0.07 (0.14) 
35-44 0. " ** 
(0.15) 
45-54 0.33** 
(0.15) 
55-59 0.26 
(0.2 3) 
60-64 0.12 
(0.20) 
1.3' 8*** 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
LLI 
-623) 2 -622.0 -606.2 -601 
-3' 
LL2 
-628.2 -628.2 -628.2 -628.2 
Z2 9.95 12.3 433.9 ý3.7 
(0.041) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) 
LLI: The maximised value of the loo-likelihood function-, LL2: The restricted log-likellhood t) 
); X2 function (computed with only the constant term A test of joint significance of all the 
coefficients in the regressions (probabilities in parantheses); ýL : The estimated parameter of the 
boundaries of responses. 
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To test the influence of tax (mis)perceptions on the spending preferences. the 
proxies of both relative visibility of IT and VATOSITand and those 
of IT- and VAT-cost perceptions (PERC17, and PERCIIAT) have been included in 
the regressions. The results from both proxies are consistent. IT perceptions 
being insignificant, and VAT perceptions being significantly positive. We are 
still cautious to interpret this as support for the invisibility of VAT. The 
previous analysis of the descriptive data showed that VAT was less accurately 
perceived, but frequently overestimated. This evidence completes the story 
about the tax and spending preferences (and perceptions): The heavy reliance 
on indirect tax in recent years, and the intention to introduce more VAT on 
other goods (such as domestic fuel and energy), provoked public reaction 
against VAT. The VAT-cost mainly fell on the low incomes due to its less 
progressive nature. Therefore, even though VAT-cost is overestimated by the 
majority of respondents, they still demand a higher public spending, and they 
expect that extra spending to be financed by other taxes (and probably by other 
tax-payers). 
Regarding the taste variables, the dummy for the respondents intending to vote 
for Labour is the only significant one, and it appeared to be positive as 
expected. 24 Others, such as marital status, school aged children etc., are not 
significant (there is weak. evidence that respondents who look after home desire 
less public spending). We included the dunu-nies for age instead, the 
24 The respondents who do not intend to vote for Labour, may not necessai-Ily Intend to vote 
for the Conservative (they may be undecided or intending to vote for another party). Thus, a 
dummy for the respondents intendmzc,,,, to vote for Conservative was also included, and a 
significantly negative coefficient was obtained. 
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respondents aged 35-54 seem to have relatively higher demand for public 
services. 25 These are the respondents who are likely to be the ones with school 
aged children (actually about 63% of school aged children). and hence. this 
may be capturing that effect too. The respondents aged 18-24 seem to demand 
relatively lower public services. This may be because they may not be too 
concerned with the secondary education and health services (further 
examination show that only 3% of those respondents have school aged 
children). 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter used the British Social Attitudes Survey-1995 to evaluate tax 
preferences (and perceptions), and their influence on the demand for public 
spending. Firstly, the respondents' perceptions of various taxes were compared 
with the actual tax-costs to identify any misperceptions using some descriptive 
statistics,, and secondly, using microeconometric techniques, those 
misperceptions were related to the tax and expenditure preferences to test 
whether they have any distortionary impact on the voter-taxpayers attitudes. 
The empirical analysis also incorporated other taste variables, such as marital 
status, school aged children, and political affiliation etc. 
Evidence showed that the tax preferences were essentially influenced by self 
interest,, and the majority of respondents preferred a more progressive tax to 
other options. Regarding the high income earners, the results appeared to be 
ambiguous because no evidence was found whether they prefer a regressive or 
?5 We included dummies for each age catetgrory from 18 to 64, while excluded the catetgory 65 
and over, and this category acts as a base from which the other categories differ. 
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a progressive tax. Respondents intending to vote for Labour, celerls paribus. 
preferred a more progressive tax. Regarding the IT- and VAT-cost perceptions. 
respondents with higher income tended to underestimate tax-costs. Both taxes 
were overestimated by married couples, perhaps because of their higher 
aggregate IT tax bill, and higher propensity to consume. Respondents other 
than the ones in paid work tended to underestimate IT, probably because the 
majority of them are not IT-payers. 
Further evidence suggests some forms of fiscal illusion. iii the sense that tax- 
payers appeared to be inconsistent in their responses regarding tax perceptions, 
and this inconsistency occured more frequently in VAT, conforming the 
argument that VAT (liability) is less visible. However. VAT is overestimated 
rather than being underestimated as argued in the fiscal illusion theory. We 
explain this by two particular reasons. One is the governments' heavy reliance 
on indirect taxes over the 1981 to 1995 period; and the other is the important 
changes concerning VAT prior to the BSAS-1995. In 1991 the VAT rate was 
raised from 15% to 17.5%; in 1993 a decision was taken to impose VAT on 
domestic fuel and energy which was previously zero-rated, and the proposal 
was to impose an initial rate of 8% and one year later move to the full rate of 
17.5%. Considerable publicity and political debate followed this proposal, 
leading to it being overturned in parliament. This might have induced citizens' 
reactions against VAT, and it is consistent with the view that there is a limit on 
the governments' ability to utilise fiscal illusion. 
Finally, a negative relationship found between the perceived tax burdens and 
spending preferences, while the impact of tax perceptions is ambiguous. IT- 
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perceptions did not have a significant influence on the deniand for public 
spending, and a positive relationship found between VAT-perceptions and 
public spending. These results suggest that even though VAT-cost is 
overestimated by the mqJority of respondents, they still demand a higher public 
spending, and they expect the extra spending to be financed by other taxes (and 
probably by other tax-payers). The dummy for the respondents intending to 
vote for Labour is the only significant one, and it appeared to be positive. The 
respondents aged 35-54 seem to have relatively higher demand for public 
services, and the ones aged 18-24 tended to demand less public services. 
CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
The Objective of this study has been to examine fiscal illusion and the demand 
. 
C- for public spending in the UK. As surnmarised in Chapter 2. mam- factors have 
been identified as contributing to the long-standing tendency of public sector 
growth in industrial countries, although empirical evidence for specific factors 
is mixed. We approach explaining public spending in the UK utilising public 
choice theories,, and concentrate particularly on demand-side factors. It has 
been argued by public choice theorists that the level of government spending 
should reflect voter-taxpayer's demand for public goods, however, certain 
features of tax structure may distort voters' tax perceptions, so that voter- 
taxpayers underestimate how much they are paying for public goods; such 
fiscal illusion implies that actual expenditure will be greater than predicted by a 
simple voter demand model. 
UK general government expenditure tended to rise steadily from 1955, and 
despite a marked reduction in the second half of the 1980s, this trend has 
continued in the 1990s. The entire period of 1955-94 can be characterised by 
quite volatile budget deficits, though the composition of tax structure is 
relatively stable. Taxes on expenditure, the relatively invisible taxes in the UK 
context, were some 40-45 per cent of total revenue over 1955-72 and 1978-94. 
Personal income taxes, the relatively visible taxes in the UK context, showed 
more movement. The other major revenue sources exhibit gentle trends. Social 
Security Contributions, the relative visibility of which is questionable, rose 
from a share of about ten to over 15 per cent. Corporate income taxes. \\7hich 
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are not paid directly by voters and therefore should be considered im-isible to 
individuals, moved around pretty much within a 5-10 per cent band. Non-tax 
revenues, which are also in principle 'invisible' (from the fiscal illusion 
perspective) declined slightly in importance from about twelve to eight per cent 
of total revenue. 
We related those trends to the fiscal illusion hypotheses (explained in Chapter 
2), and in Chapter 33. adopted a public choice approach. incorporating those 
hypotheses, to explain trends in public expenditure in the UK for the period of 
1955-94. The included sources of fiscal illusion were: revenue complexity, tax 
elasticity; the visibility of taxes, and the extent of deficit finance. The results 
obtained are consistent with comparable studies of public expenditure., income 
and population have positive signs, however, further tests reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient on income equals unity, confirming that 
government expenditure increases less than proportionately than national 
income, and therefore rejecting the simple Wagner's Law hypothesis. Evidence 
on the degree of publicness does not seem to be conclusive since the calculated 
coefficient is outside the exPected range between zero and unity. however, the 
value substantially higher than unity supports the evidence of previous studies 
that, overall, government-provided goods are highly 'private' in nature. The 
effect of relative prices is found to be negative and price-inelastic demand for 
government-provided goods is supported. The evidence here suggest that, 
ceteris paribus, relative prices have had a reductive effect on public 
expenditure presumably because resistance from voters against rising 
(nominal) public expenditures forces governments to respond with 
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compensating reductions in real government output, in order to i-ninimise these 
expenditure increases. 
Our innovation was in a more complete specification of sources of fiscal 
illusion. We found quite consistent evidence that invisible taxes and deficit 
financing were associated with increased levels of spending. but for various 
reasons the measures of elasticity and complexity performed less w-ell. In a 
time-series context with a fixed number of revenues as in the UK, the 
complexity of the tax system (as measured by a Herfindahl index) cannot 
readily be separately identified from visibility/elasticity aspects. The share of 
personal income taxes was found to primarily capture the visibility of direct 
taxes. The negative effect of the tax/expenditure ratio is also in line with 
previous findings, and appears to support the public choice argument for deficit 
illusion: over the long-run there is higher demand for government expenditures 
when a lower proportion is financed by taxes. This is consistent with the 
argument that voter-taxpayers do not fully perceive their future tax liabilities, 
posing a challenge to Ricardian Equivalence. It seems that in the UK case, 
governments relying more on indirect taxes than direct taxes have, ceteris 
paribus, been able to sustain higher govermnent expenditures. 
In Chapter 4, a public choice model of demand for public goods was applied to 
local government spending in the UK, using data for the community charge 
(poll tax) in 1991/92 and property tax (council tax) in 1993/94. We 
incorporated three measures of fiscal illusion; the flypaper effect, local 
accountability, and renter illusion. Our empirical results suggest a positive 
impact of median income on the demand for local governi-nent expenditures, 
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suggesting that local publicly-provided goods are normal goods, while the 
income elasticity is substantially lower than unity in all regression estimates. 
The price elasticity of demand for local public services could not be addressed 
explicitly, however, there is evidence for scale economics: local publicly- 
provided goods are quasi-private in nature. 
Measures of fiscal illusion appeared to have similar responses for both the 
community charge and council tax. The results for a proxy for local 
accountability show that though only a proportion of the electorate are legally 
liable for local taxes, directly non-taxpaying voters are not necessarily 
unconcerned about local taxes and spending. Renter illusion finds no support 
under either of the local tax regimes. However, there is some evidence that 
voter-taxpayers in rented accommodation demand lower spendiii(g, under the 
council tax compared with the community charge. This is consistent with 
renters being more strongly opposed to local spending than homeowners. 
Significant support was found for the so-called flypaper effect associated with 
government grants, which appeared to apply equally to (direct) grant and 
business rate revenues. The results show that such illusion persists under both 
local tax regimes, supporting the argument that if median voters have imperfect 
Imowledge of how grants and local taxes interact, public perceptions of the Poll 
Tax would not reduce fiscal illusion. 
In Chapter 5, we used the BSAS-1995 to analyse tax perceptions and their 
impact on preferences for government spending. An important contribution of 
this chapter was measuring tax perceptions by comparing the responses with 
the 'actual' tax-costs. Evidence suggests some forms of fiscal illusion, in the 
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sense that tax-payers appeared to be inconsistent in their responses regarding 
tax perceptions, and this inconsistency occurred more frequently in VAT. 
However, VAT is overestimated rather than beino underestimated as argued in 
the fiscal illusion theory (see below). 
We also related those misperceptions to the tax and expenditure preferences, 
using microeconometric techniques, to test whether they have any distortionary 
impact on the voter-taxpayers attitudes. Evidence showed that the tax 
preferences were essentially influenced by self interest, and the majority of 
respondents preferred a more progressive tax to other options. A negative 
relationship found between the perceived tax burdens and spending 
preferences, while the impact of tax perceptions is ambiguous. IT-perceptions 
did not have a significant influence on the demand for public spending, and a 
positive relationship found between VAT-perceptions and public spending. 
These results suggest that even though VAT-cost is overestimated bN7 the 
majority of respondents, they still demand a higher public spending, and they 
expect the extra spending to be financed by other taxes (and probably by other 
tax-payers). 
6.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The three analysis summarised above have tested different types of fiscal 
illusions. The time-series analysis tests for the invisibility and elasticity 
hypotheses, and deficit illusion. There is strong evidence for invisibility of 
indirect taxes, in the sense that higher percentages of indirect taxes were 
associated with higher level of government expenditures: The governments' 
reliance on 'invisible' taxes provide an indirect evidence for the tolerance of 
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tax-payers to those particular taxes, since a public policy cannot be sustained 
against voters' preferences for long. It is also true that the share of indirect 
taxes has not been increasing over our period of investigation. and though we 
were unable to test explicitly, the marginal expenditure impact of raising 
6 invisible' taxes could be expected to fall further as the share of these taxes 
approaches its limit of unity. 
Empirical results also support the argument that deficit finance is not quite 
visible to voters. However, a closer examination show that budget deficits are 
quite volatile over time, and the positive effect might be a utilisation of budget 
deficits in response to a shock which increases expenditure or reduces revenue. 
As the budget deficits have to be eventually compensated, we are wary to 
interpret the positive effect of budget deficits as a support for fiscal illusion. 
However, we do not deny it's extensive use by governments, particularly in 
response to short-term necessities. 
The other type of fiscal illusion that we have attempted to test is the elasticity 
hypothesis. The empirical examinations of this hypothesis showed that the 
negative effect of the visible nature of income tax outweighs it's positive effect 
of the elastic nature. Despite that the personal income tax is generally assumed 
to be elastic, the empirical test (probably because of the limitation of the 
measure used in the regressions) did not support the elasticity hypothesis. The 
evidence rather support the argument that direct taxes are more visible to tax- 
payers, and may have a reductive effect on the demand for government 
expenditures. However, the evidence is weak. 
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We have been able to test the visibility hypothesis more directly týy using 
survey data. The micro-data analysis supported some type of fiscal illusion, in 
the sense that tax-cost were misperceived, however, the nature of 
misperceptions were inconsistent with the public choice arguments that indirect 
taxes would be expected to be underestimated. This conflict may be explained 
by various reasons. Firstly, it may be argued that the fiscal illusion measures 
used in the time-series analysis were crude in nature. and testing fiscal illusion 
directly is best achieved by using survey evidence. In the former analysis, we 
have used some proxies to capture fiscal illusions. and this method did not 
allow us to test tax misperceptions directly. In the latter analysis. \vc have been 
able to compare the respondents' perceptions with their actual situations. On 
the other hand, the limitations of surveys cannot be denied either. Despite that 
the BSA surveys provide valuable sources of citizens' preferences and 
perceptions, the type of the questions asked in those surveys have considerable 
shortcomings (which we further discuss below). 
Secondly, the BSA survey may not necessarily be representative for the whole 
period examined in the time-series analysis. There are reasons that voters' 
perceptions might have temporarily changed. One is the governments' heavy 
reliance on indirect taxes over the 1981 to 1995 period, and the other is the 
important changes concerning VAT prior to the BSAS-1995. In 1991 the VAT 
rate was raised from 15% to 17.5%; in 1993 a decision was taken to impose 
VAT on domestic fuel and energy which was previously zero-rated, and the 
proposal was to impose an initial rate of 8% and one year 
later move to the full 
rate of 17.5%. Considerable publicity and political 
debate followed this 
inst VA proposal might have induced citizens 1) reactions agai T. 
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The combination of evidence from those different approaches seems to support 
the argument that there is a limit on the governments' ability to utilise fiscal 
illusion. We could argue that voters' perceptions may change over time under 
various policy instruments (e. g. increasing tax rates or imposing new taxes). 
Recent policies have apparently changed voters' perceptions, and reduced their 
tolerance to indirect taxes. It may also be argued that voters would be more 
reactive to current policies, and this intolerance may also diminish over time. 
Our evidence suggests that the sustainability of an aggregate level of tax 
revenues and expenditures depends on the nature of public policies, aiid voters' 
perceptions regarding those policies. 
The cross-section analysis of local public spending provides quite strong 
support for the 'flypaper effect': Central grants, by obscuring perceptions of 
full costs of locally provided services, may lead local tax-payers to 
underestimate true tax-prices and therefore to increase demands for local 
spending. We have not be able to test this type of fiscal illusion by survey data, 
because the part of the BSAS-1995 concerning local tax and spending was not 
available at the time this thesis was completed. However, our findings 
regarding the flypaper effect are in line with Preston and Ridge (1995) who use 
the BSAS-1990 to analyse local public spending, though we apply different 
approaches. 
Other types of fiscal illusions under the local government finance have not 
found support, and it seems that the introduction of poll tax to increase 
accountability did not work under the current grant system. One reason is that 
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the grant-induced fiscal illusion is quite strong. and am, changes M the local tax 
regime without any reform of central grant regime does not seem to be 
effective. The other reason is the Standard Spending Assessment (SSA) which 
restricts local governments to increase spending beyond a limit. The ctirrent 
government's plan to give more flexibility to local governments ovel* the local 
spending might induce higher local accountability. provided that they pay for 
the 'excess' amount (of spending beyond SSA) by local taxes. 
6.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has concentrated on fiscal illusion and public speiidiiig in the UK 
using a variety of tools of analysis. Howevei-, some interestin(, research topics 
have remained outside the scope of this work. One is the micro-data analysis of 
fiscal illusion at the local level. This would allow a useful comparison of 
aggregated and survey data when the survey results become available. We have 
limited our analysis to examining the effect of fiscal illusion across localities 
for two cross-sections (1991/92 and 1993/94). The issue of accountability 
under various local tax regimes could further be analysed using panel data for 
local governments to the extent that data availability permits. 
Although the BSA survey conducted in 1995 have provided quite useful 
information of voters' tax preferences and perceptions, we also observe 
considerable limitations of the questions asked in the survey. One is that the 
questions regarding the respondents' perceptions of the best and worst tax (for 
their households) were incomplete. It would be useful to know the second 
choice or a fuller ranking of respondents , perceptions, so that their relative 
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perceptions of various tax categories could be identified (A second choice was 
asked for in the question regarding their prelý, rcnces). 
A second limitation is that the questions contained the options of *a basic rate' 
and 'a flat rate' income tax were liable to be confused by respondents. It \vould 
be useful to Imow the respondents' view on these options, because the 
consequences of an increase in those rates would be different for each 
respondent. Other questions regarding the respondents' tax-paying status could 
be included. The options for the questions regarding tax-costs were also 
limited, and similar options were offered both for income tax and VAT. 
However, those two taxes may not be (in fact they are not) identical for all 
respondents. These limitations constrained our analysis. Future stii, veys 
devoted to 'attitudes to taxation and public spending' could be improved by 
asking more accurate questions to extract data which is better comparable to 
the respondents' actual status. 
In conclusion, the time-series analysis of general government expenditure and 
the cross-section analysis of local public spending produced interesting 
evidence of fiscal illusion. It also appeared, however, that the use of this 
evidence, pei- se, may be misleading in drawing future prospects for tax and 
expenditure policies. Micro-data analysis of fiscal perceptions is a potentially 
important means of determining policy instruments. 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
The Derivation of Eguation (3.3 
Gi 
=- a Yi`PgP 
,i == 1,2, ..., N (3 Al. 1) 
where Gi = GIAP'. Replacing Gi, 
G=a YiII Pgj-P IV" (')AI. 2) 
Multiplying both sides by Pgi, 
E=a Yi" Pgi-P" IV' (3AI. 3) 
where E is the demand for government expenditures in nominal terms 
. 
and Pgi 
is defined as Tj C Y'. 
E=a Yi' (TI C API)P+l (-')AI. 4) 
E=a Yi" T, (13+1) C(P+') API(VO (-' )A1.5) 
Introducing the aggregated income into 33AL 5, 
E=a (YiN)(x TiM") C(ý" YI(P") IV' N-O' (3AI. 6) 
where Tj =YN. Substituting Tj in 3AI. 6, 
E=a Y'ý' N-(O+ 1) C (0+1) N "(0+1) IV' N -c' (3AI. 7) 
Rearranging 3AI. 7, 
E=arC (ý+') N (3AI. 8) 
Deviding E by C, 
G=a Yl CN (3A1.9) 
This is criticised for being inconsistent with the underlying demand-theoretic 
formulation, and it is argued that an appropriate application of demand theory 
would require an appropriate explanatory price variable. which is the relative 
price ratio P, (= CIPýJ. Inserting P, into 3AL9. 
G=a Y1 Pr ýN 
This is the model appeared in Chapter 3 as (3.3 )). 
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APPENDIX 3.2 
Time-series Analysis 
The standard ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation assumes a stationary data 
generating process. However, if the stationarity of data is not held, the standard 
diagnostic tests may fall, and the results may not be interpreted confidently. As 
Granger and Newbold (1974) argued, the dependent variable and one or more 
of the independent variables are non-stationary, then the results may be 
spurious, and the standard tests may not be reliable. Since the mid- I 980s, time- 
series analysis has required testing the order of integration of variables. 
Stationarity of'the Variables 
A time series is stationary, briefly, if its mean, variance and autocovariances 
are independent of time. If these properties are changing over time, it is said 
that the time series has a unit root. In other words, a "shock"' or "Innovation" 
has a sustained effect in the unit root case and an effect that diminishes with 
time in the stationary case (see Holden and Perman, 1994: 53). 
Let a first order autoregressive process [AR(l)] start at t=O: 
r Yt-I + u,, t=], 2 t (3 A2.1) 
If r<l, Y, is a stationary series, otherwise Y, is said to have a unit root, meaning 
that it is a non-stationary series. Dickey and Fuller (1979) show that in a 
process such as (3.1), the standard critical values may be misleading for unit 
root tests 1, and propose Dickey-Fuller (DF) critical values. In practice, 
subtracting Yj from both sides of (3A2.1), and adding constant, time trend and 
lagged dependent variables to the right, the following specification is estimated 
to determine stationarity: 
I This is because of the standard assumption of normality collapses when the series has a un't 
root. 
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where T is a time trend, and n is the number of lags for the dependent variable. 
Using ADF 2 critical values, if rl=O, then Y, is said to have a unit root (non- 
stationary). The alternative hypothesis is r1<0, meaning that the series is 
stationary. This is a one sided test, as the sign is expected to be negative and 
significantly different from zero. The number of lags (n) is determined by 
including sufficient lagged values of dependent variable to obtain white noise 
residuals'. The time trend is included to control for trend stationary variables. 
Sometimes a variable may be stationary around a time trend although non- 
stationary by itself. 
If the series in question are stationary, they can be used in any standard 
econometric estimation. However, if they are non-stationary. any empirical 
analysis with those series may suffer from the problem of spurious regressions. 
A solution is to formulate the regressions in sufficiently differenced series to 
4 
obtain stationary series 
. 
Although using first differences tends to induce a 
stationary process, the long-run relationships between the variables, if any 
exist, may not be identified appropriately; cointegration techniques have been 
introduced to test for a long-run relationship under these circumstances. 
The two well-Imown methods of cointegration are Engle and Granger (1987) 
and Johansen (1988). In general, a vector of variables is said to be cointegrated 
if at least one linear combination of the variables is stationary. If so, an error 
2 The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) critical values are used wheii the number of lagged t) _ :1 dependent variable is increased in the regression. 
3 The number of n is increased up to the point that the null hypothesis of "no autocorrelation" 
is accepted for the residuals froin tile regression. An LM test is generally used to test this. Z__ It) 4 The first differences of an 1( 1) series, for instance, is likely to be stational-\'. Th is is held to be 
true for the majority of econornic variables. 
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correction mechanism (ECM) may be used to identify the sliort-run dynamics. 
Engle and Granger (1987) show that all the variables have to be integrated to 
the same order to test for cointegration. In addition, N,, ariables which are already 
1(0) may be included in the ECM. The economic interpretation of this may be 
that there is no long-run relationship between those variables integrated to 
different orders. However, a short-run relation may be identified in the ECM. 
The approaches by Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988) use 
different econometric techniques. Specifically. the former uses a single 
equation,, assuming that there is only one endogenous variable, and all other 
variables are exogenous. The latter assumes that all the variables are 
endogenous and uses a system of equations. The two methods will be explained 
briefly below. 
The Engle-Granger (E-G) Approach 
Let Y, be a vector of variables with dimension (n x 1), comprising series each of 
which may be transformed into stationary processes. The vector of variables is 
said to be cointegrated if there exists at least one n-element vector eci such that 
a linear combination of those variables is stationary, i. e. 
Y 
=U A 2.3) 
where uj is called a cointegrating vector. Any element of ai may be taken and 
equated to one, i. e. it may be normalised so that the chosen element is 1, and 
the outcome will look like a regression model. Let the first element be 1, 
yt = ylt +a K2t + (Y., Y/(, ut 
is a cointegrating regression. This may be rearranged as 
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meaning that Yj is the dependent variable in a single equation, where 11, are the 
residuals. This regression may be tested for cointegration using the residuals. 
To do that, the residuals will be tested for stationarity, using the same method 
explained above. The null hypothesis is that ut has a unit root, implying no 
cointegration. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then u, is said to be stationary. 
implying cointegration. The critical values are not the same as those applied to 
the raw series in unit root tests as they depend on the number of Integrated 
regressors in the cointegrating regressiod'. Engle and Granger (1987) present 
some summary tabulations of this statistic for the bivariate case although more 
extensive tables appear in Engle and Yoo (1987). 
The cointegration technique is associated with the long run or equilibrium 
properties posited by economic theory. Engle and Granger (1987) have also 
proved that if two or more series are I(I) and cointegrated then there exists an 
error correction mechanism (ECM) of the model that represents the dynamic 
process by which variables move toward equilibrium. From (3.4), the following 
ECM model can be identified: 
AYI, = ao+lali AYI,, 
-i+lai 
AY?,, 
-i 
+".. +X/. / k, lI+PutIIt (' ) A2.5) 
where i is the number of lags, and P is the speed of adjustment coefficient. If 
the variables are cointegrated, P and/or some of the as should be significantly 
different from zero. 
5 The problem is that the u is generated from a regression equation (OLS) which gives tile t t) 
coefficients that minimize the surn of squared residuals. Since the residual variance is made as 
small as possible, the procedure is prejudiced toward finding a stationary error process. Thus, 
the test for stationarity of estimated ut must reflect this fact (Enders, 1995- 375). 
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The differenced terms in the ECM describe the short run dynamic relationship 
given here by Oýki, whereas the long run information is picked up by the error 
term itp P quantifies the extent to which the series in the cointegrating 
regression diverge from their long run equilibrium. The negative sign of 
signifies that equilibrium in the previous period will be corrected for in the 
following period as the process adjusts back to equilibrium. 
The Johansen Approach 
The Johansen approach allows one to estimate all possible cointegrating 
vectors between the set of variables. Let a VAR model be: 
Yt ==A, Yt-I +... + Ak Yt-k + "t (3A2.6) 
where Y, Yt- 1, 
--- 
Yt-k are vectors of current and lagged values of n variables 
which are l(l) in the model; A,,., Ak are matrices of coefficients with (n x n) 
dimensions; and u, is a vector of random errors. The number of lagged values, 
in practice, is determined in such a way that the error terms are not 
significantly autocorrelated. Adding Y, 
-,, 
YI-k and A1 YI-2, Ak-I Yt-k to both 
sides and rearrange terms, the VAR model becomes: 
AYt = F, AYt -1 y (3A2.7) 
-, 
++ F'k-1 lýýyl-k+I +I t-k + Ul 
where Fj:: -- and rl = -(I-A, -... -Ad. I is identity 
matrix. The rank of the matrix of coefficients, FI, gives the number of long-run 
relationships between the variables of the system. Three possible cases are 
stated by Johansen and Juselius (1990): 
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If the rank equals 17 [r(F1)=n], meaning that FI has full rank, then am, linear 
combination of the I(l) series is stationary. If the rank equals zero [/-(Fl)=0. i. e. 
H is a null matrix], then there is no cointegrating relationship. Hence. a long- 
run relationship is unlikely, although a short-run relationship may be identified 
by the first differences. If the rank is between zero and n [O<r(F1)<17], then 
there are matrices cc and P with (n x r) dimension, so that it is possible to 
represent is the cointegrating matrix which has the property to 
transform P'Y, into a stationary process even though is not stationary by 
itself. cc measures the speed of the adjustment when there are disturbances in 
the equilibrium relationship. 
The rank of 1-1 
, 
that is the number of cointegrating relationships r, is 
determined by testing whether its eigenvalues (k) are statistically different 
from zero. Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) propose using, the 
eigenvalues of H, ordered from the largest to the smallest. to compute the 
maximal 
-eigenvalue and trace statistics. The maximal-eigenvalue statistic 
is computed by the following formula: 
kn? 
ax = -T In (1-k,, d, r=O, 1,2,..., n-2, n-J. 
where T is sample size. This statistic tests that there are r cointegrating vectors 
against the alternative that r+I exist. The null and alternative hypotheses are: 
HO: r=O HI: r=1 
HO: r< IH1: r=2 
HO: r<2 H I: r=3 
The trace statistic is computed by the following formula: 
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and the hypotheses are: 
Ho: r=O HI: r>l 
HO: rý I H]: r>2 
Ho: ný2 H 1: r>)' 
IýI 
The usual procedure is to begin by testing the null hypothesis that there are no 
cointegrating vectors. If it can be rejected, the alternative hypotheses (i. e. r:!! ýI. 
r::! ý2,... ) are to be tested sequentially. On the other hand, if r=0 cannot be 
rejected in the first place, then there is no cointegrating relationship between 
the variables,, and the procedure stops. 
Asymptotic critical values are provided in Osterwald-Lenum (1992). The 
maximal-eigenvalue statistic is a test of the significance of the largest k, where 
the trace statistic tests the null against the unrestricted alternatlN, C. These two 
statistics do not always produce the same results. Another problem is the small 
samples. Reimers (1992) suggests that in the case of small samples, the 
Johansen procedure over-rejects when the null is true. Thus, the number of 
parameters to be estimated in the model are also taken into account, and an 
adjustment is made for degrees of freedom by replacing T by T-nk, where n is 
the number of variables in the model and k is the number of lags in the model. 
However, this correction is not a clear cut solution. It is also suggested that the 
trace test shows more robustness to both skewness and excess kurtosis in the 
residuals than the maximal eigenvalue test. 
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The questions selected from British Social Attitudes Stirvey-1995 are 
-, 
i\en 
below (the answers none, don't know, or rýftisall. ýA are ignored): 
Taste Variables: Paper readers (Does the respondent normally read any daily 
morning newspaper: yes=I, no =O), Sex (male=l. female=O). Marital Status 
(married=l, others=O), Age (stated by the respondents). Occupation (stated by 
the respondents: in paid work for at least ten hours in week. unemployed, 
wholly retired, etc. ), Children aged 5-15 (is derived from the members of the 
family and their age: it takes the value of I if there is at least one child aged 5- 
15 in the household, 0 otherwise). 
Q35. If there were a general election tomorrow, which political party do you 
think you would be most likely to support? 
1. Conservative 
2. Labour 
3. Others 
10 15. Which of the letters on this card represents the total income of your 
household from all sources before tax? 
Weekly Income Before Tax Annual Income Before Tax 
Less than L77 Less than f 3,999 
f 78-f 115 f 4,000-f 5,999 
fI 16-f 154 E6,000-f 7,999 
fI 55-f 192 f 8,000-f 9,999 
"0 E193421 fI0,000-f 11,999 
f 23 1 
-f 2 89 f 12,000-f 1 
-33,999 
f290-f346 f 15,000-f 17,999 
047-085 f 18,000-f 19.999 
0864442 f 20,000-f 22,999 
f 44.3- f500 f23,000425,999 
f5014558 E26,000-f28,999 
f5594615 f29,000-011,999 
f 616-f 673' f 32,000-f 3)4,999 
0 f674473 L' ) 5,000-f 7,999 
0314788 08,000440,999 
E789 or more f41,000 or more 
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Q65. Suppose the government had to choose between the three options on this 
card. Which do you think it should choose? 
I. Reduce taxes and spend less on health. education and social benefits, 
2. Keep taxes and spending on these services at the same level as kilow. 
3. lncrease taxes and spend more on health, education and social 
benefits. 
Q575-Q577. Generally, how would you describe levels of taxation'? (for those 
with high incomes, middle incomes, and low incomes). 
I. Much too low 
2. Too low 
3. About right 
4. Too high 
5. Much too high 
Q578. Among which group would you place yourself 
Lhigh income 
2. middle income 
3.1ow income 
Q589. About how much do you think that an extra one penny in the pound on 
the basic rate of income tax would cost your household? 
1. Nothing 
2. <f I per week 
- 
<f 50 per year 
3. f1 
-2 per week - E5 0-100 per year 
4. f 2-3 per week 
-fI 00-f 150 per year 
5. >0 per week 
- 
>f 150 per year 
Q590. About how much do you think that a one percentage point increase in 
the rate of VAT (that is from 17.5 percent to 18.5 percent) would cost your 
household? 
1. Nothing 
2. <fl per week 
- 
<F-50 per year 
3. f1 
-2 per week - F-5 0-100 per year 
4. f-2-3 per week 
-fI 00-E 15 0 per year 
5. >0 per week 
- 
>f 15 0 per year 
-Appendices 154 
626. If these were the only options for the government, which one do you think 
that it should choose? (Q629. And which one do you think should be the 
government's second choice? ) 
1. Put up income tax for all taxpayers, by Ip in the pound to 26p, 
2. Put income tax up only for higher taxpayers, but by 5p in the pound, 
to 45p, 
3. Raise VAT by one percent to 18.5 percent on all taxable goods and 
services. 
Q632. Which one these three would leave you and your farnilý, best off. ' 
1. A penny in the pound for all taxpayers 
2. Five pence in the pound for higher taxpayers 
3. Raise VAT by one percent 
Q635. Which one these three would leave you and your family worst off? 
1. A penny in the pound for all taxpayers 
2. Five pence in the pound for higher taxpayers 
3. Raise VAT by one percent 
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The relevant information is taken from the British Tax Systein for the 1994-9ý 
fiscal year. The structure of the income tax liabilities and allowances are as 
follows: 
Income tax bands: 
1-33,000 (lower rate band) 20% 
3,001-23,700 (basic rate band) 25% 
23,700+ (higher rate band) 40% 
Allowances: 
Personal allowance 33,445 
Married couple's allowance 1 ý720 
Age allowance: 
Personal (aged 65-74) 4,200 
Personal (aged 75+) 4,370 
Married couple's (aged 65-74) 2,665 
Married couple's (aged 75+) 2ý705 
Income limit for age-related allowances 14,200 
Taxable Income for Various Groups 
Personal No Income 
Characteristics Tax 20% 25% 40% 
Single 0 
--3,445 3,445 -6,445 
Married 0-5,165 5ý165 
-8,165 
Single (65-74) 0- 4,200 4ý200 
-7,200 
Married (65-74) 0- 61865 61865 
-9ý865 
Single (75+) 0- 4,370 4ý370 
-7,370 
Married (75+) 0- 7ý075 71075-1 01)075 
6,445 
-27,145 271,145+ 
8,165 
-28,865 281865+ 
7,200 
-27.900 27!, 900+ 
9ý865 
-30.565 30,565+ 
7,370 
-28,070 28,070+ 
10,075 
-30.775 30,775+ 
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Table 5A. 1 The extra costs from an extra one penny in the pound on the basic 
rate of income tax for a single p erson (aged under 65) 
Income Groups IT(l) Income Tax IT(2) Income Tax F--xti-a cost (Basic Rate=25%) (Basic Rate=26%) IT(2)-IT(l) Coding 
. 
)999 H] 111 0 
5000 311 311 0 
7000 739 744 5 
9000 1239 1264 
11000 17339 1784 45 
13500 2 36 4 2434 70 
16500 3114 33214 100 3 
19000 33739 33864 125 4 
21500 4364 4514 150 4 
24500 5114 5294 180 5 
27500 5917 6124 207 5 
30500 7117 7324 207 5 
33500 8317 8524 207 5 
36500 9517 9724 207 5 
39500 10717 10924 207 5 
41000+ 11317 11524 207 5 
The average of each income band is used in computations, except the first band. The inc ome level 
for the first band is the upper boundary of the group, however, this does not make a ny d ifference as It 
is in the lower rate band. 
Table 5A. 2 Coding of extra cost for various groups of taxpayers 
Single Married Single Married 
Income Single Married (aged 65-74) (aged 65-74) (aged 75+) (aged 75+) 
-3999 11 11 1 1 
5000 11 11 1 1 
7000 21 11 1 1 
9000 22 21 2 1 
11000 22 22 2 2 
13500 32 3 3 2 
16500 3 3 3 
19000 44 44 4 4 
21500 44 44 4 4 
24500 55 55 5 5 
27500 55 55 5 5 
30500 55 55 5 5 
33500 55 55 5 5 
36500 55 55 5 5 
39500 55 55 5 5 
41000+ 55 55 5 5 
The extra cost for hi-h incorne groups does not change a lot, as the rate higher band assumed to rem Ln t: 1 t) 
the same while the basic rate increases one penny in pound. The i-na 
, 
jor difference between the various 
groups of people is that sorne taxpayers shift to a lower rank due to age or inarried couple's allowance! 
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Table 5A. 3 Income groups and expenditures subject to VAT (f) 
Income Income Expenditure I Expenditure 2 (FES) (BSAS-1995) (exc. domestic fuel and energy) (inc. dornestic fuel and energ 
FES BSAS-1995 FES BSAS-199' less than 4,00.3 3 less than 3,999 2,090 2,090 2.5 56 
4,004-6,08-33 4,000-5,999 2,922 2,922 3,468 3.4 
6,084-8,423 6,000-7,999 4,3.33 5 4,3) 
-3) 5 4.923' 4,9' 8,424-11,595 8,000-9,999 5,792 5,792 6,408 6,41 
- 
10,000-11,999 
- 
6,715 
- 
7, 
-33 11,596-15,131 12,000-13,999 7,638 7,638 8,33 033 8,31 
15,132-19,083 15,000-17,999 8,827 8,827 9,4833 9,4ý 
- 
18,000-19,999 
- 
9,859 
- 
10,5, 
19,084-23,659 20,000-22,999 10,891 10,891 11.598 11,51 
23,660-28,911 2-3 3,999-25,999 11,636 11,6.33 6 11371 12,3 )' 
- 
26,000-28,999 
- 
13,144 
- 
13,91 
28,912-37,855 29,000-31,999 14,652 14,652 15,446 15,4, 
- 
32,000-34,999 
- 
16,964 
- 
17,8 
- 
35,000-37,999 
- 
19,276 
- 
20,11 
37,856 or 38,999-40,999 21,588 21,588 22,551 22,5' 
more 
41,000 or 
- 
21,588 
- 
22,5' 
more 
FES: Family Expenditure Survey 
BSAS: British Social Attitudes survey 
Table 5A. 4 The extra cost from a one percentage point increase in the rate of 
VAT 
Income Expenditure 
Subject to VAT 
VAT(l) 
(17.5%) 
VAT(2) 
(18.5%) 
Extra Cost 
[VAT(2)-VAT(l)] Coding 
-3999 2090 366 387 21 2 
5000 2922 511 541 330 2 
7000 4335 759 802 433 2 
9000 5792 1014 1072 58 3 
11000 6715 1175 1242 67 3 
13500 7638 1337 1413 76 3 
16500 8827 1545 1633 88 3 
19000 9859 1725 1824 99 3 
21500 10891 1906 2015 109 4 
24500 11636 36 20) 2153 117 4 
27500 13144 2300 2432 132 4 
30500 14652 2564 2711 147 4 
33500 16964 2969 33138 169 5 
36500 19276 3373 3566 193, 5 
39500 21588 '3778 3994 216 5 
41000+ 21588 3778 3994 216 5 
The domestic fuel and energy is not included in expenditures. 
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Table A5.5 VAT and Income Tax Costs (f) 
Income One penny in the p ound for all tax payers VAT 1% Single (S) Married (M) S(65-741 M (65-74) S (75-) M (75 
-3999 26 6 0 0 0 0 
5000 35 16 0 8 0 6 
7000 49 33 6 18 28 1 -16 
9000 64 56 3' 8 48 21 46 
11000 74 76 58 68 41 66 
13500 83) 101 83' 91) 66 91 
16500 95 13 1 I1 11 12 33 96 12) 1 
19000 105 156 138 148 121 146 1 
21500 116 181 163 1733 146 171 1 
24500 124 211 19. ) 203 176 201 1 
27500 139 241 2233 233 206 231 2 
30500 154 271 253 2 63' 1 2 
-) 6 261 2 
'33500 178 301 283 -)g- 266 -)gl 
- 36500 202 3' 31 313 
-33 23 296 33 21 2 39500 226 33 61 3433 3 53 33 26 
.351 3. 41000+ 226 376 33 58 368 
-') 41 33 66 3 The domestic fuel and energy is included in expenditures 
Table A5.6 Tax Perceptions (Descriptive Statistics) 
Mean (t-stat. ) Median Skewness Kurtosis 
IT-Cost Perc. 0.08(1.22) 0.000 0.04 0. 
1 T-Cost Perc. (- 1 01/o) 0.08(1.22) 0.000 0.04 0. 
IT-Cost Perc. (+ 1 0'/o) 0.05 (0.68) 0.000 0.02 0. 
VAT-Cost Perc. 0.46(7.70) 0.000 
-0.12 -0. 
VAT-Cost Perc. (-lO%) 0.50 (8.35) 0.000 
-0.14 -0. 
VAT-Cost Perc. (+ 1 0'/o) 0.3 8 (6.06) 0.000 
-0.11 -0. 
The values in the parantheses are t-statistics for testing whether the mean is signiticantly ditterent trorr t) 
-- 
zero. The null hypothesis (HO: E(Zi)=O) is accepted for all IT cases, and rejected for all VAT cases (for 
the details of the t-test, see Appendix 5.3). 
Table A5.7 The stability of IT- and VAT-cost perceptions 
IT-Cost Perceptions VAT-Cost Perceptions 
R-C R-C (-10%) R-C (+10%) R-C R-C (-10%) R-C (+10' 
-4 5(0.6) 5(0.6) 6(0.7) 
-3 26(3.2) 26(3.2) 29 (3). 6) 13 (1.6) 1 3) (1.6) 18(2 
-2 64(7.9) 64(7.9) 67(8.2) 38(4.7) 33 3 (4.1 ) 41 (5 
131 (16.1) 131 (16.1) 127(15.6) 125(15.4) 125 (15.4) 136(16 
0 3 22 (3 ) 9.6) 
_3322 (339.6) 3' )1 (40.7) 247 (30.4) 248(30.5) 249(30 
1 155 (19.1) 155 (19.1) 145 (17.8) 216(26.6) 200(24.6) 208(25 
2 70(8.6) 70(8.6) 68(8.4) 125(15.4) 145 (17.8) 112(13 
3 1 (3.8) 31 (3.8) 31 (_3 ). 8) 49(6.0) 49(6.0) 49(6 
4 9(1.1) 9(1.1) 9(1.1) 
Total 813 (100) 813 (100) 813 (100) 81-) (100) 813) (100) 813 (1( 
R: The cocle cliosen oy responaems; t-,: i ne coue assigimu 11 Wil Ulk-, %ýUIIIVUtctuut. " 
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APPENDIX 5.3 
The Formulation of t-Test 
1 :, 
Let Xi and Yj be tax-payer i's IT and VAT misperceptions. respectively. where 
1*=: 1,2,..., 813. The following dummy variables are derived from PERCIT (IT 
perceptions) and PERC, 
'A T(VAT perceptions): 
Overestimation 
X 
== I if PERCIT>I, 
0 
otherwise 
Yj I if and PERC, AT>Iý 
0 
otherwise 
Then, Zi = Xi 
- 
Yj is computed, and the probabilities are taken as follows: 
E(Z) 
= 
E(X, ) 
- 
E(Y) 
and HO: E(Zj) =0 is tested by t-statistics as follows: 
tz where n= 813, Z= 1/813 JZj, and Sz 
Y(z 
i- 
Z)2 ]112 
812 Sz / 
-vrn- 
If the null hypothesis (HO) is accepted, then there is no significant difference 
between IT and VAT overestimation. On the other hand. if the null hypothesis 
is rejected, then the overestimation of IT and VAT are significantly different 
from each other. The same procedure was applied to the underestimation of 
those taxes (PERCIT <-I and PERCVAT< -')- 
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APPENDIX 5.4 
The Probabilistic-Choice Models: 
160 
The information about individuals demand for government-provided goods 
revealed through questionaire are qualitative, as mentioned before. referring 
only to whether the consumer would demand more, less. or the same levels of 
government expenditures (see Blundell, 1988). These type of dependent 
variables are defined by discrete values which are, in the simplest binary case, 
denoted by zero and unity. The dependent variable may take more than two 
values sometimes, such as ordered categorical variables. In microeconometric 
modelling, the probabilities of each outcome are examined by looking at 
possible explanatory factors which may effect the parameters of the distribution 
underlying these probabilities. Therefore, likelihood methods are used 
generally in microeconometric analyses. 
To explain some econometric issues, let a standard regression be as follows: 
X. ui 11 
where E(ui)=O. Yi is a binary dependent variable taking the value of I if a 
certain event occurs or a certain option is chosen by individual i (and the value 
of 0 otherwise), and Xi is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables relating 
to the ith individual in the sample. In other words, the probability that Yj will 
take the value of I given Xi is equal to P'Xi, and iti represents the unobservable 
taste variables for individual i. This error term may not be random, 
because it 
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can take only two values, ie. I- ý'Xj when ),, =] and 
-[i'X, \\Iien Yi =0. and 
hence the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of ý \vill not be efficient. ' 
The Probit Model 
Instead, the logit and probit models are used as microeconometric techniques to 
overcome this problem. Let the probability of an event be a ffinction of 
explanatory variables as follows: 
Pi 
= p(yi=]) =F (x'i P) 
where xi is a vector of exogenous variables relating to the ith individual in the 
sample. In these models, F is required to lie in the interval (0.1) and be 
increasing in (x'i P), natural choices for F will be cumulatiVe distribution 
functions,, F being the standard normal distribution function results in the 
probit model, and a logistic distribution function results in the logit model (see 
Blundell, 1996: 513). 
The Ordered Probit Model 
Some multinomial 
-choice variables, such as opinion surveys, are inherently 
ordered, and although the outcome is discrete, the multinomial probit or logit 
models would fail to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. If 
the responses, for example, are coded 0,1,2, '), 4,... ,a linear regression would 
treat the difference between 4 and 3 the same as that between 3 and 2, while in 
fact they are only rankings. The ordered probit and logit models have come into 
wide use as a solution for analysing such responses (see Greene, 199' ): 672-6). 
I For more information about the discrete regression models, see Maddala (198-33: 13-57). 
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In the same manner as the binomial probit model, let a standard regression be 
as follows: 
+ ZI 
where Yj is unobserved. What we do observe is 
< 0, i0 if 
yi *=1 ýf0 < yi: ýý t11 yi* 
=2 if ýt/ < yi:: ý ýt2, 
< yi 
where [is are unknown parameters to be estimated with P. The respondents 
have their own intensity of feelings, which depends on certain measurable 
factors,, X,, and certain unobservable factors,, it, In principle, they could 
respond to the questionnaire with their own Yj if asked to do so. Given only the 
available answers, they choose the cell that most closely represents their own 
feelings on the question. We assume that ui is normally distributed across 
observations. For the same reason as in the binomial probit model (which is the 
special case of. j = 1), we normalise the mean and variance of ui to zero and I 
(the model can also be estimated with a logistically distributed disturbance). 
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DATA ANNEX TABLE 2: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1991/92 FISCAL YEAR) 
Local Spending Mean Median Mean Tax County Per Capita(F-) Income(E) Income(E) Share 
Avon 592.2 10750 8910 0.00145 Bedfordshire 611.0 11910 9960 0.00269 Berkshire 569.4 13440 10310 0.00184 
Buckinghamshire 590.0 14620 11480 0.00217 Cambridgeshire 528.8 11370 9760 0.00214 Cheshire 562.1 11220 8660 0,00146 Cleveland 753.7 10560 9210 0.00254 
Cornwall 565.5 8910 7290 0.00284 
Cumbria 576.9 9730 7960 0.00272 
Derbyshire 549.4 10140 8440 0.00147 
Devon 534.5 9840 8060 0.00133 
Dorset 467.8 10380 8110 0.00199 
Durham 581.3 10140 8530 0.00230 
East Sussex 537.6 10910 8730 0.00190 
Essex 555.4 12090 9420 0.00088 
Gloucestershire 552.8 11140 9530 0.00255 
Hampshire 531.4 11670 9300 0.00088 
Hereford and Worcester 515.1 10760 8690 0.00197 
Hertfordshire 565.2 13290 10450 0.00141 
Humberside 630.1 10540 8500 0.00157 
isle of Wight 541.0 9090 7160 0.01053 
Kent 536.8 11560 9220 0.00089 
Lancashire 636.4 10000 8130 0,00100 
Leicestershire 616.5 10760 8740 0.00159 
Lincolnshire 544.9 10320 8440 0.00224 
Norfolk 528.4 10200 8620 0.00174 
Northamptonshire 558.7 10800 9000 0.00238 
Northumberland 592.8 10490 8770 0.00446 
North Yorkshire 500.7 10940 8140 0.00191 
Nottinghamshire 606.3 10100 8510 0.00137 
Oxfordshire 524.5 12140 9370 0.00251 
Shropshire 582.8 10510 9020 0.00332 
Somerset 556.5 10580 9190 0.00288 
Staffordshire 537.3 10740 8840 0.00131 
Suffolk 538.4 11130 8830 0.00215 
Surrey 535.3 14510 10640 0.00132 
Warwickshire 551.3 11450 9270 0,00276 
West Sussex 485.2 11370 8460 0.00187 
Wiltshire 526.8 11150 9810 0.00242 
Clwyd 663.1 9770 8150 0.00331 
Dyfed 669.2 8360 6580 0.00386 
Gwent 685.9 9830 7990 0.00315 
Gwynedd 709.1 9430 7140 0.00559 
Mid Glamorgan 736.1 9840 8690 0.00262 
Powys 754.1 9480 7360 0,01112 
South Glamorgan 678.8 10400 8240 0.00362 
West Glamorgan 713.9 10300 8620 0.00381 
Greater London 890.9 13260 10420 0.00021 
Greater Manchester 706.0 10120 8360 0.00056 
Merseyside 793.7 10590 8450 0.00098 
South Yorkshire 572.0 9760 8190 0.00109 
West Yorkshire 648.2 10120 8460 0.00069 
Tyne & Wear 682.2 9690 8190 0.00125 
West Midlands 762.7 9890 8520 0.00055 
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Population 
('000) 
953.0 
542.7 
761.3 
648.1 
677.9 
968.2 
553.4 
472.3 
490.0 
934.0 
1039.2 
670.0 
590.7 
728.4 
1558.4 
533.3 
1553.8 
683.7 
997.7 
863.5 
134.0 
1527.5 
1401.3 
897.6 
594.2 
755.5 
585.3 
306.0 
716.4 
1014.8 
586.9 
405.1 
470.1 
1046.7 
642.5 
1022.9 
492.3 
719.3 
568.5 
417.0 
357.0 
450.5 
242.0 
534.0 
116.3 
407.5 
362.1 
6751.8 
2581.4 
1430.1 
1295.8 
2069.0 
1125.3 
2592.7 
DATA ANNEX TABLE 2 (continued) 
Central Grants The ratio of The ratio of SchoolAge County Per Capita(F-) Non-taxpayers Renters Pop. (%) 
1 Avon 361.5 0.041 0.278 12.5 
2 Bedfordshire 431.7 0.048 0.260 14.6 
3 Berkshire 399.7 0.018 0.271 13.9 
4 Buckinghamshire 403.5 0.019 0.263 16.1 
5 Cambridgeshire 362.9 0.038 0.323 13.9 
6 Cheshire 348.8 0.059 0.269 13.9 
7 Cleveland 530.2 0.033 0.344 15.5 
8 Cornwall 391.3 0.014 0.257 12.6 
9 Cumbria 385.9 0.009 0.300 12.8 
10 Derbyshire 356.0 0.052 0.286 13.9 
11 Devon 358.9 0.024 0.275 12.7 
12 Dorset 308.2 0.001 0.243 12.9 
13 Durham 399.2 0.041 0.376 13.4 
14 East Sussex 359.3 0.020 0.269 11.9 
15 Essex 379.2 0.020 0.254 13.4 
16 Gloucestershire 353.3 0.032 0.264 13.4 
17 Hampshire 374.8 0.025 0.274 13.2 
18 Hereford and Worcester 341.5 0.014 0.276 13.8 
19 Hertfordshire 386.1 0.050 0.308 15.0 
20 Humberside 440.1 0.016 0.324 15.1 
21 Isle of Wight 383.6 0.003 0.210 12.4 
22 Kent 405.0 0.016 0.261 13.6 
23 Lancashire 441.9 0.033 0.235 13.7 
24 Leicestershire 425.2 0.039 0.275 14.2 
25 Lincolnshire 385.4 0.004 0.296 12.9 
26 Norfolk 350.6 0.003 0.314 12.7 
27 Northamptonshire 401.0 0.027 0.288 14.5 
28 Northumberland 387.6 0.032 0.378 13.7 
29 North Yorkshire 351.9 0.026 0.278 13.2 
30 Nottinghamshire 406.4 0,040 0.318 13.6 
31 Oxfordshire 331.9 0.040 0.313 12.2 
32 Shropshire 392.0 0.020 0.308 14.4 
33 Somerset 364.2 0.017 0.277 13.7 
34 Staffordshire 354.7 0.027 0.270 13.7 
35 Suffolk 355.2 0.038 0.310 13.8 
36 Surrey 336.7 0.027 0.226 13.5 
37 Warwickshire 333.5 0.026 0.257 13.1 
38 West Sussex 330.6 0.016 0.240 12.5 
39 Wiltshire 355.0 0.029 0.301 13.9 
40 Clwyd 556.8 0.026 0.290 13.5 
41 Dyfed 601.7 0.016 0.281 13.3 
42 Gwent 597.8 0.053 0.329 13.8 
43 Gwynedd 618.2 0.002 0.298 13.4 
44 Mid Glamorgan 652.8 0.054 0.265 15.0 
45 Powys 682.7 0.001 0.317 14.7 
46 South Glamorgan 590.7 0.066 0.288 14.0 
47 West Glamorgan 623.0 0.050 0.295 13.4 
48 Greater London 720.3 0.065 0.428 12.4 
49 Greater Manchester 516.5 0.053 0.358 13.9 
50 Merseyside 579.7 0.027 0.369 
15.3 
51 South Yorkshire 422.8 0.055 0.391 13.4 
52 West Yorkshire 483.7 0.050 0.338 
14.6 
53 Tyne & Wear 500.8 0.045 0.469 
13.5 
54 West Midlands 565.8 0.046 0.371 
14.3 
, urce: CIPFA, Census (1991), and Municipal Yearbooks. 
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DATA ANNEX TABLE 3: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1993/94 FISCAL YEAR) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Local Spending Mean Median Mean Tax Median Tax Population County Per Capita(F-) Income(E) Income(E) Share Share ('000) Avon 623.5 11160 9180 0.00145 0,00263 968.0 Bedfordshire 665.6 12150 10320 0.00269 0.00490 545.8 Berkshire 641.9 13840 11470 0.00184 0.00350 758.4 Buckinghamshire 675.3 15160 12130 0.00217 0.00411 649.3 Cambridgeshire 577.8 12160 9250 0.00214 0.00386 681.2 Cheshire 626.3 12040 9440 0.00146 0.00267 977.9 
Cleveland 776.0 10530 9020 0.00254 0,00462 548.9 
Cornwall 620.3 9620 7739 0.00284 0.00533 480.1 
Cumbria 652.6 10730 8340 0.00272 0.00508 495.0 
Derbyshire 612.5 10800 9330 0.00147 0.00267 944.0 
Devon 595.7 10660 8690 0.00133 0.00241 1048.0 
Dorset 557.0 11020 9060 0.00199 0.00371 671.3 
Durham 654.9 10360 9010 0.00230 0.00416 593.3 
East Sussex 606.0 11130 8880 0.00190 0.00333 728.2 
Essex 644.8 12530 9920 0.00088 0.00164 1564.0 
Gloucestershire 628.8 11800 9320 0.00255 0.00470 528.4 
Hampshire 572.7 12190 9820 0.00088 0.00165 1590.6 
Hereford and Worcester 573.9 11960 9220 0.00197 0.00375 688.2 
Hertfordshire 643.9 13560 10860 0.00141 0.00260 992.0 
Humberside 686.0 11030 9160 0.00157 0.00288 874.4 
Isle of Wight 641.6 9060 7310 0.01053 0.01919 128.5 
Kent 653.7 12100 9710 0.00089 0.00166 1547.0 
Lancashire 668.7 10300 8510 0.00100 0.00182 1410.7 
Leicestershire 642.6 10930 9320 0.00159 0.00296 900.7 
Lincolnshire 608.5 10280 8640 0.00224 0.00418 601.8 
Norfolk 577.3 10770 9040 0.00174 0.00326 770.1 
Northamptonshire 611.2 11750 9310 0.00238 0.00440 603.1 
Northumberland 645.4 11010 8590 0.00446 0.00806 308.3 
North Yorkshire 567.4 11500 9260 0.00191 0.00351 723.9 
Nottinghamshire 652.9 10360 8150 0.00137 0.00248 1015.5 
Oxfordshire 562.9 13300 10070 0.00251 0.00469 592.0 
Shropshire 615.1 11240 9070 0.00332 0.00631 417.0 
Somerset 589.5 10760 8950 0.00288 0.00536 477.6 
Staffordshire 593.2 10910 9180 0.00131 0.00252 1055.7 
Suffolk 678.2 11300 9130 0.00215 0.00388 565.1 
Surrey 572.3 15480 11470 0.00132 0.00249 1033.6 
Warwickshire 600.5 12040 9900 0.00276 0.00522 492.3 
West Sussex 577.7 12540 9850 0.00187 0.00342 720.4 
Wiltshire 587.8 12090 9800 0.00242 0.00448 580.6 
Clwyd 688.1 10400 8780 0,00331 0.00607 418.4 
Dyfed 730.9 10180 8210 0.00386 0.00668 355.6 
Gwent 677.7 10770 9420 0.00315 0.00555 450.5 
Gwynedd 708.6 10040 8400 0.00559 0.00917 243.9 
Mid Glamorgan 716.0 9920 8510 0.00262 0.00470 541.1 
Powys 790.2 10250 8850 0.01112 0.01949 119.1 
South Glamorgan 679.5 11730 9060 0.00362 0.00622 410.5 
West Glamorgan 702.1 10970 9120 0.00381 0.00680 369.3 
Greater London 975.5 14340 11140 0.00021 0.00036 6818.2 
Greater Manchester 840.1 10660 8950 0.00056 0.00099 2569.2 
Merseyside 920.6 10340 8290 0.00098 0.00181 1431.2 
South Yorkshire 761.5 10660 8980 0.00109 0.00194 1293.6 
West Yorkshire 807.6 10960 8780 0.00069 0.00123 2072.6 
Tyne & Wear 860.4 10270 9090 0.00125 0.00217 1120.2 
West Midlands 888.9 10670 9170 0.00055 0.00100 2603.0 
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DATA ANNEX TABLE 3 (continued) 
Central Grants The ratio of The ratio of The ratio of SchoolAge County Per Capita(f) Non-taxpayers 1 Non-taxpayers 2 Renters Pop. (%) 
1 Avon 421.4 0.041 0.882 0.278 13.3 
2 Bedfordshire 502.4 0.048 0.909 0.260 14.9 
3 Berkshire 446.7 0.018 0,935 0.271 13.3 
4 Buckinghamshire 470.7 0.019 0.930 0.263 14.7 
5 Cambridgeshire 422.9 0.038 0.876 0.323 14.2 
6 Cheshire 431.1 0.059 0.934 0.269 14.1 
7 Cleveland 593.7 0.033 0.880 0.344 15.9 
8 Cornwall 434.1 0.014 0.904 0.257 13.5 
9 Cumbria 461.0 0.009 0.889 0.300 12.8 
10 Derbyshire 429.1 0.052 0.904 0.286 13.6 
11 Devon 416.8 0.024 0.862 0.275 13.2 
12 Dorset 372.7 0.001 0.865 0.243 12.9 
13 Durham 486.1 0.041 0.880 0.376 13.9 
14 East Sussex 412.0 0.020 0.792 0.269 12.1 
15 Essex 449.4 0.020 0.908 0.254 13.6 
16 Gloucestershire 420.9 0.032 0.900 0.264 13.6 
17 Hampshire 415.2 0,025 0.927 0.274 13.8 
18 Hereford and Worce 394.1 0.014 0,928 0.276 14.1 
19 Hertfordshire 433.9 0.050 0.931 0.308 15.0 
20 Humberside 509.5 0.016 0.865 0.324 13.5 
21 isle of Wight 446.7 0.003 0.829 0.210 12.3 
22 Kent 471.3 0.016 0.896 0.261 14.1 
23 Lancashire 485.4 0.033 0.890 0.235 14.1 
24 Leicestershire 479.7 0.039 0.931 0.275 14.2 
25 Lincolnshire 453.3 0.004 0.875 0.296 13.2 
26 Norfolk 412.0 0.003 0.880 0.314 12.9 
27 Northamptonshire 466.6 0.027 0.900 0.288 14.6 
28 Northumberland 445.7 0.032 0.862 0.378 13.8 
29 North Yorkshire 391.4 0.026 0.886 0.278 13.2 
30 Nottinghamshire 476.3 0.040 0.883 0.318 13.4 
31 Oxfordshire 381.1 0.040 0.942 0,313 14.1 
32 Shropshire 436.2 0.020 0.936 0.308 13.9 
33 Somerset 406.8 0.017 0.893 0.277 13.8 
34 Staffordshire 436.0 0.027 0.979 0.270 13.7 
35 Suffolk 488.8 0.038 0.876 0.310 13.8 
36 Surrey 342.8 0.027 0.945 0.226 13.0 
37 Warwickshire 395.7 0.026 0,940 0.257 12.4 
38 West Sussex 379.1 0.016 0.856 0.240 13.0 
39 Wiltshire 405.8 0.029 0.910 0.301 13.9 
40 Clwyd 565.2 0.026 0.880 0.290 13.8 
41 Dyfed 606.6 0.016 0.761 0.281 13.6 
42 Gwent 581.6 0.053 0.856 0.329 14.2 
43 Gwynedd 587.5 0.002 0.646 0.298 12.7 
44 Mid Glamorgan 633.3 0.054 0.889 0.265 15.0 
45 Powys 674.2 0.001 0.754 0.317 14.7 
46 South Glamorgan 580.3 0.066 0.830 0.288 14.5 
47 West Glamorgan 590.3 0.050 0.875 0.295 14.0 
48 Greater London 766.0 0.065 0.873 0.428 12.4 
49 Greater Manchester 656.2 0.053 0.867 0,358 
14.4 
50 Merseyside 737.8 0.027 0.900 0.369 
14.8 
51 South Yorkshire 591.5 0.055 0.885 0.391 
13.7 
52 West Yorkshire 640.0 0.050 0.863 
0.338 14.5 
53 Tyne & Wear 672.1 0.045 0.816 
0.469 13.4 
54 West Midlands 718.6 0.046 0.922 
0.371 14.2 
)urce-. CIPFA, Census (1991), and Municipal Yearbooks. 
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